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Foreword 
This Friends of Europe background report has a dual function; it is intended 
as a stimulus to widen the debate about the European Union's social policy 
options once a new Commission and Parliament are in place, and it is also a 
basis for discussion by the 30 or so senior experts who make up the Friends of 
Europe High-Level Group* on the topic. This High-Level Group of authoritative 
and representative voices is comprised of social partners, independent experts 
and high profile political actors.
The report is authored by Frank Vandenbroucke, who chairs the High-Level 
Group. It is published as his personal view of the social challenges that confront 
the EU, and their possible solutions. His assessment of the "Ten Tough Nuts to 
Crack" makes disturbing reading, and is an important contribution to the social 
policy debate.
Frank Vandenbroucke needs no introduction in EU circles, having served as 
Belgium's Minister for Employment, Pensions and Social Affairs and as Deputy 
Prime Minister. No longer engaged in active politics, Frank's activities include a 
professorship at the Universities of Leuven, Antwerp and Amsterdam. The report’s 
co-author, Bart Vanhercke, is Director of the European Social Observatory (OSE) 
and affiliated at the University of Leuven.
Friends of Europe's High-Level Group aims to place the social dimension of EU 
policymaking in a wider context by bringing together senior experts from a wide 
range of professional backgrounds and political affiliations. This report hopes to 
fuel their deliberations, but is not intended as a blueprint for their conclusions.
It is intended that the High-Level Group should deliver a set of policy 
recommendations in its own report this autumn, in time to help define the EU 
social policy agenda for the coming five years and beyond.
Giles Merritt
Secretary-General                  
Friends of Europe                  
(*) The full list of the High-Level Group's members is available at pag. 105
Geert Cami
Co-Founder & Director
Friends of Europe
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The European Union and its Member States are failing to deliver on the fundamental 
goals of the European project: the simultaneous pursuit of economic progress 
and social progress - both within countries through the progressive development 
of welfare states, and between countries through upward convergence across 
the Union. 
In reality, average real household incomes per head EU28 were lower in 2012 
than they had been in 2004, with divergence between countries in the Eurozone 
instead of convergence. Although a recovery is now announced, the legacy of 
the crisis in social and budgetary terms, the risk of persistent low economic 
growth for several years, and the challenge of demographic ageing, makes the 
pursuit of economic progress and social cohesion even more challenging. 
With the EU being held largely responsible by public opinion for the current state 
of affairs, there is rising euroscepticism in many Member States, and decreasing 
interest in European elections. Hence there is an urgent need to review the scope 
and purpose of the Union’s social objectives, and the way they can be pursued 
and achieved. 
That is why Friends of Europe – an independent think-tank for EU policy analysis 
and debate – has launched a high-level Group on a ‘European Social Union’ aimed 
at bringing these concerns to the top of the political agenda. A final report will be 
produced by the autumn of 2014, which will include a set of recommendations 
for the incoming European Commission and European Parliament. 
That report will focus primarily on the EU’s employment and social policies, and 
will not dwell on other concerns such as macro-economic policy and financial 
markets, banking supervision, furthering internal market integration, external 
trade policy, taxation and environmental issues etc. – important as it will be to 
maintain compatibility with them. Moreover, the aim is to provide a roadmap 
rather than a detailed agenda on specific social policies. 
This background report focuses particularly on the Eurozone problematic since 
constitute a crucial challenge for the social significance of the European project, 
but the report by the Group should provide a balanced message for citizens in the 
(*) The full list of the High-Level Group's members is available at pag. 105
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Eurozone and those living in other Member States since all European countries 
face major challenges in terms of the future of their welfare states, whether they 
belong to the Eurozone or not.   
I. Five years of economic crisis: An unsettling legacy
A recovery of the European economy is announced, but the jury is still out 
regarding its robustness and scope. The major social setbacks of recent years 
need to be tackled. A series of challenges are identified, as addressed below.
Labour markets, welfare and social investment
Employment rates in the EU were lower in 2012 than 8 years earlier, including in 
EU15 as a whole when we exclude Germany, with the employment gap between 
southern EU15 countries and others growing larger. 
GDP per head was only marginally higher in 2012 than in 2004. In EU15 excluding 
Germany it was no higher than 8 years earlier; in the southern EU15  Member 
States, and in 7 of the 13 new Member States it was lower.
Changes in household income per head show a different pattern from GDP per 
head. There was a significant fall in real household income per head in 2008-
2010 (in line with the fall in GDP per head) but with an even bigger decline in the 
subsequent two years, reflecting the decline in average earnings along with the 
rise in unemployment.  
Data on material deprivation, as measured by financial stress and lack of access 
to basic goods and services, adds to the disquiet on living standards.  While the 
proportion of the population affected declined markedly from 2005-2008, it rose 
from under 13% in 2008 to over 15.5% in 2012. 
Young people have been particularly hard hit by the recession, with the youth 
unemployment rate increasing to around 23% in the EU in 2012, and over double 
that rate in Greece and Spain. While these figures may, in some cases, overstate 
the problem, the number of young people not in employment, education or 
training - the so-called NEETs – is also very high in a number of countries.  
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Huge disparities in rates of child poverty across the Eurozone and non-
convergence and even divergence during the crisis years, signal excessive social 
imbalances in the Eurozone, partly due to divergences in economic growth. 
In the years before the recession, there was already a gradual divergence in 
GDP per head between EU15 countries who were member of the Eurozone. 
As the Eurozone countries entered recession, these disparities first narrowed. 
From 2009 to 2012, however, countries with the highest levels of GDP per head 
recovered more quickly and disparities widened again. 
Public spending increased significantly relative to GDP over the period of 
economic downturn, but as a consequence of the fall in GDP rather than 
acceleration in government expenditure. Growth in public spending was only 
slightly higher over the years 2008-2010 than in the preceding four years, and 
less in both the EU15 excluding Germany and in the EU13. 
In a recession, welfare states should act as automatic stabilisers in support of 
aggregate demand and to address financial poverty. In the first stage of the 
crisis, this was the case, albeit to a varying extent between countries. From 2010 
onwards, however, the automatic stabilisers became increasingly constrained, 
notably in countries with high levels of sovereign debt. 
Public investment was reduced considerably over the crisis period. Even in the 
two years 2008-2010, when measures were taken to counter the deflationary 
effects of the global recession, general government fixed capital formation 
declined in real terms across the EU, and by even more over the subsequent two 
years. The result was an overall reduction of public investment in the EU of 15% 
over the 4 years 2008-2012.
The same occurred with investment in developing and maintaining human 
capital, covering spending on education, child care and health. 
Growth in government expenditure on education was maintained in most 
countries over 2008-2010 but was largely cut back in the following year. As a 
result real public expenditure on education was lower in 2011 than in 2008 in 10 
Member States, with expenditure on tertiary education often cut more than on 
education overall. 
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In terms of government expenditure on childcare, the available data show that, 
in the years before the onset of the crisis and in 2008-2010, there had been an 
expansion in real terms in nearly all Member States. In the following two years, 
however, expenditure was reduced in real terms in most countries, being lower 
in 2012 than it had been in 2008 in 10 Member States.
Government expenditure on health increased in real terms in most countries 
over the two years 2008-2010, though not in the Baltic States, Bulgaria, Ireland, 
Greece, Slovakia and Hungary, where it had already been reduced in the 
preceding period, as it had in Portugal, with further reductions in 2011. 
Social spending and Europe’s economic performance in the world
With the European Union facing ever expanding global economic challenges 
and opportunities, concerns are often expressed about the effect of EU social 
spending on its competitiveness even though social spending in the United 
States is nearly as high as in Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, and higher than 
in many other European countries, when public and private social spending are 
combined. 
An Appendix to the report shows little sign of any significant deterioration in 
the competitiveness of the EU relative to other developed economies, when 
measured in terms of export shares. However, the continuing competitiveness 
of Germany in export markets relative to other EU countries, especially relative 
to the larger EU15 Member States, underscores the divergence in economic 
performance that has been evident since the crisis began. 
In fact there is no correlation between social spending and competitiveness 
ranking among the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) countries. In Finland, Germany, and the Netherlands, social spending is 
around 30% of GDP, but they still figure in the top 10 of the Global Competitiveness 
Index of the World Economic Forum. The Swedish level of social spending is 
even higher, but that does not prevent it from being 6th in the ranking. 
A map of the social performance of European welfare states
If there is no evidence that social spending per se hinders countries in their 
continuous battle for competitiveness, it is nevertheless the case that some 
European countries seem to be much more effective and efficient than others in 
11A Europen Social Union: 10 tough nuts to crack | Spring 2014
the organization and allocation of their social spending.
The huge disparity in the performance of European welfare states, associated 
both with differences in the effectiveness of investment in human capital and 
differences in the effectiveness of social protection, underlines the need for a 
Europe-wide agenda for reform, with the view to improve the performance of 
European welfare states. 
The human capital asymmetry: disparate levels of educational 
achievement
Differences in educational achievement are large across the Union with, for 
example, more than one in three Spaniards aged between 25 and 34 years 
having no more than lower secondary education against less than one in six in 
Germany. There is no simple causal relationship that explains employment in 
terms of educational attainment but it is notable that Greece, Italy and Spain 
all combine low employment rates with weak PISA scores for the educational 
achievement of their 15 year old students. 
This is a challenge that the European Union has recognized, with a reduction 
in the number of early school-leavers being one of the headline targets in the 
Europe 2020 agenda. Yet, while the European Commission has developed a 
comprehensive education agenda, education still fails to receive the attention it 
deserves at the highest levels of European decision-making and in the setting of 
budget priorities. 
Increased labour migration
While the free movement of labour has been a feature of the EU since its 
inception, levels of migration have risen markedly over the past decade, notably 
with the entry of the Central and Eastern European countries. The flow of people 
of working age to EU15 has slowed since the crisis, but remains significant, 
especially from Romania and Bulgaria into Italy and Cyprus. 
Before the onset of the recession, men and women living in the EU15 from the 
EU12 countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, tended to have higher 
employment rates than those born in the country concerned. During the crisis, 
however, their employment has tended to decline by more, or increase by less, 
notably in Ireland and Spain.
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Freedom of movement is a defining feature of the European project and constitutes 
an important right for all Europeans; migration can answer tenacious problems in 
labour markets and play a positive economic and social role. In general, however, 
European welfare states fail with regard to the integration of migrants in their 
societies. Poverty rates reported by our welfare states are significantly higher 
for residents who are not national citizens of these welfare states than for their 
national citizens.  From the opposite perspective, there are growing concerns 
about the dramatic demographic loss in some Member States.
The social investment imperative
Social investment – inclusive investment in human capital – is as crucial for 
Europe’s success as research and technological investment, infrastructure 
investment, or physical capital investment. Moreover, the assessment of the 
benefits and costs of all such investments are subject to the same judgemental 
rules – requiring both a long view and a wide view in order to measure their full 
impact and not just their initial incidence.
The need for a long view with respect to social investment reflects the reality of 
human existence - with major investments in care and education in the earlier 
stages, substantial compensating economic returns in the central productive 
phase of life, and the drawing down from accumulated reserves towards the 
end.    
The need for a wide view reflects two concerns: the inter-dependence between 
social and other investments since the success of the latter depend to a large 
extent on the quality of the associated human resources, and the spill-over costs 
of social failure – whether in education, health, or social integration – which can 
place a serious and long-term debilitating and disruptive burden on economies 
and societies that are affected.
Obviously, with regard to social outcomes, increases in investment in education 
and child care are no panacea; welfare states also differ with regard to the 
effectiveness of their social protection systems, which underscores that the 
redistributive role of social protection remains important per se. Welfare state 
performance depends on the complementarity of effective investment in human 
capital – by means of education, training and child care – and effective protection 
of human capital – by means of adequate transfer systems and health care.
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II. Why a basic consensus on the European Social Model is 
a necessity 
Ten years ago the quest for an operational description of the European Social 
Model might have been dismissed as ‘interesting’ but not strictly necessary 
given the capacity of Member State governments to compromise and ‘muddle 
through’. Today, when everything ‘European’ is seemingly up for question in 
many Member States, it is an existential conundrum for the Union. 
The report first distinguishes those arguments applying specifically to the 
Eurozone, and then considers the arguments that apply to the EU as a whole.
A social dimension for the Eurozone
Three basic reasons are identified as to why EMU needs a social dimension: 
these are functional, political and economic.
1. Functional arguments
The functional argument fits into a broader debate on the consequences of 
monetary unification given that members of a currency area face a trade-
off between symmetry and flexibility that has inevitable long-term social 
consequences. 
Flexibility implies choices that are not socially neutral: there can be a ‘high 
road’ approach to labour market flexibility, based on a highly skilled and 
versatile labour force, or a ‘low road’ approach based on labour market 
deregulation. Less flexibility necessitates more symmetry, which implies a 
degree of social convergence, which limits the diversity in social systems that 
can be accommodated in a monetary union. 
There is also a further trade-off between absorbing asymmetric shocks through 
budgetary transfers between members of a monetary union, and the need for 
flexibility. In this respect, the absence of interstate fiscal transfers is seen as a 
serious flaw in the overall Eurozone design. 
Since flexibility, symmetry, or budgetary transfers, are not socially neutral 
choices, the long-term tradeoffs implied by monetary unification inevitably 
requires participating countries to establish a consensus on the social order 
that the monetary union has to serve. 
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2. Political arguments
Social divergence within the Eurozone undermines the credibility of the 
European project and makes it difficult to take the further steps necessary to 
consolidate the Eurozone in the longer term. Many agree that the longer-term 
consolidation of the Eurozone requires some degree of ‘fiscal union’ but the 
sustainability of a fiscal union between countries ultimately requires mutual 
trust with respect to each other’s internal social fabric. 
3. Economic arguments
High levels of youth unemployment and child poverty reflect an investment 
deficit in a vicious circle of underperforming labour markets, child care, 
education systems and transfer systems.  Such ‘bad equilibria’ create 
objective problems with regard to the economic symmetry required among the 
members of a monetary union. 
In other words, excessive social imbalances threaten the monetary union as 
much as excessive economic imbalances. There is thus a need to both manage 
the trade-off between symmetry and flexibility and to rebuild the stabilisation 
capacity of welfare states. 
A social dimension for the EU28: restoring regulatory capacity
The somewhat haphazard process of progressive European integration has led 
to a loss of regulatory capacity, which needs to be restored at either European 
or national level. In the words of one analyst, it has ‘eroded both the sovereignty 
(the legal authority) and autonomy (de facto regulatory capacity) of member 
states in social policy’. 
As regards the regulatory capacity of member states, a long-standing concern 
is that economic integration without social harmonisation would lead to social 
dumping and a ‘race to the bottom’. Such fears, as with those over ‘welfare 
tourism’, may not be well-founded empirically, but are nevertheless causing 
considerable social and political tensions and, even if there is no large scale 
social dumping, blatant cases of illegal work and exploitation do occur.
The most highly developed EU countries are confronted by a conflict between 
the desire of businesses to see their economies opened up to migrant workers 
in order to meet their labour market needs, against internal political opinion that 
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often appears to be opposed for a variety of reasons, from competition over jobs 
to wider social upheavals. Hence the extent to which Member States can uphold 
social standards in a context of free movement is an important issue. 
Judgments by the Court of Justice with regard to trade union actions defending 
local minimum wages raise concerns that have to be answered. They require a 
clarification with regard to legal issues, notably in the context of posted workers, 
and with regard to the application of the subsidiarity principle in social policy. 
The case of health care also illustrates how internal market rules can lead to 
unanticipated outcomes through Court of Justice interpretations of basic Treaty 
provisions. 
In short, there is no tidy separation between market issues (belonging to the 
supranational sphere) and social issues (belonging to the national spheres). This 
inspired the introduction of the ‘horizontal social clause’, via the Lisbon Treaty, in 
the European legal architecture; that clause requires all EU actions to take into 
account ‘the promotion of a high level of employment, the guarantee of adequate 
social protection, the fight against social exclusion, and a high level of education, 
training and protection of human health’ (Article 9 TFEU). So far, however, this 
does not appear to have played much of a role, for instance in the design of 
macroeconomic adjustment programmes.
A shared notion of solidarity
European integration must be based on a shared understanding of solidarity at 
both a pan-European level and within national welfare states. The pan-European 
notion of solidarity refers, not only to economic convergence and cohesion on 
a European scale, but to individual rights such as free movement. Solidarity 
within national Member States, on the other hand, refers particularly to social 
insurance, income redistribution and the balance of social rights and obligations.
This dual perspective illustrates why solidarity is inevitably a complex and 
multidimensional notion in the European context, and why consecutive 
enlargements as well as monetary unification have made it even more demanding 
and difficult to handle.
Conceptually, solidarity can take the form of mutual insurance or redistribution 
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but in practice it is often a mixture of both. Both aspects presuppose reciprocity, 
but with different emphases. When solidarity is defined as mutual insurance, 
reciprocity is embedded in contribution-based entitlements. When solidarity 
entails redistribution, it implies a propensity to cooperate and share with others. 
In all cases, reciprocity requires a sense of common goals and values among 
those concerned. There is no way back: reciprocity in the EU requires both 
shared values and a sense of common purpose. 
That underlines why the success or failure of the Eurozone requires the long-
term trade-offs implied by monetary unification to be matched by agreement on 
the social order that the monetary union has to support, including the mutual 
obligations that the countries have to meet in support of social investment. 
The necessity of a European Social Union
The damaging effects of the crisis need to be addressed by more resolute EU 
level action to promote sustainable growth, employment and social investment. 
Pragmatic observers sometimes justify the current ‘muddling through’ policy 
approach as ultimately successful, but it looks increasingly risky given the 
continuing erosion of the political capital needed to support continued European 
cooperation.
The success of the Eurozone is crucial to the EU’s future. Monetary unification 
obliges participating countries to establish a basic consensus on the social order 
the monetary union has to serve. Such a consensus must also cover Member 
States’ mutual obligations, i.e. what they may demand from one another and 
what they owe each other. European solidarity implies reciprocity.  The social 
dimension of the EU as a whole needs to be strengthened: deepening the mutual 
understanding of the social goals to be achieved through market integration 
and the mobility of people, services, goods and capital, while maintaining the 
principles of social regulation that serve those goals. 
Europe needs a Social Union that can support national welfare states on a 
systemic level in key functions such as macroeconomic stabilisation, and also 
guide the development of national welfare states on the basis of general social 
standards and objectives. That would leave decisions on the ways and means 
of social policy to the Member States. In other words, European countries would 
cooperate in a union with an explicit social purpose: hence the expression 
‘European Social Union’. 
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III. The EU’s social dimension five decades on
This part of the report provides a detailed presentation of the ‘state of play’ of 
Social Europe after more than five decades, underlining the way that a call for a 
‘European Social Union’ builds on, rather than denies, the positive social acquis 
that exists. However, it also raises the vexed question as to the extent to which 
the idea of a ‘European Social Union’ can be fitted into the existing governance 
framework. Here the report discusses four variants of the day-to-day EU social 
policymaking: the traditional Community method; the EU distributional mode; 
policy coordination; and social dialogue.
IV. Towards a European Social Union: 10 tough nuts to crack 
This year offers a window of opportunity to debate the social dimension of 
European integration afresh. European elections will take place in May, bringing 
many new Members of the European Parliament to office. In November, a new 
European Commission will take power. In December the European Council will 
have a new president. Recent initiatives in the social field, including the Social 
Investment Package, the Social Dimension of EMU and the proposal with regard 
to contractual arrangements, provide the opportunity to think through the 
development of a truly effective a ‘European Social Union’.  However there are 
‘tough nuts to crack’ along the way.
Tough nut 1: Is social convergence necessary?
In the long run, EMU is not sustainable without a basic consensus on the social 
order it has to serve, and without a concomitant degree of convergence on 
fundamental social goals. However today we see divergence in the Eurozone 
instead of convergence. In this respect it is important to note that we have 
deliberately avoided the term ‘harmonisation’ as a policy objective. Obviously the 
European aspiration is upward convergence, but it has to be reconciled with the 
legitimate diversity that characterises European welfare states.
Question: is upward convergence a necessity, in the Eurozone, and in the EU at 
large – to be reconciled with the legitimate diversity that characterizes the EU?  
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Tough nut 2: Social investment as a common agenda?
If there is agreement on the need for convergence, at least in the above terms, 
the next question concerns the direction of convergence and the way to pursue 
it. 
The concept of social investment has emerged as a social policy perspective in 
response to fundamental changes in our societies with a focus on policies that 
‘prepare’ individuals, families and societies to adapt to various transformations, 
rather than simply ‘repairing’ damage caused by market failure, social misfortune, 
poor health or prevailing policy inadequacies. 
It focuses particularly on early childhood education and care, preventing early 
school leaving, lifelong learning, affordable child care (as part of an active inclusion 
strategy), housing support (fighting homeless), accessible health services and 
helping people live indepen¬dently in old age. It presupposes an appropriate 
complementarity between ‘protecting human capital’ by means of the traditional 
instruments of social protection (cash benefits, health care) and ‘developing 
human capital’, by means of education, training and activation.
Question: Do we see ‘social investment’ as the basis for a ‘pact’ for setting long-
term goals in a spirit of reciprocity, extending the European Commission’s Social 
Investment Package? 
Even with agreement on a common orientation, there are issues of sovereignty. 
National welfare states have become semi-sovereign: the fundamental political 
question is whether we think sovereignty can be regained by limiting the role of 
the EU, or whether regaining sovereignty requires the common definition of social 
objectives at the EU level and the acceptance of solid European instruments to 
promote convergence in the agreed direction. 
We might label such a process as one of ‘shared sovereignty’. Obviously, the 
next question is what ‘shared sovereignty’ means exactly, and how the common 
orientation proposed in the preceding tough nuts can be made operational. The 
following tough nuts (3 to 7) are about policy instruments. However, answering 
them will shed light on an overarching question: 
19A Europen Social Union: 10 tough nuts to crack | Spring 2014
Question: What type of role do we see for the European Union in this process of 
shared sovereignty? 
Tough nut 3: Mainstreaming social policy objectives in the overall governance 
architecture of EMU
Excessive social imbalances such as current levels of youth unemployment or 
child poverty threaten the monetary union as much as excessive economic 
imbalances. A first step towards convergence is therefore to fight such excessive 
social imbalances, notably within the Eurozone. This requires the social dimension 
to be mainstreamed into all EU policies, notably into macroeconomic and 
budgetary surveillance, rather than being developed as a separate ‘social pillar’.
Question: Do we agree with mainstreaming social policy concerns in the 
macroeconomic and budgetary surveillance of EMU, and – if yes – what should 
be the role of the different policy strands?
Tough nut 4: Enhanced compliance in exchange for more solidarity?
The performance of welfare states is firstly a responsibility of the Member 
States. On a pan-European level, however, there is a common interest in having 
well-performing welfare states, an aspiration that cannot be achieved without 
reform, on the basis of current evidence. Under these conditions, contractual 
arrangements might complement the existing macroeconomic surveillance 
framework with a constructive surveillance of employment and social policies 
(together with mainstreaming the social dimension into macroeconomic and 
budgetary surveillance). Such contracts need to be seen by Member States 
as an effective way of achieving solidarity with respect to commonly agreed 
structural welfare state reforms, rather than as a means of imposing policies in a 
‘top-down’ fashion. 
This does raise questions, however, with regard to the work of the European 
funds. There is a need to avoid contractual arrangements overlapping with 
existing cohesion policy programmes with a clear social commitment in order to 
ensure that, together, they strengthen – rather than merely substitute – efforts at 
EU level in employment and social policies.
Question: Can contractual arrangements between the EU and the Member 
States contribute to a constructive surveillance of employment and social policies 
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alongside the surveillance now in place for economic policies? Can contractual 
arrangements and cohesion policy operational programmes become consistent 
and complementary policy tools? Can we instantiate ‘solidarity in reform’ in this 
way?
Tough nut 5: A stabilisation mechanism for EMU?
EMU badly needs a European counter-cyclical stabilisation capacity to restoring 
that which had previously been provided by national welfare states. Since the 
‘Four Presidents’ took on board the idea of equipping the EMU with a shock 
absorption capacity, the idea has gained legitimacy. Some proposals emphasise 
asymmetric shocks and propose ‘interstate insurance’, triggered by economic 
indicators. Others argue in favour of a European Unemployment Insurance 
scheme that would answer both to asymmetric and symmetric business cycle 
shocks.
Question: How does the Group assess the political (as opposed to technical) 
feasibility of such schemes? 
Tough nut 6: An agreement on minimum wages to support sustainable mobility?
The French and German governments have made proposals regarding minimum 
wages and issues of cross-border mobility, giving support to the idea that more 
cross-border mobility would be a positive development if organized with respect 
to existing social regulation.
Question: Could a binding EU framework on minimum wages support national 
social policies and ensure that cross-border mobility can be encouraged without 
jeopardizing existing social arrangements?  
Tough nut 7: Increasing the effectiveness of minimum income protection by EU 
initiatives?
Proposals have also been tabled with regard to minimum income protection, 
notably by the European Anti-Poverty Network (EAPN). Such a European 
framework would give substance and political salience to social rights in a 
‘caring Europe’. However, any binding agreements on minimum incomes would 
have to be introduced flexibly and gradually, and in unison with a degree of 
convergence in activation measures and minimum wages (not in an absolute 
sense, but relatively to median wages in Member States). Moreover, even a 
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scheme of moderate ambition would require a significant budgetary effort by 
poorer Member States. Nevertheless, in a number of Member States it is urgent 
to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of minimum income protection. 
Question: Can a more binding EU framework on minimum income protection 
raise the quality and efficiency of domestic social systems?
Tough nut 8: Strengthening social dialogue?
Strengthening social partner capacity and social dialogue structures, especially 
in Central and Eastern Europe, is a prerequisite to revamping this governance 
tool.  
Questions: What could be the most fruitful ways forward for the European social 
dialogue: building on existing arrangements, including the sectoral dialogue; 
working through the European Semester; broadening the Macroeconomic 
Dialogue? Should the EU support national social dialogue in a more direct way 
(e.g. enhanced capacity building efforts through the Funds)? And, on which 
particular issues should it focus? 
Tough nut 9: Improving the EMU’s democratic legitimacy through better social 
governance?
Developing and maintaining a basic consensus on common objectives of social 
policy, and mainstreaming them into macroeconomic and budgetary policy, 
requires governance procedures that are seen as legitimate, notably at the level 
of the Eurozone. One might imagine the different Council formations, including 
Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs (EPSCO), meeting at 
the level of the Eurozone. Similarly, the new European Parliament could (and 
arguably should) organize dedicated ‘Eurozone’ sessions for discussion and 
decision, with the social partners in the Eurozone taking the initiative to start 
negotiations for EU18. 
Question: Would better Eurozone governance in this way improve both the 
legitimacy and quality of social governance, or would it simply increase the risk 
of creating a two-speed Europe?
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Tough nut 10: Education as the pan-European social investment priority 
European welfare states are confronted with a formidable human capital 
challenge: namely the huge disparity in levels of educational achievement within 
the EU. If there is one domain in which upward convergence should be our 
ambition and a matter of common concern, it is here. 
Obviously, an education agenda must go hand in hand with an agenda to create 
employment, notably for young people. 
Question: Do we believe that more success in quality education for all young 
Europeans should be a number one priority within a credible European social 
investment strategy? How far do we see tangible pan-European action being 
developed in this area?
V. From a sense of survival to a sense of common purpose
There is a need for more resolute EU-level action to promote sustainable growth, 
employment and social investment. The social impact of the ongoing adjustment 
processes is unsettling. The European Union must be seen as caring for the 
social conditions of its citizens.  
Europe needs a Social Union that would support national welfare states on a 
systemic level in  key functions such as macroeconomic stabilisation, and guide 
the development of national welfare states through general social standards and 
objectives. That would leave the ways and means of social policy to the Member 
States on the basis of an operational definition of the European social model. 
In other words, European countries would cooperate in a union with an explicit 
social purpose: hence, the expression ‘European Social Union’. 
We should avoid three misunderstandings.
First, a European Social Union should not be a parallel and separate social pillar 
to be added to the existing pillars. The social dimension should be mainstreamed 
into all EU initiatives because social policies are very often affected by policies 
pursued in other areas. The same holds for the social dimension of the EU at 
large.
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Second, a Social Union should not be a top-down ‘one size fits all’ approach 
to social policy-making in the Member States. A balanced approach to macro-
economic coordination is needed: a combination of greater room for manoeuvre 
and tangible support for Member States that opt for social investment strategies 
and policy guidance based on clear objectives, well-defined social outcomes, 
and making maximum use of mutual learning. A European Social Union is not a 
European Welfare State: it is a Union of national Welfare States.
Third, positive reforms are needed. The social achievements of over half-a-
century of European integration and welfare state development should not be 
underestimated. However, European citizens need a reformist perspective that 
gives the social acquis a credible future: creating a European Social Union that 
builds on that acquis through a social investment pact.
As the signs of economic recovery strengthen we can look forward to Member 
States no longer being guided mainly by day-to-day crisis management. Without 
a sense of common purpose, however, it will not be possible to overcome the 
legacy of the crisis; to combat mounting euroscepticism; or to offer young 
people the kind of optimistic prospects their parents once enjoyed. Moving from 
a ‘sense of survival’ to a ‘sense of common purpose’ is a basic condition for 
building a Social Union.
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INTRODUCTION: 
PURPOSE AND SCOPE
The European Union and its Member States are failing to deliver on two of the 
fundamental goals that have been part and parcel of the European project since 
the Treaty of Rome of 1957, namely the simultaneous pursuit of economic 
progress on the one hand, and of social progress and cohesion on the other, 
both within countries (through the gradual development of the welfare states) 
and between countries (through upward convergence across the Union). 
The founding fathers of the European project optimistically assumed that these 
objectives could be reached by supranational economic cooperation (namely 
trade liberalization, the ‘four freedoms’ of the single market), together with some 
specific instruments for raising the standard of living across the Member States 
(which were later brought together in the EU's ‘economic, social and territorial’ 
cohesion policy 2). Economic integration was to be organized at the EU level, and 
would boost economic growth; domestic social policies were to redistribute the 
fruits of economic progress and upward economic convergence, while remaining 
a national prerogative. 
Indeed, through the Treaty of Rome ‘‘Member States agree upon the need to 
promote improved working conditions and an improved standard of living for 
workers, so as to make possible their harmonisation […].They believe that such 
a development will ensue […] from the functioning of the common market, which 
will favour the harmonisation of social systems’’ (Article 117). In other words: 
drawing on the Spaak (1956) report, there was a genuine belief in the spontaneous 
harmonisation of social systems 3. The Ohlin Report – which together with the 
Spaak report provided the basis for the Treaty of Rome - explains the logic behind 
this belief: ‘when account is taken of the strength of the trade union movement 
in European countries and of the sympathy of European governments for social 
aspirations, [this will] ensure that labour conditions would improve and would not 
deteriorate’ (Ohlin, 1956: § 210)’. 
2  In fact, the attention to regional policy in the Rome Treaty was minimal (namely in the Preamble). The first Commission Communication 
on regional policy was not published before 1965. The Lisbon Treaty added ‘territorial’ cohesion to the principles of economic and social 
cohesion.
 3 The Spaak Report (of which only an abridged unofficial English translation is available) stipulated : ‘La tendance spontanée a l'harmonisation 
des systèmes sociaux et des niveaux de salaire, ainsi que l'action des syndicats en vue d'obtenir un alignement dans les conditions de travail 
seront favorisées par la création progressive du marché commun’ (Spaak, 1956 :65).
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And yet, the European Union and its Member States is failing to deliver on both 
progress and convergence: in 2012 real household income per head was lower 
in the EU28 than it had been in 2004. Moreover, where the European project 
was supposed to be deepening, i.e. in the Eurozone, we witnessed divergence 
instead of convergence. As the EU has ceased to be the veritable ‘convergence 
machine’ it used to be, the EU has been increasingly held responsible by public 
opinion for failing to deliver on these essential goals: hence rising euro scepticism 
in many Member States and decreasing participation rates in European elections. 
Although a recovery is now announced, the legacy of the crisis in social and 
budgetary terms, the possibility of persistent low economic growth for a number 
of years, and the challenge of demographic ageing are bound to make the 
simultaneous pursuit of economic progress and social cohesion even more 
challenging.  
In such a context, it is essential that we review the scope and purpose of the 
Union’s social objective. That is why Friends of Europe – an independent think-
tank for EU policy analysis and debate – has launched a High-Level Group on a 
‘Social Union’, starting from the conviction that the EU should find better ways 
to reconcile its economic and social ambitions. The Group will try to take the 
social dimension out of its ‘specialist-only’ corner and bring it to the attention of a 
wider group of high-level (EU and national) policymakers, as well as stakeholders 
and independent experts. The Group will work over a period of 10 months 
(January-October 2014) and meet three times under Chatham House rules. The 
goal is to produce a final report by the autumn of 2014, which will include a 
set of recommendations for the incoming European Commission and European 
Parliament. 
In terms of scope, the report will be largely confined to questions and proposals 
that are directly related to the EU’s employment and social policies. This implies 
that it will not dwell on issues such as macro-economic policy and financial 
markets, banking supervision, furthering internal market integration, external trade 
policy, taxation and environmental issues etc., even if we are fully aware of their 
4  There is no doubt that European integration created a ‘convergence machine’ (integrating more than a dozen poor countries and helping 
them become high-income countries), to use the words of Gill and Raiser (2012).
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importance with respect to social goals. Within the realm of the EU’s employment 
and social policies, moreover, we intend to provide a broad roadmap rather than 
a detailed agenda, which is why we will not at this stage address specific policies 
such as health and long-term care, pensions and housing, although that does 
not preclude their development during the process. 
This background report puts a lot of emphasis on the Eurozone problematic, 
which may seem disproportionate from the point of view of readers living in 
Member States outside the Eurozone. The problems of the Eurozone constitute 
a crucial challenge for the social significance of the European project, but the final 
report by the Group has to provide a well-balanced message for both citizens 
living in the Eurozone and citizens living in other Member States. As a matter of 
fact, all European countries face major challenges in terms of the future of their 
welfare states. This is true whether they belong to the Eurozone or not. In the 
face of global and intra-European migration, the global redistribution of income, 
the need to drastically reduce emissions… the position of any individual country 
looks rather bleak, and creates a presumption in favour of international, and thus 
European, co-operation.   
This report is organised as follows.
Part I contrasts the aspiration to progress and cohesion with key social and 
economic facts about our performance over the years 2004-2012. In this Report, 
we do not enter the debate on the causes of the crisis, or on the merits and 
demerits of the policy responses thus far. Hence, the reader will not find a position 
with regard to, for instance, the macro-economic and fiscal policies advocated 
by the European Commission and pursued by the Member States. What may 
transpire from the document, is a belief that Europe’s current predicament follows 
from a combination of structural problems (among others in the nexus education-
employment), design failures in the Eurozone, and – at least during some crucial 
years – too much of a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to budgetary consolidation 
in the Eurozone. However, we do find it important not just to point to social 
problems and aspirations, but also to the underlying economic fundamentals; 
that is the reason why, in Appendix 2, an analysis is added on the position of 
Europe in world trade.    
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Part II explains why a basic consensus on the European Social Model is a necessity 
rather than a luxury; such a consensus must also cover an understanding of 
European solidarity as reciprocity. 
Part III then provides a ‘state of play’ of Social Europe after more than five decades. 
An impatient reader may wonder why we insert an elaborate description of the 
current social dimension of the European Union in this report. The reason is, first, 
to underscore that our call for a ‘European Social Union’ cannot be premised 
on a denial of the positive acquis that already exists; secondly, an important 
question is to what extent the idea of a ‘European Social Union’ can be fitted 
into the existing governance framework. The reader, who is already well-versed 
in the current functioning of the EU and short of time, may decide to focus only 
on sentences in bold.
Part IV proposes ten ‘tough nuts to crack’: Difficult problems to solve, on which 
we have to make up our mind.  
Part V summarises and concludes with one key question: Can the European 
Union move from a sense of survival to a sense of common purpose?
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I. FIVE YEARS OF ECONOMIC 
CRISIS: AN UNSETTLING LEGACY 
Economic and social developments in Europe: 
10 worrying observations
At the moment of writing this report, a recovery of the European economy is 
announced but the jury is still out with regard to the robustness and scope of that 
recovery, and it is certainly too early to say that ‘the crisis is over’. Meanwhile, 
we are confronted with the legacy of the protracted economic downturn in all 
Member States, whether inside or outside the Eurozone. 
In Appendix 1 we present facts and figures with regard to social and economic 
developments in the EU between 2004 and 2012, which show that this legacy is 
deeply worrying, both with regard to the aspiration to progress and with regard 
to the ambition to support national and pan-European cohesion. We summarize 
these observations here since space limitations do not allow us to include all 
that can be learned from the excellent analyses in the European Commission’s 
reports on ‘Employment and Social Developments in Europe’ concerning the 
impact of the crisis and the strengths and weaknesses of European welfare 
states, and what can be learned from the publications by Eurofound, on working 
conditions and job quality5 . 
1. In many European countries, employment rates were lower in 2012 than 8 
years earlier, including in the EU15 as a whole, when we exclude Germany. This 
was particularly the case in the four southern EU15 countries, where, Portugal 
apart, employment rates were well below the EU average before the crisis: the 
‘employment gap’ between these southern EU15 countries and the other EU15 
countries became larger, signalling the divergence which we further illustrate 
below. 
5  See the references in the bibliography. We refer the reader notably to Chapters 2 and 3 of European Commission (2013e), on social trends 
and dynamics of poverty and exclusion, and social protection systems confronting the crisis; and to the chapters on convergence and 
divergence and on effectiveness and efficiency of social expenditure in the forthcoming European Commission (2014). 
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2. Overall, GDP per head was only marginally higher in 2012 than in 2004. In 
the EU13 (the new Member States), it was higher on average but lower in 7 of 
the 13 new Member States. In the EU15 excluding Germany, GDP per head in 
2012 was no higher than 8 years earlier (and in 2013, it was slightly lower). In 
the southern EU countries, including Cyprus, it was lower, especially in Greece, 
where it was 13% lower.
3. The change in household income per head, which is a more relevant indication 
of the change in living standards, shows a very different pattern to that of GDP 
per head. While there was a significant fall in household income per head in real 
terms in 2008-2010 (along with the fall in GDP per head), there was an even 
bigger decline in the subsequent two years, reflecting the decline in average 
earnings along with the rise in unemployment which occurred. Average income 
per head across the EU was, therefore, around 6% less in 2012 than before the 
crisis began and below the level in 2004. In Greece, income per head was 30% 
below the level before the onset of the crisis and 20% less than 8 years earlier, 
while in Italy it was 12% lower. 
4. The percentage of people who are materially deprived adds to this disquieting 
observation with regard to living standards. Material deprivation is measured by 
an index of nine items relating to financial stress and the enforced lack of a list of 
durables. All persons living in a household that, at the moment of the interview, 
is deprived on at least three out of nine items are considered to be materially 
deprived. The items on the list refer to the ability to (1) pay the rent, mortgage or 
utility bills; (2) keep the home adequately warm; (3) face unexpected expenses; 
(4) eat meat or protein regularly; (5) go on holiday; (6) buy a television, (7) a 
washing machine, (8) a car, and (9) a telephone.
In the EU13, the proportion of the population identified as materially deprived, 
declined markedly during the economic boom years 2005-2008 (from nearly one 
in two of the population to a little more than one in three), but then stagnated; in 
the EU15 the proportion of the population identified as materially deprived was 
stable during the years of growth, and increased from 12.8% in 2008 to 15.6% 
in 2012. There was a marked increase in the relative number of people materially 
deprived in Greece, Spain, Italy and Ireland as well as the three Baltic States 
over the crisis period. (On the other hand, the indicator also shows a reduction 
in Portugal, where real income declined, and an increase in Malta where it rose; 
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thus illustrating the caution needed in interpreting these survey results.)
5. Young people were hit particularly hard by the recession which hit the EU in 
2008. This emerges first of all in unemployment figures. The youth unemployment 
rate increased to around 23% in the EU in 2012 and was at much the same level 
in mid-2013. The biggest increases were in Greece and Spain, where well over 
half of young people aged 15-24 in the labour force were unemployed in 2012. 
By mid-2013, the rate in Greece had risen to 59% and in Spain to 56%. The 
rate was also around 50% in Croatia and 40% in Cyprus. (As explained in the 
Appendix, the way these figures are often presented may overstate the problem 
of unemployment among young people, because most young people aged 
15-24 are not part of the labour force but still in full-time education; however, 
the proportion of young people aged 15-24 that are neither employed nor in 
education and training - the so-called NEETs – is also very high in a number of 
countries).  
6. In a number of Member States, the crisis has had a huge impact on families 
with children. We focus here on observations with regard to financial poverty 
experienced by individuals who are less than 18 years old. Some explanation 
and caveats are necessary. Although it is a crucial parameter in the assessment 
of welfare state performance, the ‘at-risk-of-poverty rate’ is a rather crude 
headcount: it simply measures the share of individuals in households with an 
income below the poverty threshold, and does not account for the depth or 
severity of the poverty faced. The poverty headcount defines poverty in relation 
to the level of income in the welfare state where an individual happens to be 
living: it is a relative measure. If we use floating poverty thresholds, as is normally 
the case, the threshold changes every year. In a number of countries the floating 
poverty threshold decreased during the crisis years, reflecting a decrease 
in median household income: this has a favourable impact on the poverty 
headcount, although financial needs may have increased in both poor and non-
poor households. A different perspective is created by anchoring the threshold in 
time, for instance based on the values observed in 2004 or 2007.6  
6  We base these measures on the European Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU SILC); EU SILC 2008 refers to incomes in 2007. 
EU SILC 2012 refers to incomes in 2011; the Irish data in EU SILC 2011 refer however to incomes in 2011.
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There is a huge disparity in child poverty across EU member states, as can be 
seen in Figure 1-A: in 2011, the at-risk-of-poverty rate was 34% in Romania 
and 10% in Denmark. During the second half of the 2000s, child poverty rates 
displayed a tendency to converge in the EU, both when measured on the basis 
of floating thresholds and (to a lesser extent) when measured with a threshold 
anchored in 2004. In some countries where child poverty rates were initially 
high, such as Poland, Lithuania, Portugal, the UK and Estonia, they declined 
both with the floating and the fixed threshold. In some countries, where they 
were traditionally low, such as Finland and Sweden, they increased when 
measured on the basis of a floating threshold. Simultaneously, there are some 
notable exceptions to this pattern, such as Denmark (low initial poverty rates, no 
increase) and Spain, Italy and Greece (high and increasing child poverty rates). 
Within the Eurozone, there was no convergence of national poverty rates. On the 
contrary, during the crisis years the Eurozone displayed a growing dispersion and 
divergence of child poverty rates calculated with a threshold anchored in 2007. 
This is illustrated in Figure 1-B. For instance, in 2007, 28% of Spanish children 
lived in a household with an income below the Spanish poverty threshold; in 
2011, 36% of Spanish children lived in a household with an income below the 
Spanish poverty threshold of 2007.
Figure 1-A: At-risk-of-poverty rates for individuals less than 18 years old  
(floating poverty thresholds)
Data retrieved from Eurostat website; data for Ireland based on Statistics on Income and Living Conditions 
(SILC) 2007 and 2011
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Figure 1-B: At risk-of-poverty rates for individuals less than 18 years old, 
anchored in time
We use ‘convergence’ and ‘divergence’ in a technical sense here. When it comes 
to poverty rates as we define them, neither ‘convergence’ nor ‘divergence’ are 
per se desirable. If convergence pertains because poverty rates increase in 
countries where poverty was initially low, we are not describing a satisfactory state 
of affairs. However, the huge disparity of levels of child poverty in the Eurozone, 
and the non-convergence and even divergence (during the crisis years, when 
anchoring poverty thresholds in time) signal ‘excessive social imbalances’ that 
should be a common concern. We return to this observation in Section 2.  
7. Part of the explanation for the divergence with regard to ‘child poverty 
anchored in time’, is due to divergence with regard to economic growth. In the 
years preceding the recession there was already a gradual divergence in GDP 
per head between the EU15 countries who were members of the Eurozone. 
While most member countries enjoyed reasonable rates of fairly continuous 
economic growth over the period from the formation of the single currency area 
up to the onset of the recession, this was not the case for Italy, whose GDP 
per head 7 declined from 2% above the EU average in 2001 to 7% below in 
Data retrieved from Eurostat website. Data for Ireland 2011 are based on the SILC 2011 statistics for 
poverty anchored in time; data for Ireland 2008 are based on SILC 2008
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2007. As the Eurozone countries went into recession, the disparities in GDP per 
head narrowed significantly as those countries with the highest levels of GDP per 
head were affected most. From 2009 to 2012, however, the countries with the 
highest levels of GDP per head recovered more quickly and disparities between 
countries widened again, and more markedly than before the crisis. 
While future developments in this respect are uncertain, the tendency towards 
divergence in GDP per head which was evident before the crisis, instead of the 
convergence which was hoped for, could turn out to be the norm in an economic 
area where there is a lack of an adjustment mechanism for correcting imbalances 
in growth performance.
Chapter five of the European Commission’s most recent report on Employment 
and Social Developments in Europe is dedicated to ‘Convergence and divergence 
in EMU – employment and social aspects’ (European Commission, 2014:. 279-
319). It shows how the con¬vergence in employment and social developments 
in the Eurozone over the period 1999 to 2007 was largely halted by the crisis; 
simultaneously it points to underlying elements of economic divergence – or at 
least, lack of convergence – which were already present before the crisis.
8. Public spending increased significantly relative to GDP over the period of 
economic downturn. This, however, was a consequence of the fall in GDP rather 
than of any marked acceleration in the growth rate of government expenditure, 
which was only slightly higher on average over the two years 2008-2010 than 
over the preceding 4 years. Indeed in both the EU15 excluding Germany and in 
the EU13, it was less. Over the two years 2010-2012, expenditure was reduced 
in most countries, especially in Greece and Ireland, though in the last it reflects 
the substantial support given to banks in the previous two years. Over the 4 
years 2008-2012 therefore, the growth of government expenditure exceeded 
2% a year only in 7 Member States and in no country was it more than 3% a 
year.  In other words, considered over the entire period and across the board, 
there is no clear indication of ‘automatic stabilisation’ by means of accelerated 
public spending.
7  To make levels of GDP per head comparable across countries, we measure it in PPS (Purchasing Power Parities).
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When a recession occurs, welfare states normally act as automatic stabilizers, 
both with regard to macro-economic demand and with regard to financial 
poverty. Analyses that are more fine-grained than the summary indication on the 
basis of overall public spending in the previous paragraph, do show that in the 
first stage of the crisis, European welfare states did play such a stabilizing role, 
albeit to a varying extent. From 2010 onwards, the automatic stabilizers became 
increasingly constrained, notably in those welfare states with very high levels of 
sovereign debt. In the first stage, the transfer systems mitigated the impact of 
the crisis on poverty; but in some countries the poverty-reducing impact of the 
welfare state was increasingly constrained when austerity measures took effect. 
Poverty reduction by transfers first increased in these countries – as one should 
normally expect – but then levelled off.
9. Public investment has been reduced considerably over the crisis period. 
Even in the two years 2008-2010 when measures were taken to counter the 
deflationary effects of the global recession, general government fixed capital 
formation declined on average in real terms across the EU as well as in most 
Member States. It declined by even more over the subsequent two years. As 
a result, there was an overall reduction of public investment of 15% over the 4 
years 2008-2012 across the EU and one of 60% or more in Ireland, Greece and 
Spain.
10. The same observation holds for investment in human capital. Investment in 
human capital is normally equated with spending on education and child care. 
However, health care is essential in ‘maintaining’ human capital. We therefore 
start our survey of public investment in human capital with data on health care.
Government expenditure on health increased in real terms in most countries 
over the two years 2008-2010, though not in the Baltic States, Bulgaria, Ireland, 
Greece, Slovakia and Hungary (where it had already been reduced in the 
preceding period, as it had in Portugal). There was a more widespread reduction 
in 2011, especially in Greece where it was cut back by over 20%, taking the 
overall reduction over the period 2008-2011 to 28%. There was also a substantial 
reduction over this period in Latvia, Slovakia, Ireland and Estonia.8 Government 
8 The social impact of the ongoing ‘internal devaluations’ in some Eurozone Member States is arguably more severe than that of the pre-
Maastricht version. Some observers are very critical about the current situation. For instance, Greer states that the outlook for countries 
that have signed a Memorandum of Understanding is unsettling, in that the Economic Adjustment Programmes are likely to be badly 
implemented, be neutral or negative for growth, be detrimental to equity and the poor, have unpredictable policy consequences, and will allow 
incumbent elites to preserve their positions (Greer, 2013). Stuckler and Basu (2013) conclude that in Greece, austerity measures in health care 
are leading to a public-health disaster to the extent that ‘austerity kills’.
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expenditure on education, widely considered to be important for future economic 
growth, has followed a similar pattern to spending on healthcare. Growth was 
maintained in most countries over the two year 2008-2010 but it came to a 
halt or expenditure was cut back in the following year. Real public expenditure 
on education, therefore, was lower in 2011 than in 2008 before the crisis in 10 
Member States, most especially again in Latvia, Greece, Ireland and Estonia 
(though not Slovakia) and also in Romania.
The relative number of people with tertiary education is commonly regarded 
as an important indicator of the growth potential of economies. Government 
expenditure on tertiary education, however, has been cut back during the 
crisis period in the majority of Member States and in many cases more so than 
expenditure on education overall. This is especially so in the countries which 
have been hit hardest by the recession – in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and 
the three Baltic States.
The provision of childcare by Governments is widely considered to be essential to 
make it possible for women with young children to pursue a working career and, 
accordingly, to be an important element in any policy for reducing child poverty 
as well as to ensure equality of opportunity between men and women. Although 
there are no EU-wide data on Government expenditure on childcare as such, the 
ESSPROS (European System of Social Protection Statistics) data shows that in 
the years before the onset of the crisis, there was an expansion of expenditure in 
real terms in nearly all Member States. There was also a widespread expansion 
over the two years 2008-2010 when GDP declined virtually throughout the EU. In 
the following two years, however, expenditure was reduced in real terms in most 
countries. In 2012, real expenditure on child care was lower than it had been in 
2008 in 10 Member States, including all three Baltic States, Greece, Portugal 
and Cyprus.
Social expenditure and Europe's economic 
performance in the world
The extended duration of the European crisis, relative to the United States, is 
seen by many observers as the result of design failures in the Eurozone and 
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– related to this – political and institutional constraints that make it difficult to 
solve typical ‘collective action’ problems at the EU level.  As a consequence, the 
burden of adjustment was borne by a subset of countries that had to organize 
internal devaluations. These internal devaluations implied considerable cuts in 
public expenditure, including cuts in social expenditure. 
From a rather different perspective, expenditure cuts have been justified by 
some analysts as fundamentally unavoidable, as they consider the level of social 
spending in those countries – or even in the EU at large – as detrimental to 
global competitiveness per se and thus unsustainable. In the latter approach, the 
contrast between Europe and the United States is predominantly one between 
high-spending and insufficiently flexible European social systems on the one 
hand, and a flexible economy with less social spending on the other hand. We 
cannot do justice to these conflicting perspectives, but some summary data may 
provide a starting point. 
Figure 2 ranks the OECD countries (on the horizontal axis) according to the World 
Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index 2013-2014. On the vertical 
axis we display public and private social spending as a percentage of GDP (the 
latest year for which such comparable data are made available by the OECD is 
2009). 
Figure 2: Global competitiveness and levels of social spending
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When public and private social spending is aggregated, social spending in 
the United States is nearly as high as in Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, 
and higher than in many other European countries. The difference between 
the United States and these European welfare states is related to the private/
public mix, rather than to the level of social spending (Adema et al. 2011). If we 
consider public social spending a cost factor that impacts upon international 
competitiveness, private social spending is, prima facie, also a cost factor. 
Figure 2 also shows that there is, among OECD countries, no correlation between 
low levels of social spending and a high score in the competitiveness ranking. 
In Finland, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK (which has also an important 
share of private spending) social spending is high, around 30% of GDP, but they 
are in the top 10 of the Global Competitiveness Index. The Swedish level of social 
spending is even higher, but that does not prevent Sweden from being 6th in the 
ranking. 
Among the ten most competitive countries in the world, five are from the 
EU15. So conceived, among OECD countries there is no relationship between 
competitiveness and social spending per se (we excluded highly competitive 
countries with very low levels of social spending such as Singapore and Hong 
Kong from the figure, as there are no comparable OECD data on social spending 
available). As noted by De Grauwe and Polan (2003), we can assume simultaneity 
in the relation between competitiveness and social spending, i.e. causality is likely 
to run in both directions. Thus, countries that are highly competitive generate a 
lot of value added and attain high levels of GDP, which allows them to spend 
more on social needs. Conversely, high levels of social spending may influence 
the productivity of workers and, through this channel, affects the competitiveness 
of nations. 
From the above we can conclude that social spending per se does not hinder 
countries in their continuous battle for competitiveness. In fact Appendix 2 shows 
that, on the basis of trade shares, there is little sign of any significant deterioration 
in the overall competitiveness of the EU relative to other developed economies. 
On the other hand, the Appendix does highlight the continuing competitiveness 
of Germany in export markets relative to other EU countries, especially relative to 
the larger EU15 Member States, which underscores the divergence in economic 
performance which has been evident since the crisis hit.
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The Appendix  also examines the share of services in total exports and shows 
that, unlike developments in our domestic economies, there is only a gradual 
tendency for the share of services in trade to increase over time, with by far the 
larger part of export earnings continuing to come from the export of goods. 
A map of the social performance of European 
welfare states
In the preceding section, we noted that high levels of social spending can be 
compatible with competitiveness. However, some countries seem to be more 
efficient in the organization of their social spending than others with high disparities 
between national welfare states. A comparison of our Figure 2 with Figures 3 
and 4 below suggests that countries like Sweden, the Netherlands, Denmark 
achieve low levels of poverty, high employment rates, a high share of people with 
secondary education or more and a good score in the competiveness index, 
while a country like Italy, which has more or less the same level of social spending 
(see Figure 2), performs worse on all these counts. 
The concern that some social expenditure is used inefficiently, therefore 
carries much more weight than the idea that high levels of social spending 
and competitiveness contradict each other. Recent research shows significant 
differences between Member States in the effectiveness of their spending in 
different social policy areas, and significant differences in the cost-efficiency with 
which policies are delivered (see European Commission, 2014, Chapter 6). There 
is still a considerable scope for reform in a number of Member States, with a view 
to improving the performance of their welfare states, as Figure 3 illustrates.
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Figure 3: A map of the performance of European welfare states
Figure 3 maps European welfare state performance on the basis of two key 
performance indicators: their employment record (on the horizontal axis), 
and their poverty record (on the vertical axis). The strong record of Northern 
welfare states, with regard to both employment and poverty, has been linked 
to their long-term orientation towards ‘social investment’, i.e. activation, 
investment in human capital, and capacitating social services such as 
child care (Hemerijck, 2013). In the next subsection, we present some 
data on differences within Europe with regard to educational achievement. 
Obviously, investment in education and child care are no panacea; welfare 
states also differ with regard to the effectiveness of their social protection 
systems. For instance, Greece does not have a system of minimum income 
assistance, and minimum income protection in Italy is generally considered 
to be inadequate. 
Cash transfer systems are highly fragmented in a number of welfare states. 
In some welfare states, pensions play a considerable role in the social 
protection of families with children, a phenomenon that seems associated 
with the inadequacy of their cash benefits other than pensions and with the 
Data retrieved from Eurostat website
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presence of multi-generational ‘extended families’ (Vandenbroucke et. al., 2013). 
Given the necessity to reform pension systems to prepare for demographic 
ageing, the social model on which these ‘pension-heavy’ welfare states rely is 
very vulnerable. 
Welfare state performance depends on the complementarity of effective 
investment in human capital – by means of education, training and child care 
– and effective protection of human capital – by means of adequate transfer 
systems and health care. The redistributive role of social protection remains 
important per se (Cantillon and Vandenbroucke, 2014).
The human capital asymmetry:                            
Disparate levels of educational achievement
Although one should resist easy recipes that suggest that there is a ‘silver bullet’ 
to improve welfare state performance, in a number of countries both poor 
social outcomes and lack of competitiveness go hand in hand with inadequate 
investment in human capital. In this respect, European Member States display 
very different profiles with regard to the educational achievement of their 
population. We illustrate this in Figures 4, 5 and 6. 
Figure 4 combines two series of data for 2012: on the one hand, the employment 
rate of the population in the age bracket 15 to 64 and, on the other, the share 
of the population with only lower secondary education attainment. The southern 
EU Member States combine a high share of people with no more than lower 
secondary education and low employment rates. This mapping also illustrates 
rather different educational legacies in the EU15, on the one hand, and the new 
Member States on the other hand: the New Member states are in the south-
western quadrant of the figure, with typically a relatively low share of people with 
only lower secondary education, but rather low employment rates.
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Figure 4: Employment rates and formal educational achievement
Data retrieved from Eurostat website
It might be objected that statistics on levels of educational attainment for the whole 
population between 15 and 64 years old are misleading with regard to progress 
in education, since they include people who left the education system more than 
40 years ago. Figure 5 adds information by comparing the educational attainment 
in the generation between 25 and 34 (on the vertical axis) with the educational 
attainment in the generation between 55 and 64 (on the horizontal axis). The 
vertical distance between the blue line and the actual position of countries in 
the figure shows the progress made in terms of educational attainment between 
the younger and the older generation (in terms of the share of people with no 
more than lower secondary education). That progress is impressive in countries 
like Spain, Italy and Greece; however, the share of people with no secondary 
qualification remains very high in these countries (their position on the vertical 
axis is comparatively high).
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Figure 5: Progress in educational attainment over generations
Data retrieved from Eurostat website
Figure 6 further illustrates the huge disparity in the effectiveness of investment in 
human capital, in today’s younger generation. It combines two series of data: on 
the one hand, the employment rate of people in the age bracket 25-29 in 2012, 
on the other, the average PISA results attained by 15-year-olds between 2000 
and 2012 in the fields of mathematical and scientific literacy, and reading. PISA 
measures the actual skill level of young students. 
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Figure 6: Educational achievement measured by PISA and employment rates 
Employment data retrieved from Eurostat website; PISA data from OECD
Figure 4, 5 and 6 not only illustrate the particular deficit of Southern welfare 
states – compared to other EU15 welfare states – with regard to education 
and employment; they underscore the huge education agenda the whole EU is 
confronted with. More than one in three Spaniards in the age cohort between 
25 and 34 years have no more than lower secondary education; in Germany this 
applies to less than one in six young people. 
We do not suggest that there is a direct connection, let alone any simple causal 
relationship, that explains employment in terms of educational attainment. But 
leaving aside outliers such as Bulgaria, Romania and Luxembourg, one cannot 
but be struck by the apparent correlation. Greece, Italy and Spain, for example, 
combine low employment rates with very weak PISA scores. This constitutes an 
exceptionally important societal agenda, at least if young people in Italy, Spain 
and Greece are to be offered real prospects. The European Union certainly 
recognises the challenge: in the Europe 2020 agenda, reducing the number of 
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early school-leavers (which is high in these countries) is singled out as one of the 
headline targets. The European Commission has developed a comprehensive 
agenda on education, training and skills, and issued excellent Recommendations 
on the modernization of education systems 9. However, the question remains as 
to whether this educational agenda carries sufficient weight at the highest levels 
of European political decision-making and in the setting of budgetary priorities; 
on the basis of the spending data presented in the previous section, the answer 
seems negative. That is not to say that the quality of education systems can be 
measured in a simplistic way by the level of public spending on education; but it 
seems very hard to improve education systems significantly whilst disinvesting.
Increased labour migration
We cannot do justice to the many aspects of labour migration and mobility, 
which have become increasingly important for Europe, both in terms of intra-
European migration and mobility, and in terms of immigration from other regions 
in the world. There have been significant changes in immigration flows, not only 
in terms of their country of origin and destination 10, but also in terms of their 
motive11: temporary migration has become more prominent, notably labour flows 
that rarely lead to permanent settlement let alone social integration. Galgoczi 
and Lescke (2012) underscore that post-2004 intra-European labour mobility 
constitutes a historically new phenomenon in a number of respects. Different 
forms of labour mobility coexist: commuting, short-term, circular or more 
permanent migration, but various ‘functional equivalents’ of migrations such as 
(bogus) self-employment and posted work also play an important role. 
In this section we focus on the data provided in Appendix 1, which concern 
residents living in another country than their country of birth (hence, they do not 
include posting and commuting). These data first of all illustrate that migration 
within the EU has risen markedly over the past decade, most especially since 
2004 when the Central and Eastern European countries entered the EU. The 
flow of people of working age, particularly young people aged under 35, from 
these counties to the EU15 has slowed down since the crisis hit but it remains 
9 See for example the European Commission (2012e) Communication on ‘Rethinking Education’; the European Commission(2013h) Education 
and Training Monitor; the Commission analysis of PISA (European Commission, 2013f), and the European Commission (2013g) Survey of 
Adult Skills (PIAAC); and the ‘Mind the Gap report on education inequality across EU regions (NESSE, 2012; European Commission, 2012d). 
10 While ‘mature’ (Western) immigration countries transformed their migration status in the third quarter of the 20th century, ‘New’ immigration 
countries (Southern countries and Nordic latecomers) became receiving countries in the 1990s. ‘Future’ immigration countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe are currently both the source and origin of immigrants (Kaczmarczyk et al, 2012).  
11 Although the flow of asylum-seekers into the EU has increased since 1989, family unification and labour migration remain the predominant 
reasons for immigration.
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significant into some countries, especially from Romania into Italy and Cyprus. 
The number of people of working age born in the EU10 and living in the UK, 
therefore, increased 4-fold in the 4 years 2004-2008, and those living in Ireland 
rose by three times in the three years 2005-2008. Similarly, those born in Bulgaria 
and Romania living in Spain more than doubled in the 4 years 2004-2008 as they 
did in Italy between 2005 and 2008. 
Over the four years of the crisis 2008-2012, there was some net outward 
migration of those born in the EU10 from Ireland, but the number living in the 
UK continued to increase if at a slower rate. There was also a slow-down in net 
migration of Bulgarians and Romanians into Spain, but not into Italy or Cyprus, 
where the number increased substantially over these four years. The data in 
the Appendix also show that inward migration into the EU15 from other regions 
in the world was equally significant for a number of countries over the period 
2004-2012, most especially for Spain (from North Africa) and Sweden. Inward 
migration into the EU13 countries, apart from Cyprus, remains small.
The outflow of Romanians and Bulgarians to other EU countries has been 
substantial in recent years, especially of women and particularly of those with 
low education. In 2012, 13% of those aged 20-34 from these two countries 
lived in another EU country, 15% of women and 19% of those with no education 
beyond basic schooling.
Before the onset of the recession, men and women living in the EU15 from 
the EU12 countries which entered the EU in 2004 and 2007 tended to have 
higher employment rates than those born in the country concerned, the only 
two exceptions being Austria and Sweden. The same was the case in the 
southern Member States for migrants from outside the EU, but not in the other 
EU15 countries. The relatively higher employment rates for migrants in southern 
Member States can be related to the comparatively weak education profile of the 
nationals in these Member States; simultaneously, migrant often occupied jobs 
of low quality and/or for which they were over-educated. 
Over the crisis period, however, there has been some tendency for the 
employment of those born outside the country to decline by more, or to increase 
by less, than for those born in the country. This is particularly so in Ireland, where 
the employment rate of those from the EU10 declined by much more than for 
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those born in Ireland between 2007 and 2012, and in Spain, where the rate of 
those from Bulgaria and Romania fell by considerably more than that of those 
born in Spain. EU10 migrants acted, at least partially, as labour market buffers. 
Freedom of movement is a defining feature of the European project and 
constitutes an important right for all Europeans; past experience has shown 
that migration can remedy bottlenecks in labour markets and play a positive 
economic and social role. However, in general, European welfare states fail with 
regard to the integration of migrants in their societies. A recent survey (de la Rica 
et al, 2013) confirms large gaps in labour market outcomes between natives 
and migrants in most countries, both in terms of employment and wages, and 
large gaps in educational outcomes. Migrants often occupy relatively weak or 
vulnerable positions in labour markets; we return to this observation in section 
2.2, where we discuss the issue of social dumping. Poverty rates reported by 
welfare states are significantly higher for residents who are not national citizens 
of these welfare states than for their national citizens, as shown in Figure 7 (for 
a survey of poverty and social exclusion among migrants in the EU, which also 
underscores the important differences between Member States in this respect, 
see Lelkes and Zolyomi, 2011).
From the opposite perspective, there are growing concerns about the dramatic 
demographic loss in some Member States. European Member States need to 
develop a shared vision on labour migration within the EU. Fundamentally, it 
seems that intra-European migration today goes hand in hand with problems of 
under-utilization and poor development of human capital.
Figure 7: Poverty risks differentiated by citizenship
At-risk-of-poverty rate for the total population, differentiated by citizenship; 
based on EU SILC 2012, retrieved from Eurostat website.
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The social investment imperative
The observations in the previous sections underscore the need for a consistent 
social investment strategy. Social investment emerged gradually as a social policy 
perspective in the 1990s in response to fundamental changes in our societies 
with a focus on policies that ‘prepare’ individuals, families and societies to adapt 
to various transformations, such as changing career patterns and working 
conditions, the emergence of new social risks and population ageing, rather than 
on simply generating responses aimed at ‘repairing’ damage caused by market 
failure, social misfortune, poor health or prevailing policy inadequacies. 
The social investment concept is not new, but the fundamental societal trends 
that led to the development of this approach are even more relevant and important 
today than they were ten years ago, not least because of adverse demography 
This, in turn, implies an urgent need for a reform-oriented agenda and a dynamic 
public sector (Vandenbroucke et al. 2011; Morel et al. 2012; Hemerijck 2013). 
Such an agenda involves: 
•  high-quality childcare;
•  investment in training and schooling, at all levels of education;
•  support for the combination of paid work and family life;
•  later and flexible retirement, in accordance with life expectancy;
•  seizing the opportunities presented by migration, through among other 
things proper integration into education and the labour market;
•  minimum income protection and, in general terms, capacitating service 
provision.
The Social Investment Package, launched by the European Commission 
(2013a,b) in February, following a European Parliament (2012) Resolution on 
this topic, presents a similar argument and provides an interesting common 
orientation for EU Member States with its focus on early childhood education 
and care, preventing early school leaving, lifelong learning, affordable child care 
(as part of an active inclusion strategy), housing support (fighting homelessness), 
accessible health services and helping people live independently in old age. 
Social investment is as crucial for Europe’s success as research and technological 
investment, infrastructure investment, or physical capital investment. Moreover, 
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the assessment of the benefits and costs of all such investments are subject to 
the same judgemental rules – requiring both a long view and a wide view 12 in 
order to measure their full impact and not just their initial incidence.
The need for a long view with respect to social investment simply reflects the 
reality of human existence - with major investments in care and education in 
the earlier stages, substantial compensating economic returns in the central 
productive phase, and the drawing down from accumulated reserves towards 
the end.    
The need for a wide view reflects two concerns: the inter-dependence between 
social and other investments since the success of the latter depend to a large 
extent on the quality of the associated human resources, and the spill-over costs 
of social failure – whether in education, health, or social integration – which can 
place a serious and long-term debilitating and disruptive burden on economies 
and societies that are affected. 
The wide view also emphasizes complementarity between social investment and 
social protection. It would be naïve to deny tensions between principles of social 
protection and principles of social investment and the emphasis on activation that 
is associated with it. As already said, welfare state performance depends on the 
complementarity of effective investment in human capital and effective protection 
of human capital. Security against the adverse effects of illness, disability, and 
unemployment, old age, divorce and child-bearing is of value to citizens – which 
is important per se - but it is also of value to society at large, on which the burden 
of poverty and social instability would fall if there were no social protection.
12 We borrow the terminology used by the seminal work Cost-Benefit: A Survey, A.R. Prest and R. Turvey (1965).
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II. WHY A BASIC CONSENSUS ON 
THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL MODEL IS 
A NECESSITY
Whereas ten years ago the quest for an operational description of the European 
Social Model might have been dismissed as ‘interesting’ but not strictly necessary, 
today it is no less than an existential conundrum for the Union. We distinguish 
arguments applying specifically to the Eurozone from arguments applying to the 
EU as a whole.
A social dimension for the Eurozone:  
Functional, political and economic arguments
There are three reasons why the EMU (now comprising 18 Member States13) 
needs an additional social dimension: these are functional, political and economic.
There is first and foremost a functional argument, which fits in to a broader 
debate on the consequences of monetary unification and more particularly the 
fact that members of a currency area are confronted with a long-term trade-off 
between symmetry and flexibility. In textbooks on monetary unions, the need 
for flexibility is explained in terms of wage and price flexibility, labour mobility 
and migration, which determine a country’s ‘internal’ adjustment capacity in 
case of an asymmetric shock (i.e. a recession which only affects some Member 
States). Flexibility implies choices that are not socially neutral: less regulated 
labour markets, temporary shock absorbing mechanisms such as ‘Kurzarbeit’ 
in Germany, a highly skilled and versatile labour force… provide different ways 
and means to labour market flexibility, which can be mixed in different ways, 
according to social preferences. There might be a ‘high road’ to labour market 
flexibility, based predominantly on skills, as opposed to a ‘low road’, based 
predominantly on mere deregulation of labour markets.
13  Latvia adopted the euro on 1st January 2014. 
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Less flexibility necessitates more symmetry, according to the theory of optimal 
currency areas. In economic textbooks explaining this trade-off, symmetry is 
defined in purely economic terms, but sustaining symmetry in the long run may 
imply a degree of social convergence: there seem to be limits to the diversity in 
social systems that can be accommodated in a monetary union, not with regard 
to the details of their organisation, but with regard to some their fundamental 
parameters (Vandenbroucke, 2013). The insistence of the European Commission 
that retirement ages be indexed on longevity in all European Member States can 
be interpreted in this sense: apart from the fact that it may be good policy per se, 
for any welfare state, to establish a link between retirement ages and longevity, it 
is plausible to argue that unsustainable pension systems in some Member States 
of the Eurozone would lead to budgetary imbalances that threaten the Eurozone 
as such.  
Next to the trade-off between flexibility and symmetry, there is a well-known 
second trade-off: if the possibility exists of absorbing asymmetric shocks 
through budgetary transfers between members of a monetary union, then the 
need for flexibility is reduced. Knowing that labour mobility in the EU is limited 
in spite of free movement and that wages and prices are rather ‘sticky’, the 
absence of interstate fiscal transfers is, according to some, a key design flaw in 
the Eurozone. 
Pursuing the problem of economic shocks, it might be argued that the Eurozone 
not only suffers from a design flaw with regard to asymmetric shocks: it seems 
that the automatic stabilisation capacity that normally characterizes welfare 
states has been constrained by the actual functioning of EMU: perverse 
feedback-mechanisms related to sovereign debt can push Eurozone members 
in ‘bad equilibria’ and inhibit automatic stabilisation in reaction to a financial crisis 
(as described by De Grauwe, 2011). If this type of analysis is correct, EMU must 
be equipped with a stabilisation mechanism to compensate for the decreased 
stabilisation capacity of national welfare states. In short, we may need more 
solidarity in the Eurozone than is present at this moment; yet, what is called for 
is not a kind of ‘altruistic redistribution’, but ‘interstate insurance’ based on the 
enlightened self-interest of all the Member States (see Section 4).
Neither flexibility nor symmetry, nor indeed budgetary transfers, are socially 
neutral choices. The long-term trade-offs implied by monetary unification force 
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upon the participating countries a consensus on the social order which the 
monetary union has to serve. This entails discussions about sensitive social 
issues such as the degrees of freedom between countries with regard to pension 
systems and retirement age; but also with regard to the skills of their labour force 
and educational achievements; with regard to the role of migration.
We do need convergence, but what we see is the exact opposite: increasing 
divergence which undermines the sustainability of the EMU. Elsewhere I argue 
that excessive social imbalances threaten the monetary union as much as 
excessive economic imbalances (Vandenbroucke et al. 2013b). The expression 
‘excessive social imbalances’ describes a set of social problems that affect 
member states very differently (thus creating ‘imbalances’). These imbalances 
are not simply ‘similar problems’ in a subset of poorly performing member states: 
they should be a matter of common concern for all Eurozone members. Youth 
unemployment and child poverty are two examples. The argument has a political 
and economic dimension.
Politically, social divergence in the Eurozone threatens the sustainability of the 
project in that it will steadily undermine the credibility of the European project. 
Reasoning in terms of ‘us’ and ‘them’ – ‘the South’ versus ‘the North’ – will 
inevitably gain legitimacy, while the Union will lose legitimacy. This will make it 
increasingly difficult to take steps that are necessary to consolidate the Eurozone 
in the longer term, such as stabilizing fiscal transfers, let alone the creation of a 
fully-fledged fiscal union. European Commissioner László Andor warns that we 
may be heading towards ‘steadily weakening of the pro-European mainstream 
in Southern European countries, and some of these countries may not be far 
from a disastrous situation where Eurozone membership and democracy are no 
longer compatible’ (Andor, 2013: 3). Sustaining a fiscal union between entities 
requires mutual trust in each other’s internal social fabric.
In economic terms, the disparity and divergence in youth unemployment 
and child poverty (for example) can be seen as signalling objective economic 
problems that affect the long-term economic sustainability of the Eurozone. 
A comparatively high level of youth unemployment and child poverty is 
synonymous with an investment deficit that may be cause and effect in a vicious 
circle of underperforming labour markets, child care, education systems and 
transfer systems. If some members of the Eurozone get trapped into a vicious 
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circle of underperforming labour markets and education systems, such a ‘bad 
equilibrium’ creates an objective problem with regard to the economic symmetry 
that is required among the members of a monetary union. 
In sum, (1) managing the trade-off between symmetry and flexibility, (2) repairing 
the decreased stabilisation capacity of welfare states and (3) preventing 
excessive social imbalances (for political and economic reasons) presuppose 
an operational basic consensus on common, normatively charged objectives of 
social policy within the Eurozone. 
A social dimension for the EU28:   
Restoring regulatory capacity
Several other arguments in favour of an active social dimension to the EU 
transcend the Eurozone problematic, as they apply to the EU as a whole. A 
starting point may be the observation by Stephan Leibfried that ‘European 
integration has eroded both the sovereignty (the legal authority) and autonomy 
(de facto regulatory capacity) of member states to conduct their own social 
policies.’ (Leibfried, 2010: 254). Member States have lost more control over 
national welfare policies, in the face of pressures from integrated markets, than 
the EU has gained de facto in transferred authority: ‘The [EU] centre generates 
various constraints on social-policy development, rather than producing clear 
mandates for positive action. (…) Diminished member-state authority combined 
with continued weakness at the EU level restricts the room for innovative policy’ 
(Ibid, 278). In other words, the process of European integration has led to a loss 
of regulatory capacity, which must be restored, either at the European level or at 
the national level. This is not just worrying because of the need to regulate per 
se, but also because it may impacts negatively upon the capacity to innovate 
social policies. 
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The de facto regulatory capacity of welfare states and social dumping
With regard to the de facto regulatory capacity of Member States, a well-
known argument holds that far-reaching economic integration without social 
harmonisation induces downward pressure (‘social dumping’) on social 
development in the most advanced Member States, notably in low qualified 
services (mostly women) and in the heavy manual work (men), particularly in 
the building sector, and transport. Intensified intra-EU competition would create 
the risk of a ‘race to the bottom’, whereby the member states with lowest 
social standards become the most competitive in terms of production costs 
(see Maslauskaite, 2013, for a nuanced discussion). Although in the past the 
spectre of large-scale social dumping has never materialized, in the enlarged EU 
of today blatant cases of illegal working conditions and exploitation do occur, 
resulting from the interplay of lacunae in the (domestic) implementation of social 
and employment protection in the Member States, reduced legal sovereignty 
of the Member States, and the absence of common social standards in a very 
heterogeneous entity. 
Fears of social dumping, but also welfare tourism, are causing considerable 
social and political tensions with regard to labour migration. Postwar Europe has 
transformed itself from an emigration to an immigration region: both net migration 
to the EU 14 (mostly from developing countries) and within the European Union 
have increased sharply (Diez Guardia and Pichelmann, 2006; de la Rica et al, 
2013). As a result, the EU has already acquired a significant migrant population15. 
The available studies emphasize the broadly positive long-term influence of 
migration on (European) host labour markets and welfare states, which include 
(fiscal) gains for the whole economy, and partially offsetting demographic 
developments, at least in the short- and medium term 16. 
At the same time, however, many European countries are not doing a very good 
job at integrating foreign workers in their labour markets, where they occupy a 
relatively vulnerable position. They are indeed overrepresented in the informal 
economy, in low-skilled, low-paid, flexible and often atypical blue collar jobs as 
well as in the service sector; often the jobs taken in destination countries are of 
a lower qualification than those left (pointing to ‘brain waste’). In addition, the 
14  In absolute numbers, migration from third countries is a much more important phenomenon than intra-EU mobility. 
15 Of all foreign-born worldwide 20% live in the EU; in turn, 19% of all residents of the EU are either non-EU citizens or foreign-born or 
had parents or grandparents born abroad, and an additional 11% are EU citizens who are returned migrants or have a foreign spouse 
(Kaczmarczyk et al, 2012:7)
16 Population ageing affects migrants themselves, as they get older and their fertility patterns tend to resemble those in their host country.
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unemployment rates of foreign workers in general are two to three times higher 
than those of natives, except in recent immigration countries. 
While there is no conclusive evidence that the sizeable (and unprecedented) 
labour migration 17 flow from the EU8 countries which accessed the EU in 2004 
caused significant labour market disturbances in the EU15 countries , the ‘Polish 
plumber’ debate 19 in France re-emerged during 2013. Similar fears are present 
in the public debate in the UK 20, Germany, Denmark, The Netherlands and 
Sweden, but also in Spain, Greece, and Italy. In Central and Eastern European 
countries there is also a tense debate about labour migrants from neighbouring 
countries such as Ukraine and Belorussia. 
As the economic crisis gave rise to stark differences in recent migration patterns21, 
this type of discussion will not be easily resolved as was perfectly illustrated by 
the heated debates about the consequences of ending transitional restrictions 
on Bulgarian and Romanian workers on 1 January 2014. In sum, it would seem 
that well developed EU countries are confronted with a ‘liberal paradox’ (Hollifield 
et al. 2008): in order to remain competitive in the globalising world they need to 
open their economies to migrants to meet their labour market needs and finance 
the social protection systems, but at the same time security reasons as well as 
internal political forces push them towards a more restrictive, even protectionist, 
approach. 
A crucial condition to confront the ‘liberal paradox’ is that Member States 
must be able to uphold their social legislation in a context of increased labour 
migration. Migration and posting of workers should fit into a regulated social 
17 Out of 3.8 million immigrants recorded in 2008 more than one million originated from the former European communist countries. The CEE 
member states of the EU-27 accounted for around 60% of intra-EU population movements (Kaczmarczyk et al, 2012:9).  
18 For an early assessment, see Diez Guardia and Pichelmann (2006). De la Rica et al. (2013) conclude their survey as follows: ’Turning to the 
effects of immigration on the economic outcomes of natives, the majority of studies, though not all, find a surprisingly small response of the 
relative wages of natives to immigration-induced changes in the size and skill composition of the labour force. (…) Exploiting improved and 
expanded datasets, several authors find statistically and economically large effects on the wages of subsets of the workforce. In particular, 
there exists clear evidence that immigration reduces the wages of workers employed in unskilled-intensive service sectors. Likewise, several 
authors have shown that recent immigration leads to a sharp reduction in the wages of previous immigrants. (…) It appears that comparably 
skilled natives and immigrants are imperfect substitutes in production. This seems to be the result of endogenous responses by native 
workers, who are able to reduce their exposure to competition from recent immigrants by specializing in occupations that build on their 
comparative advantage in communication-intensive tasks. Furthermore, skilled native females increase their labour supply in response to 
the greater availability of household services provided by immigrants, firms adjust their production technologies to the changes in the skill 
composition of the local work force.’   
19The ‘Polish plumber’ came to prominence in French public debate in 2005, becoming a symbol for undesirable eastern European workers. 
20In January 2014, British Prime Minister David Cameron said the EU treaties should be changed to allow member states to withhold child 
allowances and other social benefits for workers from other member states.
21Some countries immediately experienced a deep decline in the inflow of migrants (e.g. Spain, the Czech Republic, Italy and Ireland); some 
others experienced hardly any changes (e.g. the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Sweden and Austria); but there were also some where 
the inflow of migrants strongly intensified (e.g. Portugal and Denmark) (Kaczmarczyk et al, 2012:7).
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order, it must not undermine that social order. Hence the importance of the 
recent agreement reached by between Social Affairs Ministers (December 
2013) on the controversial posting-of-workers enforcement directive. The latter 
is supposed to resolve various well-known legal, administrative and practical 
forms of abuse, circumvention of regulations and fraudulent practices when 
workers are temporarily posted in another country.  The revised directive now 
falls to negotiations between EU countries and the European Parliament. Merely 
a few months before the European elections (May 2014), especially the issues 
of national control measures and liability in subcontracting chains remain highly 
sensitive.
The question of to what extent Member States can uphold social standards in 
a context of free movement is also relevant with regard to minimum wages: the 
Viking and Laval judgments by the Court of Justice have called into question trade 
unions’ scope for action on such matters and seem to give precedence to the 
liberal principle of free movement regarding the question whether minimum wages 
in the country of employment are applicable to posted workers from another 
Member State. The line of thought developed by the Court in these cases merits 
a nuanced debate, as explained in the next paragraph; simultaneously these 
judgments signalled the need for legislative action. Mario Monti (2010) raised the 
problem in his report on the single market, and in March 2012 the Commission 
took an initiative to adapt legislation in this area, which should in effect widen the 
scope for trade union action. Bruun and Bücker (2012), however, argue that the 
Commission’s proposal was inadequate and did not go far enough. They argue 
that, in this instance, fundamental social rights ought to be given precedence 
over, or at least receive equal weight to, economic freedoms. Meanwhile, the 
Commission initiative was blocked by a number of national parliaments, using 
the subsidiarity ‘alarm procedure’.
The example of minimum wage regulation highlights a deeper problem with regard 
to the traditional notion of subsidiarity in social policy. In Member States such as 
Germany and Sweden, trade unions resisted state regulation of minimum wages: 
they considered that to be the domain of collective bargaining and a no-go area 
for public authorities; thus, they applied a (domestic) principle of subsidiarity. 
The Viking and Laval judgements by the Court suggest that that traditional 
position may be unsustainable: the Court argues that only predictable systems 
of minimum wage protection can be imposed on foreign companies that post 
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workers. If that argument is accepted, it would mean that social partners must 
reconsider traditional positions on subsidiarity within welfare states, i.e. they 
must reconsider the respective roles of social partners and public authorities, 
or, reconsider the relation between nationwide collective bargaining and local 
bargaining.22  Simultaneously, such an argument would politically23 strengthen the 
case for a pan-European framework with regard to the concept and regulation of 
minimum wages. In other words, both at the domestic and the European level, 
we must reconsider the application of subsidiarity principles, given new contexts 
in which social policy operates today.24 
Reduced legal authority
The problematic described above by Stephan Leibfried, notably with regard to 
the reduced legal sovereignty of national welfare states, suggests an intrinsic 
conflict between the imperatives of, on the one hand, economic integration in a 
free market and trans-border mobility of citizens and services; and, on the other, 
the development of national welfare states and communities through nationally 
conceived reciprocity of rights and duties (see also Ferrera, 2005). Direct 
imposition of ‘market compatibility requirements’, or ‘negative policy reform’, as 
Leibfried and Pierson (1995) call it, mainly occurs through the application of two 
fundamental freedoms provided for in the Treaty: the free movement of workers 
and the freedom to provide services policy .25 
The technical coordination of social security rights for mobile citizens across 
the EU, which is in itself a considerable social acquis of the European project, 
entrenching fundamental principles of non-discrimination on the basis of 
nationality, implies a loss of sovereignty in the following sense:
22 ’Predictability’ suggests that Member States must create a legal context in which only generally applicable minimum wage protection has 
to be respected by foreign service providers. Blauberger (2012) argues that the actual response in Sweden and Denmark to the Laval case 
preserves the autonomy of collective bargaining, but also shows how that response impacts on the autonomy of collective bargaining: ‘[B]
oth reforms reaffirm the autonomy of collective bargaining, but introduce conditions for the exercise of collective action. As a consequence, 
collective agreements can only be enforced through collective action against foreign service providers if they correspond to existing 
nationwide collective agreements and do not define conditions beyond the ‘hard core’ of the posted workers directive’, (p. 117-118). Thus, 
this implies that the Swedish and Danish domestic responses also change the rules of the game in terms of the ‘subsidiarity’ of the national 
versus the local level.
23We write ‘politically’ here, because the argument in this sentence is not of a legal nature.
24There are yet other reasons (linked to the development of the service sector and SMEs) why public authorities should intervene in minimum 
wage regulation, whilst that was seen as unnecessary or even harmful in the past; cf. the debate in Germany leading to the new coalition’s 
agreement on minimum wages. 
25The following paragraphs are to a large extent inspired by the analysis of Leibfried (2010) and Leibfried and Pierson (1995).
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•  a Member State may no longer limit most social benefits to its citizens;
•  a Member State may no longer insist that its benefits only apply to, and can 
only be provided within, its territory;
•  Member States do not have an exclusive right to administer migrants' 
claims to welfare benefits.
The piecemeal application of the principle of free movement of services is closely 
linked to the fact that the treaties, as well as secondary European law, focus 
on economic activity and entrepreneurial freedoms. The question is obviously: 
do welfare state services constitute an economic activity? If so, the freedom to 
provide financial or social services would apply, as would the general European 
competition regime, implying, for example, that Member governments can no 
longer exclusively decide who may provide social services or benefits.
Fortunately, European integration does acknowledge non-economic true welfare 
activity, and the Court of Justice has issued a set of often nuanced judgments. 
However, there is no general exemption for welfare state activity from the treaty's 
market freedoms, and the distinction between ‘economic’ and ‘welfare’ (or 
‘solidarity’) activity is not always clear-cut. Hence, drawing - and continually 
redrawing - this fine line between ‘economic’ and ‘solidarity’ activity is what much 
of the legal conflict and judgments of the ECJ are about. Since the 1960s the 
ECJ has delivered about 900 decisions on social policy topics (which puts social 
policy in second place for demand for ECJ decisions, agriculture being placed 
first), two thirds of which are related to free movement, workers and their social 
security. Since the Court decides on a case-by-case basis this situation creates 
a great deal of insecurity as regards the range of policy options still available (or 
prohibited) to sovereign welfare states. 
The example of health care (elaborated upon below) shows that it would certainly 
be simplistic to blame ‘Europe’ for the problems national social policy makers are 
confronted with, as if ‘Europe’ enforced market solutions upon reluctant Member 
States. As a matter of fact, instead of asking the question ‘Do welfare state 
services constitute economic activity?’ one could put forward a slightly different 
question: ‘To what extent do Member States believe they can organise their 
domestic welfare services as an economic activity?’
58 Friends of Europe | Life Quality
The case of health care indeed illustrates this point: Internal market rules 
increasingly apply to aspects of health systems in an unanticipated way. This 
process is mainly driven by the Court of Justice, directly applying the basic 
Treaty provisions to this sector. Treaty rules on free movement of services now 
apply to health care services, irrespective of the way in which they are funded. 
Health authorities thus have to reimburse care obtained abroad (which provides 
real opportunities for patients, especially in countries with waiting lists) and can 
no longer ask for prior authorization as far as ambulatory care is concerned. 
Some, but certainly not all of the legal uncertainties surrounding the issue were 
settled in 2011 through a Directive (2011/24/EU) on the application of Patients’ 
Rights in Cross-border Healthcare (Council of the EU, 2011). But the impact of 
application of the free movement rules reaches far beyond the issue of patient 
mobility.  Health care providers can challenge any kind of regulation in the health 
care sector for hindering their fundamental freedoms. This applies for instance to 
rules on ownership (who can own an optician's shop?), capacity planning (can 
authorities limit the number of pharmacies in a given geographical area?), or legal 
status (can authorities require a hospital to have a not-for-profit status?). The 
rules on free movement of persons also apply to health care professionals, and 
can challenge national quota systems limiting the number of doctors in training. 
The application of EU competition law also creates a great degree of uncertainty 
as regards price fixing and state aid in the health care sector, and even puts 
pressure on existing contracting arrangements between payers and providers, 
which are at the very heart of some health care systems.26 In short, even if 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) tries to balance the social 
objectives of the national systems when deciding upon the applicability of market 
rules, it cannot take into account all the possible consequences of its decisions 
– direct but also and mainly indirect consequences. It would therefore seem 
desirable (but politically unlikely) that progress is made on a clear legal framework 
with regard to ‘services of general interest’ which would provide a legal exemption 
from competition law to be applied to national health care systems; or to at least 
provide legal certainty regarding this issue. 
26 In addition, it should be noted that secondary legislation that is not specifically drafted for the health sector can have significant unintended 
impacts when applied to the health sector. For example the Working time Directive limits the long work hours that junior doctors can perform 
as part of their training.
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All this underscores that a neat separation between ‘market issues’, belonging to 
the supranational sphere, and ‘social issues’, belonging to the national spheres, 
is unsustainable. This observation inspired the proposal to introduce a ‘horizontal 
social clause’ in the European legal architecture, for the purpose of emphasising 
more strongly the significance of solidarity as an ordering principle and in order 
to provide clearer guidance in this grey area to all European institutions, including 
the Court of Justice. 
Such a horizontal social clause found its way, via the Lisbon Treaty, into Article 
9 TFEU, which formulates the requirement that all EU actions take into account 
‘the promotion of a high level of employment, the guarantee of adequate social 
protection, the fight against social exclusion, and a high level of education, training 
and protection of human health’. Will this clause play an important role? Opinions 
diverge and the jury is still out. For the EESCs, the (legally binding) social clause 
represents a major step forward to a more social Europe, and it intends to draw 
up an annual opinion on its application (EESC, 2012). If Article 9TFEU seems to 
have remained dead letters so far, according to a critical reading by de Witte this 
is also because it does not transfer any new competences to the EU, and can 
therefore not be used as a legal base for the establishment of a pro-active and 
comprehensive EU social policy (de Witte et al., 2010:34). 
One could imagine that the social clause is used to push for the incorporation 
of social policy objectives in competition, state aid and internal market rules 
(Ibid: 36); for instance, in its Report on the Internal Market for Services, the 
European Parliament recalls that the Services Directive must be interpreted in 
the light of the Article 9 TFEU (EP, 2013b). In practice, however the debate about 
the horizontal social clause has been narrowed down (esp. by the European 
Commission) to the issue of Social Impact Assessments (SIA). But here, too, 
the ambitions have been strictly limited: SIA’s have not been generalised across 
the full range of economic and social policies; SIA has not been part of the 
design of macroeconomic adjustment programmes. Hence, the horizontal social 
clause did not play a visible role when designing macroeconomic adjustment 
programmes – where it should have played a role.
And yet, the horizontal social clause should not necessarily remain a purely 
rhetorical statement, if it plays a role in the deliberations of the Court of Justice. 
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The Court indeed mentioned the clause in a judgement 27 (as well as in the 
preceding Opinion) in 2012, but the reference does not seem very significant 
in this case (i.e. the decision could have been the same without reference to 
Article 9). Potentially far more significant is that the Advocate General referred 
to the horizontal clause in an Opinion in 2010, and argued (in a case related to 
the posting of workers) that the new Article 9 implies no less than a revision of 
the reasoning of the court: “To the extent that the new primary law framework 
provides for a mandatory high level of social protection, it authorises the Member 
States, for the purpose of safeguarding a certain level of social protection, to 
restrict a freedom, and to do so without European Union law’s regarding it 
as something exceptional and, therefore, as warranting a strict interpretation” 
(Case C 515/08, dos Santos Palhota e.a.: §53) 28. While the Court did not follow 
this reasoning, and even refrained from referring to Article 9 TFEU, the Opinion 
clearly illustrates the potential of the horizontal social clause to prompt significant 
redirections of European policies in the future (Vielle, 2012).
A shared notion of solidarity
The foregoing discussion shows that the next steps in European integration must 
be based on a shared understanding of solidarity. To be more precise: we have 
to entertain two perspectives on the meaning of ‘solidarity’ in Europe: a pan-
European notion of solidarity and solidarity within national welfare states. The 
pan-European notion of solidarity refers to economic convergence and cohesion 
on a European scale. But it also refers to the rights of individuals to improve their 
own lives by working in a Member State other than the Member State where 
they were born; the rights of patients to benefit, under certain conditions, from 
medical care in other Member States than their state of residence…. Solidarity 
within national Member States refers to social insurance, income redistribution, 
the balance of social rights and obligations… defining national welfare states. 
This duality of perspective cannot be reduced to a single one, as it is premised 
on conflicting views on the size of the solidarity circle concerned: the ‘we’ to 
27 Case C-544/10 Deutsches Weintor eG v Land Rheinland-Pfalz
28The authors would like to thank Pascale Vielle for pointing out these Court cases and their possible significance.
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which solidarity applies is differently defined. Hence, solidarity is inevitably a 
complex (multidimensional) notion, when used in the European context. There 
should be no denying that it can imply trade-offs (national vs. EU), certainly in the 
short term. However, the political legitimacy of the European project depends 
on a virtuous circle of growing pan-European and national cohesion. Sustaining 
such a virtuous circle should be the primary objective of a social Europe.
Consecutive enlargements as well as monetary unification made this intrinsically 
complex notion of solidarity even more demanding and difficult to handle.29 Indeed, 
what is seen by some as ‘the dynamics of upward convergence’ associated with 
the enlargement of the EU, is seen as ‘social dumping’ by others. At the same 
time, the discussion above demonstrated that monetary unification necessitates 
forms of solidarity which were, thus far, a no-go area in European politics. 
Conceptually, solidarity can take the form of ‘mutual insurance’ or of 
‘redistribution’; in practice it is often a mixture of both. Both mutual insurance 
and redistribution presuppose reciprocity, but with different emphases. When 
solidarity is defined as mutual insurance, reciprocity is embedded in contribution-
based entitlements. When solidarity entails redistribution, it implies a propensity 
to cooperate and share with others similarly disposed, even at personal cost. In 
any case, reciprocity requires a sense of common goals and values among the 
actors concerned. 
29 Iceland, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey are all official candidates to become Members of the EU. Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina have concluded an association agreement and are preparing an application for EU membership.
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The necessity of a European Social Union
The success – or failure – of the Eurozone has become crucial for the EU’s 
future: this section has argued that the long-term trade-offs implied by monetary 
unification force upon the participating countries a basic consensus on the social 
order which the monetary union has to serve: this is no longer a superfluous 
luxury, but a necessity. Such a consensus must also cover the issue of Member 
States’ mutual obligations, i.e. what these countries may demand from one 
another (an understanding of ‘European solidarity’ as reciprocity). This will be 
the only way to move beyond ‘small repairs’ to the EMU construction, and to 
start addressing its fundamental design flaws. Or, in the words of European 
Commissioner László Andor: today’s functioning of the EMU and sticking to the 
Maastricht orthodoxy ‘is not sustainable: it must be either altered through reform 
of the EMU, or the EU itself risks being destroyed by political conflict between the 
EMU's winners and losers’ (Andor, 2013:3). 
This is why EMU must be complemented with a genuine social dimension for 
it to be sustainable in the long term. A Social Union would support national 
welfare states on a systemic level in some of their key functions (such as 
macroeconomic stabilisation) and guide the substantive development of 
national welfare states – via general social standards and objectives, leaving 
ways and means of social policy to Member States – on the basis of an 
operational definition of ‘the European social model’. In other words, European 
countries would cooperate in a union with an explicit social purpose – hence, 
the expression ‘European Social Union’ (ESU). ESU, so conceived, is not only 
desirable, but necessary. 
When defining the social dimension of EMU, Fernandes and Maslauskaite (2013a) 
convincingly argue that EMU should not have a parallel and separate social pillar 
to be added to the four essential building blocks identified in Van Rompuy’s June 
2012 report (European Council, 20112a): integrated financial, budgetary, and 
economic frameworks as well as democratic legitimacy. The social dimension 
should be mainstreamed into all EMU initiatives because social policies are very 
often affected by policies pursued in other areas. 
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Fernandes and Maslauskaite (Ibid) distinguish between EMU and the EU28 (‘If 
reinforcing the social dimension at the EU28 level is desirable, but less feasible, 
more social integration on the EMU level is necessary and should be more 
feasible’); yet, they argue that it is also desirable to reinforce the social dimension 
of the EU as a whole. Our analysis in section 2.2. supports that conclusion: at the 
level of the EU28, we must deepen our mutual understanding of the social goals 
to be achieved by market integration and the mobility of people, services, goods 
and capital; and it must be possible to maintain principles of social regulation that 
serve those goals. 
Last but not least, there is an argument that applies both to the EMU and to 
the EU28. Given the legacy of the crisis, as documented in section 1, there is 
a need to counteract the effects of the crisis by more resolute action at the EU 
level to promote sustainable growth, employment and social investment. What is 
at stake, fundamentally, is the legitimacy of the European project and the need 
for public support; a recent Eurobarometer survey suggests that trust in the EU 
continues to decline 30 Without a sense of common destiny, supported by a clear 
narrative on the social ambition of European cooperation, the European project is 
doomed to ‘muddle through’. Pragmatic observers sometimes justify ‘muddling 
through’ as – ultimately – a successful strategy. However, notwithstanding the 
signs of economic recovery today, ‘muddling through’ is an increasingly risky 
strategy, given the ongoing erosion of political capital. 
30 Note that trust in the European Union is still (somewhat) higher than trust in national governments and parliaments (European Commission, 
(2013e).
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III. THE EU’S SOCIAL DIMENSION 
FIVE DECADES ON 
As mentioned in the introduction, the founding fathers saw the harmonisation 
of social systems as the (spontaneous) result of the functioning of the common 
market, and not as a policy to be actively pursued. Even more: they agreed on a 
neat division of labour: economic integration was to be organized at the EU level, 
while national governments would remain responsible for the adoption of social 
policies. Already in the 1990s, scholars of European integration started arguing 
that such a division of labour is no longer sustainable, in view of the obvious 
tensions it causes between national principles of solidarity and community on 
the one hand, and European principles of market integration and mobility on the 
other; the example of health care which we visited briefly in section 2.2; illustrates 
this. Our analysis of the Eurozone’s predicament implies a similar conclusion. The 
challenge is therefore to develop a basic consensus about the social order which 
the monetary union and the freedom of movement of persons, services, goods 
and capital, have to support. 
This said, one should not overlook the fact that during the past fifty years a 
European social dimension has been actively pursued – in spite of the founding 
fathers' assumptions and the initial Treaty stipulations – which led to a non-trivial 
social acquis (broadly understood, including employment and non-discrimination). 
This section outlines this historical development, since we will need to answer the 
following question: To what extent can the challenges analysed in the previous 
sections be tackled within the existing policy instruments and processes? 
We discuss four variants of the day-to-day EU social policymaking: the traditional 
Community method, the EU distributional mode, policy coordination and social 
dialogue.
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The traditional Community method and the 
Court’s activism 31
For a long time, the Community method was seen as the predominant (and 
even ideal) method of supranational policy making (Wallace, 2010). And yet, the 
EU’s legislative involvement in employment and social policy should in principle 
be a rather short story to tell. The consecutive Treaties only provided a limited 
transfer of powers from the national to the EU level in these areas. In the case 
of employment, for example, the treaty requirements insist that employment 
legislation respects variations in industrial relations and labour law systems 
(which often leads to significant exemptions being granted) and that small and 
medium-sized firms should be protected from excessive regulatory burdens. This 
obviously limits the scope for real coercion (Rhodes, 2010). 
This is not to say that there has been no activist role for Brussels in social 
policy developments, but the obstacles to such activism are formidable: first, 
institutionally, because either unanimity or a qualified majority is needed for most 
initiatives in social policy, as Member governments protect their social policy 
prerogatives on the basis of the subsidiarity principle. Second, politically, there 
is the historical opposition of some large Member States (notably the UK) to any 
new transfer of power to the EU (Leibfried, 2010). 
In spite of these formidable hurdles, the EU has accumulated substantial 
regulatory mandates in employment, social and anti-discrimination policy.32  
This is first of all the case with regard to the technical coordination of social 
security rights, which is to guarantee the free movement of persons. The Council 
of Ministers gave high priority to the Regulation on this issue, which was one 
of the first measures ever taken by the European Economic Community (EEC): 
already on 1 January 1959, Regulations No 3 and 4 - later Regulation 1408/71, 
now Regulation 883/2004 - on social security for migrant workers entered into 
force.
31 We lack the space to pay due attention to the European Parliament's activism in the domain of social policy. The Parliament has a track 
record of pushing for tough legislative initiatives in the social domain.  
32 The current legislative output is also significant, as may become clear in this section. Around 60 labour market Directives have been 
introduced since 1987 (Vaubel, 2008), as well as more than 20 health and safety directives. There are many more Occupational Safety and 
Health (OSH) Directives and Regulations, while in gender equality 13 Directives have been adopted so far.
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Next, there is the case of gender equality at work, which has had a sound treaty 
base ever since the Treaty of Rome (Article 119 EEC). As a result, since the mid-
1970s, a range of directives have been adopted by the Member States. The 
CJEU played an activist role in this which (a) gave a broad interpretation to the 
Treaty provisions and the directives, (b) provided legitimation to the Commission’s 
ambitious legislative agenda, and (c) helped to ensure the implementation of 
directives. The latter have brought in protective gender equality legislation that 
was previously non-existent in several Member States.33 EU institutions have 
been important catalysts in shaping women’s economic, political and social 
equality in Europe; it has even been argued that gender equality is visible only in 
pure gender legislation: the EU as a gender-equal polity is, according to critics, a 
‘myth’ (Macrae, 2010: 171). 
The activist stance taken by the ECJ in the eighties and nineties also paved 
the way for the adoption of a broader series of more general anti-discrimination 
Directives (on Anti-Racism and Employment). This was done by extending, 
in the Treaty of Amsterdam, the prohibition on labour discrimination from the 
longstanding areas of ‘nationality’ and ‘gender’, to new grounds such as ‘racial 
and other origins, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation’. 
A third case in the area of EU social policymaking is health and safety in the 
workplace. The first (and arguably most important) European Framework 
Directive on Safety and Health at Work (89/391 EEC) produced a range of 
daughter directives on specific hazards, such as exposure to chemical agents 
(98/24/EC), biological agents ( 2000/54/EC), electromagnetic fields (2004/40/
EC), asbestos (83/477/EEC) etc. 
Rhodes (2010) describes how the European Commission played a ‘treaty-base 
game’, in which it stretched the interpretations of ‘health and safety’ as far as 
possible to develop an agenda on working conditions and workers’ rights, when 
a firm legal treaty base was missing. Directives on Atypical work (91/383/EC) 
and Pregnant workers (92/85/EC) required more generous policies in several EU 
countries; they were adopted under the ‘health and safety’ provisions, allowing 
33 For example, EU legislation introduced parental leave to the United Kingdom, has defined sexual harassment in the workplace as a form 
of discrimination and has brought about changes in pension laws to protect women who choose to stay at home to raise their children 
(Macrae, 2010: 160).
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qualified majority voting (QMV). This was also the case for the highly contested 
Working Time Directive (2003/88/EC), which set a limit to weekly working hours, 
but excluded a number of sectors and allowed important derogations for the 
Member States. The Young Workers' Directive (94/33/EC) prohibited work by 
children under the age of 15 and gave rights to those under the age of eighteen 
(again, with many derogations allowed). EU legislation also supported social 
dialogue: the European Works Councils were established (Directive 94/45/EC) 
in 1994, after the failure to reach an agreement among the cross-industry social 
partners. 
The high point in the development of social policy mandates dates to the mid-
1990s. The 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, with its Social Chapter, enlarged the 
scope of the original mandates on health and safety (now broadened to all 
working conditions) and gender equality (extended to all labour force issues). The 
latter was now placed under QMV, as was the case for worker information and 
consultation and integration of people excluded from the labour market. At the 
same time, the range of subjects on which bargaining can be initiated between 
the social partners was considerably limited, by explicitly excluding three key 
topics, namely pay, the right of association, the right to strike or the right to 
impose lock-outs. 
The Amsterdam treaty also added a new chapter on Employment (see section 3.3 
below). The extended QMV (and decreased possibility to form a blocking minority 
after the ‘northern enlargement’ in 1995) led to the adoption of Directives on 
Parental leave (96/34/EC), Part-time work (97/81/EC) and Fixed-term contracts 
(1999/70/EC), all three of which had been agreed by the cross-industry social 
partners (see section 3.4 below) and constitute the prime achievements of Euro-
corporatism endowed with legislative powers. 
Reference should also be made to the range of EU Directives which were 
primarily aimed at the consolidation of the internal market, but de facto 
supported employment and social protection. Examples include early Directives 
on dismissals (75/129/EEC); procedural rights under collective redundancies 
(98/59/EC), rights of employees under change of ownership of undertakings 
(77/187/EEC), worker’s rights in the event of cross-border mergers (2005/56/
EC) and state compensation in case of insolvency (80/987/EEC). 
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As importantly, there is the legislation relating to the safety of machinery, which 
led to the development of an unprecedented body of protective European 
standards. Crucially, these were often the synthesis of the highest protective 
standard available, and therefore represented a significant step forward in most 
countries. The first Machinery Directive (89/392/EEC) was adopted in 1989 and 
contributed to a significant reduction in the number and severity of occupational 
accidents and illnesses (Fraser, 2012). Many of these European standards have 
also been ‘exported’ to the rest of the world via ISO (now so-called ‘EN ISO’) 
standards. 
At the same time it should be noted that the level of enforcement (‘market 
surveillance’) of the internal market Directives is inadequate. In some Member 
States and for some products, there is still next to no enforcement activity, which 
begs the question of increased market surveillance activity by the European 
Commission. Even in the Member States with a serious market surveillance 
system, the public services concerned are all suffering cuts in budget and staff, 
including as a result of the economic crisis. Both trade unions and industry 
representatives agree that the European Commission has yet to devote significant 
new resources to the coordination of market surveillance activity (Ibid).
More recent legislative initiatives have become far scarcer, but are still ongoing. 
Following the strengthened legal base in the Treaty of Amsterdam, a Framework 
directive was adopted on equal treatment in employment and occupation 
(Directive 2000/78) which aims to combat a wide range of discriminations. 
A European Company Statute was created in 2001, which also provides for 
the involvement of employees in such companies; on a similar topic, a highly 
controversial directive (2002/14/EC) on national information and consultation 
rules was agreed in 2002. The issue of equal treatment between women and 
men was moved outside the workplace, through a Directive (2004/113/EC) 
aimed at combating sex discrimination in access to and supply of goods and 
services.  
Some, but certainly not all of the legal uncertainties surrounding the issue of 
Cross-border Healthcare (cf. section 4.2) were removed in 2011 through a 
Directive (2011/24/EU) on the application of Patients’ Rights in Cross-border 
Healthcare. While negotiations between the cross-industry social partners 
concerning a revision of the Working Time Directive failed in 2012, and the 
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Social Affairs Ministers reached a hard-fought agreement (December 2013) on 
the controversial posting-of-workers enforcement directive (cf. section 2.2). 
The European Commission also proposed legislation with the aim of attaining 
an objective of 40% of women in non-executive board-member positions: the 
European Parliament voted with an overwhelming majority (November 2013) 
in favour of backing the European Commission’s proposal. In the area of 
health and safety, Member States agreed (December 2013) on a review of the 
abovementioned directive (2004/40/EC) concerning the protection of workers 
exposed to electromagnetic fields, which encountered huge implementation 
problems. Finally, a rather weak agreement was reached (December 2013) 
regarding the acquisition and preservation of supplementary (occupational) 
pension rights, but which excludes the key issue of transferability.  
The EU distributional mode
Once the Single European Act (1986) had enshrined the EU’s ‘Cohesion policy’ 
in a constitutional text, the 1988 reform of the Structural Funds 34meant the start 
of a genuine Community policy which ‘is not simply a matter of throwing money 
at problems…It implies rather a willingness to act at Community level to redress 
the disparities between regions and between different social groups’ (Delors, 
1988). Over the past decades this policy has undergone radical transformations 
in at least three important respects 35, which are relevant for the discussion about 
the European Social Union (ESU).
First, expenditure on cohesion policy through the structural and cohesion funds 
- namely the European regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social 
Fund (ESF) and the Cohesion Fund - grew steadily, from a modest 5% of the EU 
34 The ERDF and the ESF are the two ‘Structural Funds’ (for a long time the rural development fund and the fisheries fund were regarded as 
Structural funds as well, but then became ‘independent’). The ERDF is the largest: since 1975 it has provided support for the creation of 
infrastructure and job-creating investment (mainly for small businesses) in declining industrial regions. The ESF, set up in 1958, supports EES 
objectives such as raising employment rates and preventing long-term unemployment, mainly through training measures. The Cohesion 
Fund was set up in 1993 and finances environment and transport networks, first in Spain, Greece and Portugal and later in the ten new 
member States. Structural Fund and Cohesion Fund support always involves a degree of co-financing from the Member States, which in the 
new budget (2014-2020) will depend on whether regions are ‘less developed’ (GDP per capita < 75% of EU average), a (new, intermediate 
category of) ‘transition region’ (GDP per capita between 75% and 90% of EU average) or ‘more developed’ (GDP per capita > 90% of EU 
average).
35 There is a fourth transformation, which we do not discuss here: the actors involved and the power relations between them (i.e. between the 
European Commission and the Member States) have changed considerably.
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budget in 1975 to more than one third (35%, or 347 billion Euros) in the period 
2007-2013. It is thereby the second largest EU budget item. At the same time, 
it remains modest, both in terms of the national GDP of recipient countries (the 
highest share was 4% of national GDP in Greece, before 2004) and in terms 
of the EU GDP (about 0.46% in 2013). Each of the two ‘Delors Packages’, in 
1988 and 1992 respectively, doubled the allocations for cohesion policy (Jouen, 
2012). In both cases the need for more European solidarity through a major cash 
injection was presented by the Commission as a sine qua non as well as a matter 
of fairness, in the context of establishing the internal market and the prospect of 
EMU 36, respectively (Manzella and Mendez, 2009). 
Second, cohesion policy has been increasingly concentrated in terms of 
beneficiaries and goals. In terms of the beneficiaries, a majority of resources 
are targeted (since 1988) on the most disadvantaged European regions. These 
received 81.5% of the budget in the period 2007-2013; in the 2014-2020 period 
the most developed countries will receive a modest 16% of the funds. While 
some Member States have repeatedly tried to restrict Cohesion policy support 
to the less developed Member States, it is still the case that all regions in all 
EU member states – even the richest – are eligible for at least some degree of 
funding (thus, the ERDF has provided ‘something for everyone’ since 2007). 
At the same time, the large number of (sometimes conflicting) objectives the 
money could be spent on will be considerably reduced in all funds in the new 
programming period (in the ERDF, for example, Member States always had great 
leeway to spend the money on their own preferences). The ESF has been the 
first to have moved to a policy approach (abandoning the earlier target group 
approach): since 2000, ESF spending has provided financial support for the 
actions taken with the framework of the European Employment Strategy (EES). 
In the new programming period the structural funds will have to support the 
Europe 2020 Strategy (see below). This points to a progressive embedding of 
cohesion policy within the EU’s more general socio-economic strategy. 
36 The very first Council commitment to the creation of a regional development fund - in the early 1970’s – already made an explicit link with 
EMU, the move towards which had been decided in 1969 (Manzella and Mendez, 2009:23).
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Third, the structural and cohesion funds also underwent important changes in 
terms of their conditionality and control. Especially in view of the consecutive 
enlargements, the controls over spending have been tightened considerably 
over the years, to the extent that the system became overly complex and 
bureaucratic. These checks include multi-annual planning (inspiring more long-
term and strategic approaches, at least in the ESF), additionality (EU expenditure 
is not to be substituted for national expenditure), concentration (on a smaller set 
of priorities and on the least developed regions, cf. supra), partnership (ensuring 
a policy space for regional and local authorities as well as social partners and 
NGOs), evaluation and monitoring (improving national and regional public 
administration).
In spite of these manifold changes, the EU cohesion funds remain contested 
territory, as the 2.5 years of negotiations over the new multiannual financial 
framework clearly illustrates. EU cohesion policy has been vulnerable to 
criticism from policy-makers, academics and stakeholders: in spite of the 
past reforms, it is, they claim, (a) too loosely linked to a large number of EU 
priorities, (b) spreading resources too thinly across policy areas, (c) too under-
resourced to have a serious macro-economic effect, and (d) excessively complex 
and bureaucratic to administer. All this with an impact that is often difficult to 
measure in (macro-) economic terms (Allen, 2010; European Commission, 2010; 
Manzella and Mendez, 2009), but has been well-documented at the (micro) 
level of governance (European Commission, 2011; van Gerven et al., 2014; 
Verschraegen et al, 2011). 
Fabrizio Barca wrote a report in 2009 at the request of European Commissioner 
Danuta Hübner, in which he called for a place-based approach to the ‘EU’s only 
true development policy’ (Barca, 2009). He insisted on the necessity of returning 
to the original idea of regional development policy and thus the enhancement of 
local and regional potential rather than viewing the funds as a compensation for 
handicaps. This new paradigm was a major argument used by the Commission 
to justify aligning EU cohesion policy and the Europe 2020 Strategy. 
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It would seem that both the European Commission and the Member States 
have partly taken on board some of the criticism and obvious dysfunctions when 
designing the cohesion policy for the next period (2014-2020), during which:
•  the mantra will be that that from now on all funds should support EU 
policy priorities: spending will be further concentrated on a small number 
of investment priorities linked to the objectives of the Europe 2020 Strategy 
and the National Reform Programmes (NRP’s)37;
•  Partnership Agreements between the Commission and the Member States 
will detail the use of the funds and will be based on a Common Strategic 
Framework (CSF) governing all funds 38 – which are now called ‘European 
Structural and Investment Funds’ – also with a view to avoiding overlaps;
•  macroeconomic conditionality, which has existed in the Cohesion Fund 
since its creation in 1994 39, is being generalized to all funds: Partnership 
Agreements need to set out how the EU and national funding streams will 
contribute to addressing the most recent Country-Specific recommendations 
issued by the Council. The European Commission can ask the Member 
States to modify their programmes, and can - as a last resort – suspend 
funds if Country-Specific recommendations (CSRs) are repeatedly and 
seriously breached;
•  Ex-ante conditionality: the Commission will assess whether Member States’ 
programmes have a good chance of being effectively implemented;
•  More focus will be given to results and policy effectiveness (rather than 
on compliance with rules) through a performance framework, Joint Action 
Plans and counterfactual impact evaluation;
•  Simplification of financial management and reduction of the administrative 
burden are envisaged (but ‘cutting red tape’ has been on the table for nearly 
20 years and may again be wishful thinking);
•  23.4 % of the cohesion policy envelope is earmarked for the ESF, while at 
least 20% of the ESF in each Member State will have to be used for social 
inclusion. 
37 When it formally adopted the Europe 2020 Strategy, the European Council stressed that all common policies, including the common 
agricultural policy and cohesion policy, will need to support it (European Council, 2010, § 5 g).
38 The CSF will also cover the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund 
(EMFF).
39 Macroeconomic conditionality in the Cohesion Fund was an inherent aspect of the very establishment of the Fund (1992-1994): it was 
conceived to support the poorer Member States who needed to put their public finances under control in order to meet the economic 
convergence criteria to join the European Monetary Union while at the same time still in need to complete their efforts to catch up with EU level 
of infrastructure endowment (transport and environment). The rationale for the macroeconomic conditionality of Cohesion Fund should be 
seen in this specific historical context. As a consequence, the Council could decide to suspend commitments from the Cohesion Fund (until 
the deficit has been brought under control) if a beneficiary country has an excessive government deficit. It has never been applied in practice, 
until it was invoked in March 2012 by the ECOFIN Council against Hungary and subsequently revoked in June 2012 after the adoption of the 
requested measures. For an early assessment of the macro-economic conditionalities in cohesion policy, see European Parliament (2012).
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Thus, the new rules of the European Structural and Investment (ESI) Funds 
2014-2020 provide concrete opportunities to increase orientation to results 
and surveillance (one can also link the reporting part of the regulations with the 
‘performance reserve’ which can provide a further incentive to deliver results), 
while at the same time promoting the establishment of incentive mechanisms to 
actually promote the achievement of results in the social field. We return to this 
observation in section 4.4, below. 
In general it would seem that there has been a gradual shift in the debate over 
the EU’s cohesion policy: Member States tend to be more interested now in the 
conditions of use (their substantive purpose), and somewhat less in the question 
of the amount and allocation (even if this was of course also part and parcel of 
MFF negotiations) .40
Policy coordination
From the first steps of European integration, Member States provided the 
possibility for ‘close co-operation between Member States in the social field’, 
including in sensitive areas such as employment and social security; this was 
to be done by ‘making studies, delivering opinions and arranging consultations’ 
(Treaty of Rome, Article 118). The founding fathers also addressed economic 
policies: ‘Member States shall co-ordinate their economic policies’ (Ibid, Article 
105), while the chapter on conjunctural policies stipulates that they ‘shall consult 
each other and the Commission on the measures to be taken’ (Ibid, Article 103).
It would take until the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, which launched the EMU, 
to firmly anchor an EU process of coordination and surveillance of member 
states' economic policies, through so-called Broad Economic Policy Guidelines 
40 Other innovations (outside the ceilings of the MFF) are the creation of an Emergency Aid Reserve (humanitarian, civil crisis management and 
protection operations in third countries), the European Union Solidarity Fund (in the event of major disasters in a – future - member State), 
and the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (to help workers reintegrate into the labour market after restructuring), with a very modest 
budget of Euro 150 million (Council of the EU, 2013a). Finally, a limited share of the funds are set aside in a performance reserve (of 5%), to 
reward well performing projects; note that the performance reserve introduced in 2000 was seldom used. The Erasmus+ programme will have 
a significantly higher budget than before (40% higher), and Horizon 2020will equally have (around 30%) more funds than its predecessor, FP7. 
The newly created ‘Fund for European aid to the Most Deprived’ (FEAD) allows the Member States (since 1 December 2013) to provide food 
and goods for homeless people and materially deprived children, which can be seen as a significant innovation (some of the funding may be 
used to facilitate food donations from private sources such as supermarkets).
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(BEPG, Article 121 TFEU). These involved non-binding recommendations from 
the Council to Member States to monitor the consistency of national economic 
policies with those of the European Monetary Union. Important from a political 
point of view is the fact that the European Commission could issue a ‘warning’ 
to a member state whose economic policies do not conform to the BEPG, which 
have been adopted annually since 1993 (and every three years since 2003). Even 
if a ‘recommendation’ is a legislative act that suggests a course of action, it is 
not legally binding. Economic policy coordination can therefore be seen as the 
pioneer of a structured EU ‘policy coordination’ mode of governance, drawing 
inspiration from the much looser ‘OECD technique’ (economic surveys began in 
the 1960s).
Even if this governance by persuasion was soon revealed to be rather ineffective 
for coordinating economic policy (Math, 2002), a political spill-over to the domain 
of employment followed (Rhodes, 2010). Indeed, the sharp rise in unemployment 
immediately after the Maastricht Treaty was signed, made it necessary for 
governments to defend their support for Monetary Union and the unpopular 
convergence efforts it required. They had to make it clear to their electorate that 
the EU was not only concerned with price stability and budgetary discipline, but 
also with employment. As a result, a new Employment chapter was added to 
the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, which can be regarded as a ‘correction’ to the 
legitimacy deficit caused by Maastricht. The new Employment chapter made 
it possible to codify the EES that had been decided upon by the Extraordinary 
European Council on Employment in Luxembourg in 1997 41. In practice, the 
EES is implemented by the Employment Committee (EMCO) .42
The emergence and visibility of the Employment chapter in turn set an example 
for cooperation in other areas, as became clear at the Lisbon European Council 
in 2000. The latter formally coined the ‘Open Method of Coordination’ (OMC) 
as a new - and at the initial stage rather experimental – policy instrument for 
the EU. The OMC clearly drew on the experience and institutional framework 
that was established by the EES, and can be seen as a direct spillover of the 
EES (van Riel and van der Meer, 2002). The concrete architecture of the OMC 
41 The European Council added the subject of employment to the agenda at the Copenhagen Summit in June 1993, merely a few months after 
the signature of the Maastricht Treaty. Following the 1993 White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment, the contours of the 
EES were decided by the Essen European Council in 1994.
42 The EMCO was formally established in 2000 and is one of the two advisory committees of the EPSCO Council (together with the SPC).  It 
has its Treaty base in Article 150 TFEU.
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indeed shows how it is mirrored on the EES: the Lisbon European Council 
Conclusions describe the OMC as ‘the means of spreading best practice and 
achieving greater convergence towards the main EU goals’ (European Council, 
2000: §37). Still according to the same source, this involves: fixing guidelines 
(with specific timetables), establishing quantitative and qualitative indicators and 
benchmarks (against the best in the world), national and regional targets and 
periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review organised as mutual learning 
processes (Ibid). 
Following a mandate from the Lisbon European Council, OMC began to 
provide a Europe-wide approach to social policy: it was first launched in the 
area of social inclusion (2000) to be followed by pensions (2001) and health 
care (2004) and in practice implemented by the Social Protection Committee 
(SPC)43. Importantly, the Lisbon Council Conclusions stipulated the introduction 
of the OMC ‘at all levels’ (European Council, 2000: § 7), and explicitly referred 
to the use of the OMC in the areas of information society/e-Europe (Ibid: § 8), 
innovation and research and development (Ibid: § 13). Furthermore, even though 
the term ‘OMC’ was not explicitly used with regard to enterprise promotion, 
economic reform and education and training, the wording of the Lisbon Council 
Conclusions were such that they gave a de facto support for the development 
of open co-ordination in more than ten policy areas (Zeitlin, 2005), as indeed 
happened in the early 2000s. 
The post-Lisbon enthusiasm for policy cooperation through the OMC came to 
an end in 2004, when the High Level Group headed by Wim Kok assessed the 
overall Lisbon Strategy, and stated that ‘The open method of coordination has 
fallen far short of expectations,’ and called for ‘a radical improvement of the 
process’ (Kok, 2004:42), including through naming, shaming and faming (Ibid: 
43). While the operational conclusions of the Kok report were largely dismissed 
by the European Council, the re-launched ‘Lisbon II’ Strategy from 2005 onwards 
focused on ‘Jobs’ and ‘Growth’. The Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG) 
and Employment Guidelines were merged into a single set of ‘Integrated 
Guidelines’, reporting on which was to take place through new National Reform 
43 The SPC is the second advisory body of the EPSCO Council of Ministers, next to the EMCO. It was set up in 2000 and is formally based 
on Article 160 TFEU.
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Programmes (NRPs). The Social OMC was reduced to a ‘parallel’ process to the 
revised Lisbon Strategy, rather than an integral (but rather weak) part of it.
To some extent, this situation has been corrected through the initial design of the 
Europe 2020 Strategy, which replaced the Lisbon Strategy in 2010 and is intended 
‘to turn the EU into a smart, sustainable and inclusive economy delivering high 
levels of employment, productivity and social cohesion’. Thus, at the time when 
it was launched, Europe 2020 had a rather all-encompassing political agenda (to 
some extent, a return to the original Lisbon Strategy) and provided considerable 
visibility and importance for employment and social inclusion. More concretely, 
Europe 2020 has been organised around three integrated pillars: macroeconomic 
surveillance, thematic coordination (in areas such as employment, education and 
social inclusion) and fiscal surveillance under the Stability and Growth Pact. 
Thematic coordination combines EU priorities with EU headline targets, seven 
EU flagship initiatives. Thus, ‘Inclusive growth’ is one of Europe 2020’s key 
objectives; there is the target to raise to 75% the employment rate for women 
and men aged 20-64, as well as the target of lifting at least 20 million people out 
of the risk of poverty and exclusion; there are the flagships on ‘An agenda for 
new skills and jobs’ and the ‘European Platform against poverty’ (EPAP); and 
finally four Integrated Guidelines concern employment, including Guideline 10 on 
promoting social inclusion and combating poverty (the first six guidelines relate 
to the economic policies of the Member States and the EU). 
The different building blocks of the Strategy are now being organized through 
the European Semester, which starts every year with the Commission identifying 
the key economic challenges and priorities through its Annual Growth Survey 
(AGS). Member States then write National Reform Programmes and Stability and 
Convergence Programmes, in which they set out the action they will undertake: 
these programmes are then assessed by the Commission, and result in Country-
specific Recommendations. The latter are discussed and amended by the 
respective EU Committees preparing the work for the  Economics and Finance 
(ECOFIN) and Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs (EPSCO) 
Council formations, and are ultimately adopted by the Council. Although most 
of the recommendations focus on economic and employment reforms, an 
increasing proportion also address social cohesion issues, including combating 
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poverty and social exclusion (for a more detailed description of the Europe 2020 
architecture, see Vanhercke, 2011, 2013). 
While at first sight the employment and social issues in the Europe 2020 Strategy 
had some visibility, these were quickly subsumed by the other objectives. In 
its first AGS the Commission regarded pensions and health care as a burden 
on government budgets, and reforms were intended to ‘balance the books’. 
As importantly, this AGS - which was strongly defined by the economic crisis - 
narrowed down social policy to the fight against poverty and social exclusion. 
Radical changes in the content and tools for implementing the Europe 2020 
Strategy added to this. Most importantly, a new surveillance and enforcement 
mechanism entered into force in December 2011 as part of the so-called ‘Six-
pack’ legislation, which reinforced economic governance in the EU and the euro 
area. The Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) relies on the following 
main elements: 
•  An early warning system is established, based on an ‘MIP scoreboard’ 
consisting of a set of – by now – eleven indicators covering the major 
sources of macroeconomic imbalances. The scoreboard is published in the 
Alert Mechanism Report that marks the starting point of the annual cycle of 
the MIP;
•  Preventive action: the MIP allows the Commission and the Council to 
adopt preventive recommendations at an early stage before the imbalances 
become large. Crucially, these recommendations are embedded in the 
package of Country-Specific Recommendations which the Commission 
puts forward in the context of the European Semester;
•  The MIP also has a corrective arm which applies in more severe cases: an 
Excessive Imbalance Procedure (EIP) can be opened for a Member State if 
it is found to experience excessive imbalances. The corrective arm for euro 
area countries can lead to a fine (up to 0.1% of GDP).
As importantly, the Six-pack introduced so-called reverse qualified majority voting 
(RQMV) for most of these sanctions. Reverse qualified majority voting implies 
that a recommendation or a proposal of the Commission is considered adopted 
in the Council unless a qualified majority of Member States votes against it. In 
practice it is very difficult for Member States to form a blocking majority. RQMV 
can therefore be considered as a ‘semi-automatic decision-making’ procedure 
which gives wide-ranging power to the Commission. 
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The second pillar of the Europe 2020 strategy that has been considerably 
strengthened since it was launched is fiscal surveillance under the Stability 
and Growth Pact (SGP), which is supposed to contribute to strengthening 
fiscal consolidation and fostering sustainable public finances. First of all, the 
abovementioned Six-pack strengthens the SGP and more particularly the 
Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP), which applies to Member States which have 
breached either the deficit or the debt criterion (sanctions under the EDP are also 
adopted via RQMV). During 2012, Member States furthermore agreed on the 
two additional Regulations – also known as the ‘Two-pack’ – which introduced 
additional coordination and surveillance of budgetary processes for all Eurozone 
members (thus, the Two-pack integrates some elements of the 2012 ‘European 
Fiscal Compact’ directly into EU law).
Unsurprisingly, these changes resulted in CSRs and AGS that have been 
largely focused on economic issues, as was the case with the National Reform 
Programmes (Degryse, 2012; Degryse et al., 2013; EAPN, 2013). And yet, recent 
research (Costamagna, 2013; Vanhercke, 2013) show a partial rebalancing in 
that the social dimension is slowly acquiring its substantive place in Europe 
2020. Indeed, after two years of trial and error in the implementation of the 
European Semester, the employment and social actors involved have begun to 
formalise their positions and continue to do so in the preparation of the 2014 
European Semester (Council of the EU, 2013b). Recent AGS have a more 
nuanced account of social issues, while there is an increasing number of CSRs 
paying attention to social objectives (notably with a view to reduce poverty), 
which are no longer accepted as ‘given’ by the Member States (i.e. they are 
being successfully amended, despite RQMV). Certainly, this ‘socialization’ of the 
European Semester’ (Barcevicius et al., 2014), is a slow evolution (e.g. the role 
of the SPC in Europe 2020 still needs further clarification). 
Nevertheless, it is remarkable that in an environment so strongly defined by the 
economic crisis, EMCO, the SPC, and Directorate General (DG) EMPL of the 
European Commission have used the context of intensified ‘mutual surveillance’ 
throughout the year to strengthen their own analytical toolbox. The latter includes 
the Joint Assessment Framework (JAF), the Social Protection Performance 
Monitor (SPPM) and the Employment Performance Monitor (EPM). At the same 
time, Member States seem to have chosen to combine ‘being tough’ on each 
other (through the ‘comply or explain’ rules of the European Semester) with 
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securing mutual learning opportunities, as many objectives of Europe 2020 do 
not lend themselves easily to top-down prescriptions. The latter element will be 
key in the coming discussion about the proposed ‘contractual arrangements’ 
through which the European Commission hopes to enhance Member State 
compliance with the CSRs (see Section 4 below). 
All in all, it would seem that policy coordination in employment and social policy 
has been shown to be rather resilient. Even more: policy coordination through 
the (Social) OMC has become a template for EU domestic and even regional 
policy coordination in sensitive policy areas 44, or for how to achieve better 
practice in the absence of centralized policy regimes (see Vanhercke, 2014 for a 
more detailed discussion). It remains therefore part and parcel of the EU’s ‘soft’ 
social policy. 
This ‘soft approach’ to social policy is now increasingly coordinated through 
the ‘Social Investment Package’ (SIP) which was launched in February 2013 
(European Commission, 2013a; Hemerijck, 2013; Vandenbroucke et al., 
2011). The SIP sets out a coherent European-level policy framework that 
addresses the whole range of social policies and has some of the features of 
the European Commission’s earlier encompassing Social Agendas. It proposes 
an interesting common orientation for the European Social Model, with its focus 
on early childhood education and care, preventing early school leaving, lifelong 
learning, affordable child care (as part of an active inclusion strategy), housing 
support (fighting homeless), accessible health services and helping people live 
independently in old age. The SIP argues that the choice between achieving 
either social or economic objectives is in fact a false dichotomy. It includes a 
strong Commission Recommendation on ‘Investing in Children: breaking the 
cycle of disadvantage’.
Whether the SIP, and other new ‘soft’ initiatives will have effect, will also depend 
on the extent to which they are seen as strategic – and consequently used 
as leverage – by the whole range of actors involved in the policy coordination 
processes. It is broadly acknowledged that besides the institutional actors, 
44 See the recent Council Recommendation (December 2013) on effective Roma integration measures, which also adopts a Social investment 
approach (Council of the EU, 2013c).
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non-state actors such as NGOs have contributed to the process of broadening 
the scope of EU intervention in the social domain. Since the1990s, networks 
of NGOs operating in the field of the fight against poverty and social exclusion 
have been funded by the European Commission and, with their lobbying and 
mobilizations, they have contributed to raise the attention on those issues and 
to keep them on the EU agenda (Bauer, 2002). It is thus not surprising that 
the objective of promoting the involvement of a broad range of stakeholders in 
the policy process at both the EU and national levels is a distinctive feature of 
the Social OMC: it was one of the overarching objectives of the ‘streamlined’ 
Social OMC (since 2006) and it has been confirmed in the framework of the 
‘reinvigorated’ Social OMC (in 2011). 
While studies on stakeholders’ involvement show mixed results when it comes 
to the scope and actual impact of this objective of involving a broad range of 
stakeholders (cf. Inbas et al. 2010), the usefulness of such an approach has 
been documented (Frazer, 2014). First, stakeholders’ involvement can contribute 
to the enhancement of the quality of policy-making by enriching the debate with 
knowledge, ideas and experiences of people operating ‘on the ground’. Second, 
it enhances the democratic nature of the process and increases the legitimacy 
of decisions taken. Third, stakeholder involvement raises awareness on EU 
initiatives, thus contributing to building much-needed support for EU initiatives.
European Social Dialogue45
EU Social dialogue is part and parcel of the European Social model and the acquis 
communautaire, as it is promoted by the Treaty (TFEU Articles 151-155) and is 
given a specific role in the EU’s decision-making process through a complex set 
of procedures for the pursuit of law via collective agreements. Crucially, before 
submitting proposals in the social and employment policy field, the Commission 
is required to consult management and labour on the possible direction of 
Union action. Once social partners have reached an EU-level agreement, the 
Council can only decide whether or not to adopt the directive; it does not have 
the opportunity to amend the agreement’s provisions. The EU also promotes 
45 This section draws heavily on the excellent ‘Social Europe guide. Volume 2’ on Social Dialogue produced by Mark Carley and the European 
Commission staff (European Commission, 2012a), to whom the authors are indebted.
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social partnership and cooperation by setting minimum standards for employee 
representation in national and cross-border firms, and by consulting EU-level 
social partners on policy initiatives.
Reflecting widespread practice in the Member States, EU social dialogue takes 
two basic forms and occurs at two main levels: 
•  Bipartite social dialogue (launched in 1985 by Jacques Delors at Val 
Duchesse) involves only the social partners (organisations representing 
employers and workers). Tripartite social dialogue involves both the social 
partners and the EU institutions. ;
•  Cross-industry (or ‘intersectoral’) social dialogue on the one hand covers 
the whole EU labour market, and all sectors. In this case, trade unions 
are principally represented by the European Trade Union Confederation 
(ETUC), and employers by BUSINESSEUROPE (private sector employers), 
CEEP (public services employers) and UEAPME (small and medium-
sized enterprises). Sectoral social dialogue on the other hand, covers one 
specific industry across the EU: in this case the dialogue brings together 
62 European-level employers and 17 European trade union federations, 
which represent national unions and employers’ associations operating in a 
particular industry across Europe.
In a rather complex set-up, bipartite social dialogue occurs both at cross-
industry level (through the Social Dialogue Committee, SDC) and at the sector 
level (through some 10 Sectoral Social Dialogue Committees and nearly 1,000 
European Works Councils in individual multinational companies). Tripartite 
dialogue (also referred to as concertation), occurs mainly at cross-industry 
level. The best-known example is the ‘Tripartite Social Summit for Growth and 
Employment’ which was established by a Council Decision in 2003, with the 
role of ensuring continuous dialogue between the Council, Commission and 
social partners on the Union’s economic and social strategy. The Summit has 
met twice a year since its conception and allows the social partners to provide 
an input into the Lisbon Strategy and later the Europe 2020 Strategy.
Once the Maastricht Treaty and its Agreement on Social Policy had given 
the social partners a specific consultation and negotiation procedure, cross-
industry dialogue took two distinct courses. First, consultations based on the 
Commission’s legislative agenda shaped much of the partners’ dialogue and 
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marked the (very short) ‘golden years’ of EU cross-industry social dialogue in 
the years 1995-1999. Consultations on the reconciliation of professional and 
family life resulted in a first cross-industry agreement on parental leave in 1995. 
Consultations on flexibility in working time and workers’ security led to two 
agreements: in 1997 on part-time work and in 1999 on fixed-term work. 
In all three cases, the agreements were made binding in the Member States 
through directives. A further framework agreement in 2009, again implemented 
by a directive, amended the 1995 accord on parental leave. In the sectoral social 
dialogue, consultations led in some cases to agreements between the social 
partners, e.g. on working time in sea transport and civil aviation. Importantly, at 
the partners’ request, these sectoral agreements can also be – and have at times 
been - implemented by Council directives. 
Secondly, the social partners followed their own autonomous agenda, as 
expressed in their 2001 joint contribution to the European Council held in 
Laeken: cross-industry social partners announced their own (independent) work 
programmes, which have indeed been agreed since 2003 (each covering 2-3 
years). Following consultations by the Commission, the cross-industry social 
partners signed an autonomous framework agreement on teleworking in 2002. 
In contrast to earlier cross-industry agreements, the partners did not ask for the 
teleworking agreement to be implemented by a directive. Instead, the agreement 
was to be implemented by the signatories’ national member organisations, ‘in 
accordance with the procedures and practices specific to management and 
labour in the Member States’.
The first cross-industry work programme led to a 2004 framework agreement 
on work-related stress, which was implemented by the signatories’ national 
members, and to a second framework of actions on gender equality, in 2005. 
The 2006-2008 programme led to an agreement on harassment and violence at 
work in 2007. The most significant output of the 2009-2010 programme was an 
agreement on inclusive labour markets, again implemented by the signatories’ 
national member organisations. In addition, the autonomous cross-industry 
dialogue led to a range of joint opinions, statements, joint publication of guides, 
joint seminars and conferences etc. 
In a similar vein, autonomous sectoral social dialogue has led to a range of 
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autonomous agreements (including in the railway sector), to be implemented 
by the national member organisations. In addition, autonomous sectoral social 
dialogue led to a series of recommendations (frameworks of action, guidelines 
and codes of conduct, and policy orientations) but also contributed to exchange 
of information through joint opinions, declarations and tools (guides and manuals). 
In quantitative terms, the output of EU social dialogue is rather impressive: All 
in all some 650 joint texts have been produced, most of them since the second 
half of the 1980s. However, over three-quarters are joint opinions and tools, 
agreements make up only 3 % of the total. What do these agreements look 
like in practice? The most tangible achievements of the EU-level social dialogue 
are those agreements that have been made legally binding across the Union 
by Council directives. As discussed above, there are four such cross-industry 
agreements, two dealing with parental leave and one each with part-time work 
and fixed-term work. These agreements have resulted in changes to legislation 
in many Member States. 
In addition, five sectoral agreements have also been implemented by directives. 
These are concerned with (a) seafarers’ working time, (b) the working time of 
mobile civil aviation staff, (c) the working conditions of mobile workers assigned 
to ‘interoperable’ cross-border rail services, (d) the implementation in EU law 
of the Maritime Labour Convention, and (e) preventing of ‘sharp injuries’ (for 
example, from needles and scalpels) in the hospital and health care sector. So all 
in all, EU social dialogue resulted in nine Directives so far.
As mentioned above, four cross-industry agreements have been implemented 
by the national member organisations, namely on telework, work-related stress, 
harassment and inclusive labour markets. Autonomous sectoral agreements 
have been agreed in the railway sector, the different sectors involved in the use 
of crystalline silica (a hazardous substance), certificates for hairdressing, and 
competence profiles in chemical industry. The key problem is that whenever 
an EU-level agreement is put into effect through autonomous agreements, 
the actual implementation (and impact) crucially depends on the concrete –
and widely varying - procedures and practices in each country. As a result 
implementation of these agreements has been patchy, with gaps and even a 
total lack of implementation in some Member States. The implementation of 
(even less constraining) recommendations is even more difficult to evaluate, 
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even though some have pointed to the importance of the vast array of informal 
networks created through such non-binding texts (OSE, 2011).  
Some countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 have experienced particular 
problems in this area. One of the key challenges European social dialogue faces 
is indeed that there is a considerable mismatch between the social dialogue 
architecture at the EU level and the situation in the Member States, largely as 
a result of the last waves of enlargement, which have made things far more 
complicated (Pochet, 2003):
•  Bipartite bargaining remains weak in many of the Member States that 
joined the EU in 2004 and 2007. This said, the growth of EU-level bipartite 
cross-industry social dialogue (and more particularly the need to implement 
EU-level autonomous agreements, see below) has contributed to the 
development of national bipartite dialogue in some countries where it was 
previously largely unknown or limited. 
•  While a majority of the Member States have tripartite cross-industry 
dialogue, these usually have an advisory and consultative role; and there 
has been a tendency, especially in the wake of the economic crisis, to 
erode, downgrade or even eliminate bipartite/tripartite arrangements in 
several countries.
•  Sectoral bargaining covers a high proportion of economic sectors in many 
of the EU15 countries, while in others collective bargaining has been largely 
decentralized to the company level (in general there have been decentralizing 
pressures). In many of the new Member States sectoral collective bargaining 
is non-existent, or limited to a few industries. Unsurprisingly then, bargaining 
coverage is low, sectoral social partners in these countries are frequently 
under-resourced and sometimes absent. Such in spite of the fact that in the 
run-up to accession the European Commission ran a number of projects 
providing financial and technical assistance aimed at strengthening social 
dialogue at cross-industry and sectoral levels.
In view of the robust institutional framework for European social dialogue, it 
would seem that it has not yet been fully explored, to put it mildly. There has not 
been a single cross-industry agreement in 15 years and social partners' work 
programmes have become less ambitious. The number of (key) issues on which 
the social partners have been unwilling or unable to negotiate, in spite of the 
Commission’s efforts to get the social partners to negotiate, far outnumber the 
successes represented by agreements. ETUC has historically been in favour of 
the creation of legally binding new EU-wide rights and protection for workers (but 
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internal divisions weaken its mandate in a number of issues, and ETUC prefers 
the Community method which usually leads to higher benefits for its members), 
while the employers’ bodies, especially BUSINESSEUROPE, generally oppose 
new EU regulation of employment rights. As a result, the European Commission 
has increasingly withdrawn from its role of promoter of social dialogue, and 
is now a ‘supporter’, at best (OSE, 2011), which implies that bargaining is no 
longer taking place ‘in the shadow of the law’ (Pochet, 2003).
Sectoral social dialogue seems to have been more successful, even if it is 
relatively young. Recent developments include the setting up of a sectoral 
social dialogue committee in the food and drink industry (January 2012), an 
agreement on working time for inland waterway transport; an agreement on 
minimum standards for football players’ contracts, and a sea fisheries sector 
agreement to Adopt ILO Convention no 188. At the same time, sectoral Social 
Dialogue Committees sometimes experience problems of representativeness. 
Thus, a recent agreement on health and safety in the hairdressing sector (incl. 
provisions on exposure to chemicals and other irritants, especially for pregnant 
women) has been labelled as ‘red tape’ by the European Commission after 
its representativeness was challenged by the UK government 46. All in all it 
would seem that trade unions and employers tend to concentrate their efforts 
at national and company levels. But as shown above, where dialogue fails on 
specific issues, the process continues nevertheless. 
It would seem that strengthening social partner capacity and social dialogue 
structures (especially in Central and Eastern Europe) is a prerequisite to revamping 
this governance tool. Perhaps in the meantime, resources should be focused on 
the promotion, by the European Commission - whose role has proven to be 
critical in bringing the partners around the table - of the currently more promising 
sectoral dialogue, possibly to be implemented through directives). This would 
provide a strong signal from the social partners that they are still able and willing 
to contribute to the European Social model.
46 According to the UK government, the regulation on hairdressing would have affected small businesses disproportionately. The Daily Mail 
(9 April 2012) reported that ‘Hairdressers will be banned from wearing high heels and jewellery under nanny state proposals being drawn 
up in Brussels.’ The Sun took the analysis one step further under the headline ‘Hair Hitlers’ (10th April 2012). It should be noted that UK 
hairdressers were themselves represented at the negotiation table, i.e. by the National Hairdressers Federation, which forms part of Coiffure 
EU, the employers’ representative.
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IV. TOWARDS A EUROPEAN SOCIAL 
UNION: 10 TOUGH NUTS TO CRACK
The year 2014 presents a window of opportunity to debate afresh the social 
dimension of European integration. European elections will take place in May, 
bringing many new Members of the European Parliament to office. In November, 
a new European Commission will take power. The European Council will also 
have a new president by 1 December. Building on recent initiatives in the social 
field, including the Social Investment Package, the Social Dimension of EMU and 
the proposal with regard to contractual arrangements, this year of change allows 
us to think through the concept of a ‘European Social Union’. 
This is not to deny the positive acquis but to recognise the need to respond to 
new challenges as we build upon it. A Social Union would need to both support 
national welfare states on a systemic level in some of their key functions (including 
macroeconomic stabilisation) as well as guide the substantive development of 
national welfare states – via general social standards and objectives, leaving 
ways and means of social policy to Member States – on the basis of an 
operational definition of ‘the European social model’. In other words, European 
countries would cooperate in a union with an explicit social purpose – hence, the 
expression ‘European Social Union’ (ESU). 
Such a ESU, is not only desirable but necessary even though the concept needs 
to be fully clarified, both intellectually and politically. This is why the following 
section presents 10 ‘tough nuts to crack’.  
•  Tough nuts number 1 and 2 concern objectives: cracking them implies, 
fundamentally, an agreement on the meaning and significance of the 
European social model.
•  Tough nuts 3 to 7 are about instruments; they may serve to illustrate an 
overarching question about the social policy role of the EU in a context of 
‘shared sovereignty’, as we explain in a short introduction to these nuts (see 
below, between ‘nut 2’ and ‘nut 3’). 
•  Tough nuts 8 and 9 refer to challenges of governance and stakeholder 
involvement.
•  In tough nut 10 we return to two substantive policy challenges, notably 
education
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Is social convergence necessary?
Chapter five of the European Commission’s most recent report on Employment 
and Social Developments in Europe is dedicated to ‘Convergence and divergence 
in EMU – employment and social aspects’ (European Commission, 2014:. 279-
319). It shows how the con¬vergence in employment and social developments 
in the Eurozone over the period 1999 to 2007 was largely halted by the crisis; 
simultaneously it points to underlying elements of economic divergence – or at 
least, lack of convergence – which were already present before the crisis. In 
this report, we have argued that economic and social convergence cannot be 
dissociated: in the long run, EMU is not sustainable without a basic consensus 
on the social order it has to serve, and without a concomitant degree of 
convergence on fundamental social parameters. 
Obviously, the aspiration of the European project is not a regression to the mean: 
convergence should be upward convergence with regard to a multidimensional 
set of relevant social parameters. We deliberately did not use the expression 
‘harmonisation’: the challenge is to achieve upward convergence in fundamental 
social parameters, whilst respecting the diversity that characterizes European 
welfare states. Reconciling diversity and the aspiration and necessity of 
convergence, requires stringent policy guidance based on well-defined social 
outcomes with genuine scope for differentiation and experimentation as regards 
the concrete measures needed to achieve those outcomes.
The first nut to be cracked is whether or not we believe that this analysis is 
correct, i.e. whether or not we believe that upward convergence is a necessity, in 
the Eurozone, and in the EU at larg – to be reconciled with the legitimate diversity 
that characterizes the EU?  
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Social investment as a common agenda?
If there is agreement on the need for convergence, the next question concerns 
the direction of convergence. How can we create a virtuous circle whereby both 
pan-European cohesion and national cohesion are enhanced? Given the ‘human 
capital asymmetry’ which we documented in section 1, social investment may 
offer an interesting perspective, with regard to both pan-European cohesion and 
national cohesion. 
As explained in section 1, social investment emerged gradually as a social policy 
perspective in the 1990s in response to fundamental changes in our societies 
with a focus on policies that ‘prepare’ individuals, families and societies to adapt 
to various transformations, such as changing career patterns and working 
conditions, the emergence of new social risks and population ageing, rather than 
on simply generating responses aimed at ‘repairing’ damage caused by market 
failure, social misfortune, poor health or prevailing policy inadequacies. We do 
not wish to present social investment as an easy panacea. Social investment 
policies cannot substitute for sound macroeconomic, industrial and regional 
policies: they must be mutually supportive. Successful social investment also 
presupposes a well-designed complementarity between ‘protecting human 
capital’ by means of traditional instruments of social protection (cash benefits, 
health care) and ‘developing human capital’, by means of education, training and 
activation.
The Social Investment Package, launched by the European Commission 
(2013a,b) in February, presents a similar argument and provides an interesting 
common orientation for EU Member States with its focus on early childhood 
education and care, preventing early school leaving, lifelong learning, affordable 
child care (as part of an active inclusion strategy), housing support (fighting 
homelessness), accessible health services and helping people live independently 
in old age. Obviously, a ‘Package’ is not a ‘Pact’; the latter underscores the 
sense of reciprocity that is needed: all Member States should be committed to 
policies that respond to the need for social investment; simultaneously, Member 
States’ efforts in this direction – notably efforts by Member States who face a 
difficult budgetary and economic context – should be supported in a tangible 
way.
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The second nut to crack is: Do we see ‘social investment’ as the basis for a 
‘pact’ for setting long-term goals in a spirit of reciprocity, extending the European 
Commission’s Social Investment Package? 
Suppose we agree on the need for a common orientation, as proposed in the 
preceding ‘tough nuts’. We should not hide the fact that this raises issues of 
sovereignty. Our arguments with regard to EMU, in section 2 of this report, 
are premised on the idea that the tuning of economic strategies requires a 
minimal tuning of social policy, even if this should not lead to the application of 
an undifferentiated social policy. Common orientations may be implemented in 
different ways by Member States, taking into account the legitimate diversity of 
their social systems. Section 2 also explained that EU welfare states have become 
semi-sovereign for reasons unrelated to EMU. The latter analysis supported the 
idea that Member States should retain sovereignty in specific areas (e.g. the 
organisation of health care), and that they must be able to effectively assume 
the responsibilities they bear. Still, what is at stake is the acceptance of ‘shared 
sovereignty’ in important dimensions of economic and social development. 
The fundamental political question is whether we think Member States can regain 
sovereignty by limiting the role of the EU, or, alternatively, whether regaining 
sovereignty in a true sense, requires the common definition of social objectives 
at the EU level and the acceptance of solid European instruments to promote 
convergence in the agreed direction. Developing a – politically sustainable 
– response to that challenge is most urgent in the Eurozone, but is partly 
surpasses the Eurozone problematic. We might label such a process as one of 
‘shared sovereignty’. Obviously, the next question is what ‘shared sovereignty’ 
exactly means, and how the common orientation proposed in the preceding 
tough nuts can be made operational. The following tough nuts (3 tot 8) are about 
policy instruments. 47 However, answering them will shed light on the following 
overarching question: What type of role do we see for the European Union in this 
process of shared sovereignty?
47 Tough nuts 3-7 should not be read as an exhaustive list of policy instruments. For instance, we do not assess the argument by actors 
concerned with the development of social services that the concept of ‘(social) services of general interest’ has to be further developed. Also, 
the potential role of the ‘horizontal social clause’, which is discussed in section 2.2, is not taken on board in our tough nuts, although it might 
play a specific role in ‘mainstreaming’. .
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Mainstreaming social policy objectives in the 
overall governance architecture of EMU?
Our next questions (nuts 3-8) are about the way to implement common social 
orientations for the EU, i.e. about the policy methodology and the instruments. 
In section 2.1 we wrote that excessive social imbalances threaten the monetary 
union as much as excessive economic imbalances. The expression ‘excessive 
social imbalances’ describes a set of social problems that affect member states 
very differently (thus creating ‘imbalances’). These imbalances are not simply 
similar problems in a subset of poorly performing member states: they should be 
a matter of common concern for all Eurozone members. Youth unemployment 
and child poverty are two examples. The first step towards convergence, is 
to fight such excessive social imbalances, notably within the Eurozone. This 
requires that the social dimension is mainstreamed into all EU policies, notably 
into macroeconomic and budgetary surveillance, rather than it being constituted 
as a separate ‘social pillar’.
Although the notion of mainstreaming seems straightforward, how exactly it 
should be done and which institutional actors should take the lead in it, is a 
matter of internal debate in European policy circles and some ambiguities need 
clarification. Refining the MIP Scoreboard, which is used in the Macroeconomic 
Imbalances Procedure, was a first step towards such mainstreaming. Social 
and employment indicators have indeed been added to the set of ‘auxiliary’ 
indicators that are used in the economic reading of the MIP Scoreboard. Such 
social indicators could alert ministers about employment and social imbalances 
that could threaten the stability of the EMU (Barcevicius et al., 2013). These new 
monitoring tools, which might become broader than the Europe 2020 targets48, 
seem essential for the effective implementation of the European Semester and the 
recently proposed Social Dimension of a Genuine EMU (European Commission, 
2013c). However, some nervousness exists about the ownership and control of 
the process in which they will be used 49. 
48 Initially, the idea was to add the indicators on ‘At-risk-of Poverty and Social Exclusion’ (AROPE) to the auxiliary indicators used in the MIP. 
However, the intention seems to be to enlarge the set of social indicators used.
49 The Commission initiative to add some social indicators to the auxiliary indicators set accompanying the MIP scoreboard has - to put it mildly 
- not been met with a lot of enthusiasm from the side of the different Council formations. In this, those in the economic and financial strand 
that do not want to weaken the economic scoreboard with social considerations (not the aim of the scoreboard and of secondary importance) 
have found objectives partners in those in the social strand that are weary of the ECOFIN strand picking social indicators on its own and 
then interpreting them as they see fit in a procedure that does not include the social affairs ministers in the EPSCO council as full partners.
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As a matter of fact, there is more than one ‘scoreboard’. Next to the auxiliary 
indicators in the MIP, a scoreboard of (a few) employment and social 
indicators was adopted by the EPSCO Council in December 2013, to inform 
macroeconomic and fiscal policies, both at EU and national levels, in the context 
of the European Semester. In itself, that can be seen as promising. However, the 
European Council’s confirmation of “the relevance of the use of a scoreboard 
of key employment and social indicators” (European Council, 2013: §38) and 
especially that “The use of this wider range of indicators will have the sole 
purpose of allowing a broader understanding of social developments” (Ibid: §39) 
is unsatisfactory. The precise role of this new scoreboard vis-à-vis the strong 
analytical tools developed recently by the EPSCO Council – the EPM and SPPM 
– should be further defined. Finally, mainstreaming should include monitoring the 
impact of social and labour market reforms in Member States having signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding.
In short, if mainstreaming social policy objectives is deemed necessary, the 
content, the process and the role of the different policy strands have to be 
clarified, in order to make such mainstreaming effective and legitimate in the 
perception of all the actors involved. 
Hence, the third nut to crack concerns the idea of mainstreaming, notably with 
regard to the Eurozone: Do we agree with mainstreaming social policy concerns 
in the macroeconomic and budgetary surveillance of EMU, and – if yes – what 
should be the role of the different policy strands?
Enhanced compliance in exchange for more 
solidarity?
Given the diversity of European welfare states, mainstreaming social objectives 
should be far removed from a top-down, ‘one size fits all’ approach to social 
policy-making in the Member States. It might be argued that mainstreaming 
social objectives presupposes first of all a more balanced approach to macro-
economic coordination, i.e. a combination of greater room for manoeuvre and 
tangible support for Member States that opt for a social investment strategy. In 
the context of the ongoing debate about the macro-economic policies pursued 
by the Union, a number of proposals have been tabled to that effect. Some 
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argue that the Stability and Growth Pact should distinguish between investment 
spending and current expenditure (Natali, 2013:257; Dervis, 2012). 
Within the framework of a ‘Europe of incentives’, Leonard and Zielonka (2012: 
35) propose a ‘growth compact for Europe: “The first step would be to allow 
countries with large deficits (such as Spain) more time to get back to the deficit 
threshold of 3 percent of GDP in order to help break the downward spiral of 
contracting GDP, rising unemployment and rising deficits. Second, in order to 
make sure that public investment is not reduced so quickly that it sucks demand 
out of the economy, the financing of public investment could be taken out of the 
national budgets (and hence the measured deficit). One possibility would be 
to give the European Investment Bank (EIB) a central role in public investment 
financing. To avoid cheating, what qualifies as investment could be subject to 
approval by a European authority.” Alternatively, room for manoeuvre can also be 
created by concentrating EU Funds – including outstanding and/or uncommitted 
resources – on key priorities, such as social investment 50. Additional grants/
co-financing could be organised for specific projects 51. Rather than re-opening 
the discussion on the Stability and Growth Pact, our next tough nut revisits the 
underlying issue by posing the question how tangible support can be given to 
countries that wish to re-orient their welfare edifice towards more effective social 
investment and protection.
Obviously, the performance of welfare states is first of all a responsibility of 
the Member States themselves. On a pan-European level, however, there 
is a common interest in having well-performing welfare states, an aspiration 
that cannot be achieved without reform52. Which is why well-conceived 
contractual arrangements between the EU and the Member States - proposed 
by the European Commission as part of a ‘convergence and competitiveness 
instrument’ (European Commission, 2012b, 2013d) - may be a way forward 
if they are based on the genuine reciprocity that is objectively needed in the 
EU today (that is, if they can contribute to reboot convergence) and if they 
are perceived as embodying such reciprocity, and not as ‘bribery’ into reform 
50 Arginger et al. (2012: 8) propose to use “all available funds at EU level to support long-term growth in deficit countries and set mandatory 
targets for their use (as closely monitored as the budget reduction goals). Specifically, use funds for promoting jobs and business start-ups 
in countries with high youth unemployment”.
51 Leonard and Zielonka (2012), for example, propose to link the funding of the renovation of public university buildings to the achievement of 
certain enrolment or graduation rates in a country.
52 That reform is needed, is not to say that there has been no reform so far: the range and depth of current reforms in Member States’ social 
protection systems is documented in SPC (2013).
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(Pisany-Ferry, 2013) which could provoke the kind of popular resistance already 
seen in bailout countries.
Under these conditions, contractual arrangements might complement the 
existing macroeconomic surveillance framework with a constructive surveillance 
of employment and social policies. Fernandes and Maslauskaite (2013a) describe 
the idea as follows: 
‘(…) contrary to the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure, which includes a 
sanction mechanism, in the social field member states should adopt an incentive 
mechanism instead. This mechanism could rest on the ‘Convergence and 
Competitiveness Instrument’ which is currently being debated and which aims at 
reinforcing the implementation of structural reforms. Nevertheless, the approach 
for these contracts has to be different from the one provided today. Rather than 
a bilateral approach in which the Commission tells each government what it has 
to do, the member states should define a set of social objectives – or retake the 
ones from the Europe 2020 strategy – and agree on a financial aid addressed to 
the countries that are launching initiatives and reforms aiming at achieving these 
objectives as well as reducing their social imbalances.’
The discussion on contractual arrangements, which has first been launched in 
the European Council (2012b) by President Van Rompuy, raises many operational 
questions. Some have been answered in the European Council’s Conclusions of 
December 2013; other questions remain open. What would the contracts pertain 
to, exactly? To which Member States would they apply (involving only Eurozone 
countries, but open to the others)? Why should the (Economic Adjustment) 
Programme countries be excluded 53? Should they be concentrated on social 
investment priorities in the CSR’s and the NRP’s, as suggested by the French 
Commissariat Général (2013)? How binding can they really be (legal questions 
arise 54)? Who would be involved in negotiating the contracts so as to increase 
ownership (national parliaments, social partners?)? And, last but not least, how 
much money would be put on the table in exchange for enhanced compliance 
53 The European Council of December 2013 refers to the need for ‘timely correction’ (European Council, 2013: § 30), i.e. the willingness to 
support ’sound’ policies ’before countries face severe economic difficulties’ Ibid: § 32).  There is consequently a clear attempt to include 
the contractual agreements in a sort of preventive surveillance toolbox within the European Semester, implicitly acknowledging the higher 
financial, political and social costs of an intervention at a later stage, when a crisis has kicked in. The exclusion of Member States under 
macroeconomic adjustment programme is being explained by this timing factor: they are already under severe economic difficulties and 
therefore no longer fall under preventive ‘timely correction’. From a formal point of view, the programme countries are implementing measures 
whose adoption is linked to the conditional disbursement of the financial assistance agreed (which is not a substantive argument why they 
should be excluded from the contracts, in the view of the authors).
54 The Council Conclusions stipulate that the agreements on the financial support associated to the contractual arrangements should be legally 
binding (European Council, 2013: § 36).
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(what amounts are we talking about 55?) and what will be their nature (loans, 
grants or guarantees)? These are important questions; notably the last one – the 
solidarity mechanism – seems to lag behind in terms of political consensus. But, 
fundamentally, the key question is whether the contracts envisage a bilateral 
top-down56 approach with the Council and the Commission dictating policies 
to specific countries (a ‘principal-agent model’ with financial incentives), or, 
alternatively, solidarity in mutually agreed57 structural welfare state reform (see 
Rubio, 2013, for a development of this argument).
So conceived, the questions at hand echo the questions raised with regard to 
the European funds, which follow from our description in section 3.2. We have 
argued that cohesion policy is supporting ‘inclusive growth’ more effectively 
than it did before, mainly thanks to concentration of efforts. The case could be 
made that not only the ESF, but also the ERDF and other funds should support 
the employment and social policy thematic objectives, and have corresponding 
social investment priorities.
As described in section 3.2, macroeconomic conditionality, which has existed in 
the Cohesion Fund since its creation in 1994, is being generalized to all European 
Structural and Investment (ESI) Funds, as they are called in the programming 
period. Such conditionality implies that the disbursement of all Common Strategic 
Framework (CSF) expenditures is dependent on Member States’ performance 
under EU economic governance procedures. That is to say: the Commission 
could suspend (as a last resort) part or all of the cohesion policy payments and/
or commitments when a Member State is found to not to have taken sufficient 
measures to correct its fiscal or macroeconomic problems. This requires some 
careful reflection. One might even question the pertinence of macroeconomic 
55 Vanden Bosch (2013:18-19) estimates that the total committed funding required over 5 years could vary between €30bn and €75bn; the net 
transfers towards beneficiaries would range between 0.2% and 0.5% of their respective GDP.
56On the basis of the Council Conclusions, whether or not the contracts will instantiate a top-down approach is an open question: the 
Conclusions refer to an agreement between the Member State and the Commission to be submitted to the Council for approval; in such a 
scheme the top-down nature of the approach depends on the political influence of the Member State concerned (European Council, 2013: 
§ 36).
57The European Council Conclusions of December 2013 refer to ‘mutually agreed contractual arrangements that will be a home-grown’ 
commitment, which seems a way to consider the aspect of reciprocity and connected ownership (European Council, 2013: §32). Likewise, 
the European Council considers the contractual arrangements as being part of ‘partnerships’ on growth, jobs and competitiveness, involving 
Member States, the Commission and the Council (Ibid: § 36) but also the ‘involvement of national parliaments, social partners, and other 
relevant stakeholders’ (Ibid). 
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conditionality in the ESI Funds.58  On the other hand, in section 3.2 we also 
mentioned that the new rules of the ESI funds 2014-2020 provide concrete 
opportunities to increase orientation to results and surveillance, while at the 
same time promoting the establishment of incentive mechanisms (in the sense 
of Fernandes and Maslauskaite, 2013) to actually promote the achievement of 
results in the social field. The cohesion policy Operational Programmes (OP’s) 
are indeed ‘contracts’ between the Member States and the Commission where 
funding is ensured against the commitment to implement agreed interventions in 
defined policy areas . 59 
There is a risk that the contractual arrangements overlap with existing cohesion 
policy programmes with a clear social commitment. Under which conditions 
can contractual arrangements and cohesion policy operational programmes be 
made consistent and complementary policy tools, in order to increase – instead 
of merely substitute – efforts at EU level in employment and social policies? 
Can the reformed programming of the cohesion policy support a ‘constructive 
surveillance’ of the implementation of EU employment and social policies? 
The fourth nut to crack is thus: Does the Group see the possibility of establishing 
contractual arrangements between the EU and the Member States that ensure 
a constructive surveillance of employment and social policies alongside the 
surveillance now in place for economic policies? Can contractual arrangements 
and cohesion policy operational programmes be made consistent and 
complementary policy tools, in order to increase – instead of merely substitute 
– efforts at EU level in employment and social policies? Can we thus instantiate 
‘solidarity in reform’?
58 On the one hand, such conditionality may be a strong incentive to deliver on the macroeconomic commitments. But there are some real 
risks involved (Tokarski and Verhelst, 2012).  Thus, there is the risk that conditionality would especially penalize the major beneficiaries of 
cohesion policy (i.e. those countries where these funds constitute several percentage points of GDP). For that reason Tokarski and Verhelst 
propose a cap on the maximum amount of funds in relation to GDP that could be suspended. The question is whether such a correction is 
sufficient: many questions remain as regards the pertinence of macroeconomic conditionality in the ESI Funds. Macroeconomic conditionality 
contradicts the view that cohesion policy reinforces the achievement of Europe 2020 objectives. The suspensions or the cuts of the funds 
triggered by macroeconomic conditionality in the ESI funds brings to a halt the policies supported by those funds (including social inclusion, 
human capital and employment policies) and is likely to trigger negative effect on macro-divergence. Finally, one should also ask to what 
extent the ‘contractual arrangements’ may in practice overlap with existing cohesion policy programmes with a clear social commitment.
59 Furthermore, the articles on ‘strategic progress’ of Regulation 1303/2013 laying down common provisions on the ESI funds, explicitly refer 
to a ‘debate on the ESI funds’ (Articles 52 and 53). This offers an opportunity to set up a structured political debate based on the ‘summary 
report’ which the Commission has to send – starting from 2016 – to the other EU institutions, based on implementation reports and available 
evidence on evaluations of programmes. We thank Fabrizio Barca for drawing our attention to these points with regard to cohesion policy.
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A stabilisation mechanism for EMU?
The previous section focused on solidarity in structural reform. A separate question 
concerns the organisation of solidarity in adverse cyclical circumstances.
Many now seem to agree that EMU necessitates a European stabilisation 
mechanism that contributes to restoring the systemic stabilisation capacity of 
national welfare states. Since the ‘Four Presidents60 ‘ (European Council, 2012b) 
and then the European Commission (2012b) took on board the idea of equipping 
the EMU with a shock absorption capacity in their report about deepening the 
EMU, the idea gained considerable legitimacy (e.g. Commissariat Général, 
2013). Recently a group of eleven German economists, lawyers and political 
scientists convincingly explained that monetary union cannot be permanently 
stable without a controlled transfer mechanism and that it is in Germany’s self-
interest to overcome fears about a transfer union (Glienicker Group, 2013). 
The elaboration of the idea entails complex questions (which are also discussed 
by the IMF, see Allard et al. 2013): some researchers emphasize asymmetric 
shocks and propose ‘interstate insurance’, triggered by economic indicators 
(Enderlein e.a., 2013; Drèze and Durré, 2013). Member states pay into the 
scheme when their output gap is above the euro area aggregate output gap, i.e. 
when their cyclical economic position is better, and countries receive payments 
from the scheme when their output gap in a given year is more negative than 
the euro area average. Importantly, such an insurance scheme would not lead to 
permanent transfers from some countries to others, but all countries would be 
contributors and benefactors over time. 
Other researchers argue in favour of a European Unemployment Insurance, 
which would respond both to asymmetric and symmetric business cycle shocks 
(Dullien, 2012, 2013). The idea of an EU-wide unemployment benefit is far from 
new, having been proposed – without success - by the Marjolin (1975) Report 
on EMU and supported by the MacDougall (1978) Report on the role of public 
finance. The underlying idea is to establish a ‘basic unemployment insurance’ 
in Europe with transfers to short-term unemployed. These transfers would be 
paid for a limited time (12 months) and the absolute amount would be linked to 
60 The Presidents of the European Council, the Commission, the Eurogroup and the ECB.
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wage income prior to the beginning of the period of unemployment. Moreover, 
only those who have been in dependent employment prior to being unemployed 
would be eligible. Such proposals are demanding - albeit in different degrees - in 
terms of mutual trust, common purpose and the understanding that responsibility 
and solidarity go hand in hand.
Rather than organizing a technical discussion on the details of such proposals61, 
the fifth nut to crack is: How does the Group assess the political (as opposed to 
technical) feasibility of such schemes? 
An agreement on minimum wages to support 
sustainable mobility?
In their joint statement of 29 May 2013, France and Germany proposed 
‘considering implementing minimum wage floors, defined at national level 
that would guarantee a high level of employment and fair wages – leaving the 
choice between legislation and collective-bargaining agreements.’ Interestingly, 
this joint statement immediately added a consideration on the enhancement 
of cross-border mobility, ‘calling for encouraging cross-border worker mobility 
by removing obstacles, improving cooperation between employment services 
(building upon the EURES platform) and facilitating the portability of rights in case 
of mobility’ (Bundesregierung, 2013). This lends support to the idea that cross-
border mobility is a positive development, if organized with respect to existing 
social regulation, such as decent minimum wages, as we also argued in section 
2.2.
Admittedly, the French-German proposal was formulated in rather vague terms. 
In April 2005, researchers from Germany, France and Switzerland proposed a 
European minimum wage policy according to which every country in Europe 
should guarantee a national minimum wage (Schulten et al., 2005). They 
proposed a national minimum wage norm corresponding to 60% of the average 
national wage. As a short-term target, these researchers called for a norm of at 
least 50% of the national average wage. 
61 For a discussion of the legal options for an additional EMU, see European Parliament (2013a).
98 Friends of Europe | Life Quality
The French-German proposal carefully specifies that at the national level the 
choice would be open between legislation and collective bargaining agreements. 
Returning to the specific issue of posting, in section 2.2 we interpreted the Court 
of Justice’s judgments in the Viking and Laval cases as follows: only predictable 
systems of minimum wage protection, resting on some public authority (i.e. 
systems that are regulated or at least ‘confirmed’ by public authorities) can be 
imposed on foreign companies that post workers. If that argument is accepted, 
it would mean that social partners must reconsider traditional positions on 
subsidiarity within welfare states, that is, they must accept that Member 
States create a legal context in which only generally applicable minimum wage 
protection has to be respected by foreign service providers. In other words, both 
at the domestic and the European level, we must reconsider the application of 
subsidiarity principles, given the new contexts in which social policy operates 
today. 
Accepting all this – that we should embrace cross-border mobility62 positively, 
that EU Member States should have universally applicable systems of minimum 
wages, affirmed in one way or other by public authorities, with levels defined 
with reference to the national context – is more than one tough nut to crack at 
once; but it would definitely constitute a coherent approach. Recent evolutions 
in the debate about minimum wage in both Germany63 and the UK64, seem 
encouraging to at least engage in the debate.
The sixth nut to crack is therefore: Can a binding EU framework on minimum 
wages support national social policies and ensure that cross-border mobility can 
be encouraged without jeopardizing existing social arrangements? 
62 Note the Commission’s plans to present proposals in 2014 to review the unemployment chapter of Regulations (EC) 883/2004 and 987/2009 
with a view to simplifying procedures for granting unemployment benefits in cross-border situations (European Commission, 2013c: 10).
63The introduction of a minimum wage was a central issue during the 2013 German elections. The introduction of the minimum wage is now 
part of the coalition agreement: a nationwide minimum wage of EUR 8.50 will be introduced as of 2015, but won’t come into full effect until 
until 2017.
64 In January 2014, the UK Government made a significant shift in the minimum wage debate: the Chancellor of the Exchequer, George 
Osborne called for a rise in minimum wage from 6.31 to 7 pounds per hour, reflecting an unusual consensus developing in Britain over how 
to distribute the spoils of the economic recovery. 
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Increasing the effectiveness of minimum 
income protection by EU initiatives?
Proposals have been tabled with regard to minimum income protection, notably 
by the European Anti-Poverty Network 65 (EAPN, 2010). An in-depth examination 
of this proposal (Vandenbroucke et al., 2013a) concluded as follows. A European 
framework with regard to minimum income protection would give substance and 
political salience to social rights in a ‘caring Europe’. But, given the heterogeneity 
between European Member States, any binding agreements on minimum 
incomes would have to be introduced flexibly and gradually, and implemented 
in unison with a convergence in activation measures and minimum wages. 
Moreover, since such a scheme – even if it is moderate in its initial ambition – 
requires a significantly greater budgetary effort on behalf of some of the poorer 
Member States in Eastern and Southern Europe, it raises a complex question 
about the meaning of solidarity within the EU. More recently the European 
Economic and Social Committee also called for an EU directive that would 
extend minimum income schemes to all Member States, while it linked such 
schemes to active labour market policies and the setting up of a European fund 
for an EU minimum income (EESC, 2013) 66.
In the poorer Member States ‘the rich’ are poorer than ‘the poor’ in the richer 
Member States. Hence, a minimal condition for a ‘caring Europe’, that attempts 
to upscale minimum income protection, is that it should help the poorer Member 
States, not just by opening up markets and implementing successful macro-
economic policies at the EU level, but also by putting at their disposal generous 
Structural Funds for the foreseeable future. Simultaneously, a caring Europe 
would put positive pressure on poorer and richer Member States to gradually 
improve the overall quality and efficiency of their welfare regimes (introducing 
conditionality with regard to aspects of social inclusion policy in the European 
Social Fund may be a possible way to develop more leverage). Meanwhile, 
65 EAPN proposes a draft directive on adequate minimum income in 2010. It would stipulate that ‘every Member State shall introduce a 
minimum income scheme, that guarantees the right to an adequate minimum income to all people living on their territory, in line with Council 
Recommendation 92/441/EEC on common criteria concerning sufficient resources and social assistance in social protection systems and 
Commission Recommendation 2008/867/EC on active inclusion of people excluded from the labour market. Member States may decide 
whether the minimum income schemes provide financial assistance only or also in kind support’ (EAPN, 2010). The objective would be to 
ensure that the combined effect of their minimum income provisions and other policy measures are sufficient for lifting all persons above the 
poverty threshold (60% of the national median income). 
66 The Workers' Group of the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) contracted the European Social Observatory to conduct a 
study on the legal and political feasibility of introducing a guaranteed minimum income at European level. The report also investigates several 
scenarios related to the costs of increasing current minimum income benefits to the level of relative poverty thresholds, set at 40, 50 and 60% 
of national median equivalised income (Peña-Casas et al., , 2014).
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existing strategies – notably Europe 2020 – should be taken seriously and given 
real bite (this means that budgetary and macro-economic policies should serve 
the social investment goals of Europe 2020). If this were the overall context, 
then the prospect of gradually introducing a more binding EU framework on 
minimum income protection may become realistic and useful, for the political 
reasons indicated above and as a measure to increase the quality and efficiency 
of domestic social systems. Fundamentally, enhanced solidarity within Member 
States cannot be decoupled from enhanced solidarity among Member States – 
and vice versa. That is the intellectual and political agenda we have to come to 
terms with.
The seventh tough nut to crack is therefore: Can a more binding EU framework 
on minimum income protection serve to raise the quality and efficiency of 
domestic social systems?
Strengthening social dialogue?67 
Section 3.4 concluded that strengthening social partner capacity and social 
dialogue structures (especially in Central and Eastern Europe) is a prerequisite to 
revamping this governance tool.  Hence, the question is which instruments could 
be used to support national social partner organisations, as a stepping-stone to 
a more fruitful EU social dialogue? Would monitoring of national social partner 
involvement in all stages of the European Semester be a way forward (e.g. 
Member States to annex Social Partner’s opinions to their NRP’s, or invite them 
to contribute to implementing the CSR’s that are relevant for them?) Or increased 
ESF Funding for national trade union campaigns, training and networking?
Secondly, the question is how can the social partners be involved more 
effectively in the European socio-economic governance (as proposed in the 
Social dimension of EMU Commission Communication)? Is the Tripartite Social 
Summit an appropriate vehicle for this purpose, and to what extent should its 
composition and preparation be improved? Is there scope to improve the (rather 
formal) Macroeconomic Dialogue where Council, Commission, European Central 
Bank (ECB) and social partners exchange views?
62 Our emphasis on these questions with regard to the social dialogue between the traditional social partners does not imply that we consider 
the involvement by NGO’s unimportant, cf. the final paragraphs of section 3.3. above. We think the latter should be uncontroversial.  
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Thirdly, to what extent can European Commission and European social partner 
resources be focused on the promotion of the European sectoral social dialogue? 
In which areas can such a dialogue could still bear fruit (on Member States’ 
social investment strategy?, on Industrial innovation strategies?, on an ultimate 
agreement on working time with a view to responding to the CJEU’s activism in 
this area?, on the conditions for a transition towards a green economy?). 
Summing up, the eighth nut to crack is this: What could be the most fruitful ways 
forward:  building on existing arrangements, including the sectoral dialogue; 
working through the European Semester; broadening the Macroeconomic 
Dialogue? Should the EU support national social dialogue in a more direct way 
(e.g. enhanced capacity building efforts through the Funds)?  And, on which 
particular issues should it focus? 
Improving the EMU’s democratic legitimacy 
through better social governance?
In section 2.1 we have explained why a basic consensus is needed, at the level 
of the Eurozone, on common objectives of social policy. It would seem that 
arriving at such a consensus is only possible if we improve governance within 
the Eurozone so as to improve its legitimacy. 
•  Thus, one can imagine the different Council formations, including the 
EPSCO, meeting at the level of the Eurozone, mirroring the monthly 
Eurogroup meetings (since 1998) of the finance ministers.  
•  Similarly, the idea of creating special arrangements within the European 
Parliament for deputies from Eurozone countries is gaining traction (e.g. 
creating Sub-Committee(s) on the Euro after the next elections).
•  Some imagine the social partners in the Eurozone taking the initiative to 
start negotiations that would address the specific issues of the Eurozone 
(Chopin and Fabre, 2013). 
At the same time, would such improved Eurozone governance, and thus a 
deepening of integration at the level of the Eurozone countries - which for the 
abovementioned Glienicker Group (2013) should include a new euro-Treaty an 
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economic government and a euro-budget - not increase the risk of a two-speed 
Europe?
Summing up, the ninth nut to crack is this: Would better Eurozone governance in 
this way improve both the legitimacy and quality of social governance, or would 
it simply increase the risk of creating a two-speed Europe?
Education as the pan-European social 
investment priority 
In Section 1 of this report, we underscored the human capital challenge with 
which European welfare states are confronted: the disparity with regard to 
educational achievement within the EU is huge. If there is one domain in which 
upward convergence should be our ambition and a matter of common concern, 
it is education.
The European Commission has developed a comprehensive agenda on 
education, training and skills, and issued excellent Recommendations on the 
modernization of education systems. However, the question remains as to 
whether this educational agenda carries sufficient weight at the highest levels 
of European political decision-making and in the setting of budgetary and policy 
priorities in Member States.
Hence, the tenth nut to crack concerns the selection of priorities and the scope 
for tangible EU initiatives: Do we believe that more success in quality education 
for all young Europeans should be a number one priority within a credible 
European social investment strategy? How far do we see tangible pan-European 
action being developed in this area?
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V. FROM A SENSE OF SURVIVAL TO 
A SENSE OF COMMON PURPOSE
Against the backdrop of the continuing financial, economic and social crisis, 
there is a need for more resolute EU-level action to promote sustainable growth, 
employment and social investment. The social impact of the ongoing adjustment 
processes is unsettling. That is, in itself, a reason why the European Union must 
be seen as really caring for the social conditions of its citizens. But the challenge 
is even more fundamental.
In this report, we have argued that Europe is in need of a Social Union: one 
that would support national welfare states on a systemic level in some of their 
key functions (such as macroeconomic stabilisation) and guide the substantive 
development of national welfare states – via general social standards and 
objectives, leaving ways and means of social policy to Member States – on the 
basis of an operational definition of the European social model. In other words, 
European countries would cooperate in a union with an explicit social purpose 
– hence, the expression ‘European Social Union’.  
From the outset, we should avoid three misunderstandings.
First, EMU should not have a parallel and separate social pillar to be added to 
the existing pillars. The social dimension should be mainstreamed into all EMU 
initiatives because social policies are very often affected by policies pursued in 
other areas. The same holds for the social dimension of the EU at large.
Second, the practice of a Social Union should be far removed from a top-down, 
‘one size fits all’ approach to social policy-making in the Member States. What is 
needed today, is a more balanced approach to macro-economic coordination, i.e. 
a combination of greater room for manoeuvre and tangible support for Member 
States that opt for a social investment strategy, and policy guidance based on 
clear and sufficiently stringent and constraining objectives with regard to well-
defined social outcomes on the one hand, and genuine scope for exploration 
and mutual learning on the ways and means to achieve those outcomes on the 
other hand. The emphasis on a Social Union is not a coincidence. A European 
Social Union is a Union of Welfare States, it is not a European Welfare State.
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Third, this report favours positive reform, not the preservation of the status quo. In 
policy terms, the challenge is to make long-term social investments and medium-
term fiscal consolidation mutually supportive and sustainable, under improved 
financial and economic governance. In political terms, European citizens need a 
reformist perspective that gives the social acquis they cherish a credible future. 
At this critical juncture, we should not underestimate or discount the massive 
achievements of over half-a-century of European integration and welfare state 
development. The unprecedented deepening and widening of regional integration 
from six to twenty-eight member states, creating a community of some 500 
million people, was accompanied by the expansion of comprehensive welfare 
systems, while promoting democracy and securing peace, to an extent barely 
conceivable at the start of post-war reconstruction. A European Social Union 
should build on that acquis; simultaneously, building on that acquis requires 
reform. That is the quintessence of the call for a ‘social investment pact’ 68. 
At the moment of writing, signs of economic recovery are getting stronger. 
Maybe, in the near future, the actions of the Member States will no longer be 
guided by day-to-day crisis management. However, without a sense of common 
purpose, it will not be possible to overcome the legacy of the crisis; it will not be 
possible to avoid the spectre of sluggish economic growth for many years; it will 
not be possible to fight the mounting euroscepticism 69; and it will certainly not 
be possible to offer young people the kind of optimistic prospects their parents 
once enjoyed. Moving from a ‘sense of survival’ to a ‘sense of common purpose’ 
is a basic condition for building a Social Union.
 
68 Hemerijck and Vandenbroucke (2012).
69 Fernandes and Maslauskaite (2013b), who’s Scenario C also inspired the subtitle of this particular section.
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APPENDIX I: Economic and social 
developments over the crisis
By Terry Ward (Applica)
Employment and unemployment
Employment rates, 20-64, 2004-2012 (% population 20-64)
EU28
EU15 
EU15 excl. DE
EU13
Belgium
Bulgaria
Czech Republic
Denmark
Germany
Estonia
Ireland
Greece
Spain
France
Croatia
Italy
Cyprus
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Hungary
Malta
Netherlands
Austria
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovenia
Slovakia
Finland
Sweden
UK
67.2
68.6
68.8
62.2
65.8
61.2
70.1
78.1
67.9
70.3
71.0
64.4
65.0
69.1
59.7
61.6
75.8
69.3
69.2
67.7
62.0
57.2
74.9
69.6
57.0
72.7
64.7
71.0
63.5
72.5
77.8
74.9
70.3
71.3
70.6
66.6
68.0
70.7
72.4
79.7
74.0
77.0
72.3
66.5
68.3
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62.9
63.0
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After an almost universal increase in employment rates over the growth period 
2004-2008, rates have declined in all countries except Germany, Austria, 
Hungary and Malta over the crisis period. The latest quarterly figures show little 
sign of recovery up to mid-2013 (indeed rates were marginally lower than a year 
earlier). In many countries, rates were lower than 8 years earlier, including in the 
EU15 as a whole excluding Germany. This was particularly the case in the 4 
southern EU15 countries, where, Portugal apart, employment rates were well 
below the EU average before the crisis. 
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The decline in employment rates has been accompanied by an increase in 
unemployment. In most countries, the unemployment rates was higher in 2012 
than 8 years earlier and in many cases markedly so. This was particularly so in 
Greece and Spain. As in the case of employment, there is no sign of any general 
reduction in unemployment during 2013 but instead a continued increase, the 
average rate in the EU reaching 10.9% in mid-2013 and 11.1% in the EU15.
Youth unemployment rates, 2004-2012 (% labour force, 15-24)
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Young people were hit particularly hard by the recession which hit the EU in 
2008. The youth unemployment rate increased to around 23% in the EU in 2012 
and was at much the same level in mid-2013. The biggest increases were in 
Greece and Spain, where well over half of young people aged 15-24 in the labour 
force were unemployed in 2012. By mid-2013, the rate in Greece had risen to 
59% and in Spain to 56%. The rate was also around 50% in Croatia and 40% 
in Cyprus.
Youth unemployed relative to population, 2004-2012   
 (% population 15-24)
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The youth unemployment rates exaggerate the problem of unemployment among 
young people because most young people aged 15-24 are not part of the labour 
force but still in full-time education. Relating the youth unemployed to population 
in the same age group gives a somewhat more meaningful indication of the 
scale of the problem. This still shows an increase in the relative number of young 
people who are unemployed but not so dramatically so as the unemployment 
rates. The proportion of those aged 15-24who were unemployed in 2012 was 
still highest in Spain and Greece but it was only around the EU15 average in 
Italy instead of being well above.  These relative figures, however, do not entirely 
reflect the relative scale of the problem since not all young people not in the 
labour force – i.e. not employed or unemployed – are in education or training. 
This is particularly so in Italy, Ireland and Bulgaria. Here as in Greece and Spain, 
the proportion of young people aged 15-24 that are neither employed nor in 
education and training (the NEETs) was around 20% in 2012.
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Growth in GDP per head at constant prices, 2004-1012
 (Annual average % change)
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All EU countries, apart from Malta and Poland, experienced a decline in GDP 
per head in the two years 2008-2010, which average 1.7% a year (i.e. an overall 
decline of around 3.5%). There was some recovery over the two years 2010-
2012 but not in all countries and in most only modest. In 2013, there was a 
renewed downturn in many countries and a small reduction in GDP per head 
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overall. In 2012 (and 2013), GDP per head was below the level before the crisis. 
In the EU13, it was higher on average but lower in 7 of the 13 Member States. 
In the EU15 excluding Germany, GDP per head in 2012 was no higher than 8 
years earlier (and in 2013, slightly lower). In the southern EU countries, including 
Cyprus, it was lower, especially in Greece, where it was 13% lower.
Change in household income per head, 2004-2012 
(Annual average % change)
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Czech Republic
Denmark
Germany
Estonia
Ireland
Greece
Spain
France
Croatia
Italy
Cyprus
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Hungary
Malta
Netherlands
Austria
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovenia
Slovakia
Finland
Sweden
UK
0.7
0.1
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0.1
8.1
2.8
3.0
1.7
1.2
na
-0.2
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0.5
2.9
-0.8
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Note: Figures for DK, LU and RO for 2010-12 relate to 2010-11; figures for DK and RO for 2004-12 
relate to 2004-11. Source: Eurostat, EU Labour Force Survey
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The change in household income per head, which is a much more relevant 
indication of the change in living standards, shows a very different pattern than 
that in GDP per head. While there was a significant fall in real terms in 2008-
2010 along with the fall in GDP per head, there was an even bigger decline in the 
subsequent two years, reflecting the decline in average earnings along with the 
rise in unemployment which occurred. Average income per head across the EU 
was, therefore, around 6% less in 2012 than before the crisis began and below 
the level in 2004. In Greece, income per head was 30% below the level before 
the onset of the crisis and 20% less than 8 years earlier, while in Italy it was 12% 
lower. 
Proportion of population at risk of poverty, 2003-2011 (% total population)
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127A Europen Social Union: 10 tough nuts to crack | Spring 2014
While the relative number of people at risk of poverty (those with disposable 
income below 60% of the median) increased on average in the EU between 2007 
and 2011, the increase was relatively small and was by no means general (there 
were almost as many countries where it fell as where it increased). Although 
there was an increase in Greece, Spain and Italy where real income fell markedly 
over this period, the relative number declined in Ireland and Portugal. There was 
also an increase in Germany, Sweden and Luxembourg where real incomes 
rose. In short, there is only a relatively limited relationship between changes in 
income and in the proportion of people at risk of poverty emphasizing the nature 
of the indicator as a measure of relative rather than absolute poverty. 
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Proportion of population identified as being materially deprived,  
2005-2012 (% total)
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11.9
13.2
na
14.3
31.2
56.3
51.7
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-0.4
-2.6
-1.6
-2.3
5.4
-18.5
1.8
-3.0
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0.9
6.6
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Note: Figure for 2005 for BG relates to 2006 and for RO to 2007. Figure for IE for 2012 relates to 
2011. Material deprivation defined in terms of being deprived of 3 of 9 items the non-affordability of 
which is taken as being indicative of deprivation. Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC.
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Material deprivation is a much better indicator of absolute poverty. (Note that 
material deprivation s measured in terms of being deprived of three items rather 
than four, which is an indicator of extreme material deprivation which is included 
as part of the Europe 2020 target.) This varies more in line with changes in 
average real income levels. It shows a marked increase in the relative number of 
people materially deprived in Greece, Spain, Italy and Ireland as well as the three 
Baltic States over the crisis period. On the other hand, it also shows a reduction 
in Portugal, where real income declined, and an increase in Malta where it rose. 
The Europe 2020 indicator of poverty and exclusion, which is a less satisfactory 
indicator of developments because of its combination of different measures 
relating to different tie-periods, also shows an increase in most Member States 
over the crisis period, though not in Portugal. It also shows increases in both 
Luxembourg and Malta
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General Government expenditure in real terms, 2004-2012 
(Annual average % change)
EU28
EU15 
EU15 excl. DE
EU13
Belgium
Bulgaria
Czech Republic
Denmark
Germany
Estonia
Ireland
Greece
Spain
France
Croatia
Italy
Cyprus
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Hungary
Malta
Netherlands
Austria
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovenia
Slovakia
Finland
Sweden
UK
2.4
2.2
2.7
5.8
2.4
6.3
4.3
0.2
0.5
9.6
9.9
5.5
4.6
1.6
na
1.5
4.0
9.2
10.0
1.8
2.3
3.3
2.9
0.6
5.8
0.8
10.7
4.1
5.8
2.7
1.3
4.7
2.6
2.4
2.2
4.4
2.5
-3.8
2.0
3.6
3.5
-5.2
19.1
-3.2
3.6
2.3
na
-0.2
4.4
-5.0
-1.8
4.1
-2.2
-1.3
4.2
2.3
5.3
6.6
-2.9
2.3
6.6
3.5
1.2
1.1
-0.7
-0.7
-0.4
-0.8
3.2
-0.8
1.3
1.8
-1.4
5.4
-18.4
-4.8
0.7
1.1
-2.5
-0.9
-0.8
-3.6
-3.2
1.8
-1.3
3.3
-1.1
0.8
-0.5
-6.2
-3.1
-2.3
-0.4
1.7
1.5
-1.4
0.9
0.9
0.9
1.8
2.8
-2.3
1.6
2.7
1.0
0.0
-1.4
-4.0
2.2
1.7
na
-0.5
1.8
-4.3
-2.5
2.9
-1.8
1.0
1.6
1.6
2.4
0.0
-3.0
0.0
3.0
2.6
1.4
-0.2
2004-2008 2008-2010 2010-2012 2008-2012
Note: General government expenditure in current price terms is deflated by the GDP deflator
Source: Eurostat, Government finances and national accounts 
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General Government expenditure increased significantly relative to GDP over 
the period of economic downturn. This, however, was a consequence of 
the fall in GDP rather than of any marked acceleration in the growth rate of 
government expenditure, which was only slightly higher on average over the two 
years 2008-2010 than over the preceding 4 years. Indeed in both the EU15 
excluding Germany and in the EU13, it was less. Over the two years 2010-2012, 
expenditure was reduced in most countries, especially in Greece and Ireland, 
though in the last it reflects the substantial support given to banks in the previous 
two years. Over the 4 years 2008-2012 therefore, the growth of government 
expenditure exceeded 2% a year only in 7 Member States and in no country was 
it more than 3% a year. 
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General Government gross fixed capital formation, 2004-2012 
EU28
EU15 
EU15 excl. DE
EU13
Belgium
Bulgaria
Czech Republic
Denmark
Germany
Estonia
Ireland
Greece
Spain
France
Croatia
Italy
Cyprus
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Hungary
Malta
Netherlands
Austria
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovenia
Slovakia
Finland
Sweden
UK
4.9
4.0
4.1
12.0
1.7
22.6
7.9
2.0
3.7
15.1
14.8
4.0
7.5
2.9
na
-0.9
-2.8
19.5
16.8
-1.8
-2.8
-8.0
4.6
2.3
14.1
-5.2
29.3
11.7
2.7
0.5
5.4
8.7
-0.9
-1.6
-2.3
3.7
2.2
-11.7
-4.9
6.6
2.3
-20.4
-22.6
-24.7
-2.3
-2.7
na
-5.2
10.5
-21.2
-10.6
8.8
4.9
-4.5
1.5
-2.7
13.7
12.4
-10.6
-2.9
14.6
-3.4
3.5
1.5
-6.7
-6.6
-7.5
-7.5
5.6
-13.2
-12.7
7.3
-1.6
26.3
-25.2
-16.3
-35.0
1.3
-11.3
-6.9
-19.7
12.3
-5.9
-2.8
0.6
22.4
-4.4
-3.5
-6.8
-35.0
-7.6
-15.9
-12.0
2.9
2.3
-4.4
-14.5
-15.4
-18.3
-8.0
16.5
-41.2
-31.1
30.8
1.2
1.0
-66.5
-60.3
-59.7
-2.8
na
-22.1
-21.1
-21.6
-29.2
11.9
11.3
36.5
-5.8
-11.8
12.2
-46.6
-31.8
-33.4
1.7
-1.3
12.1
-5.8
2004-2008 2008-2010 2010-2012 2008-2012
Note: General government investment in current price terms deflated by the GDP deflator
Source: Eurostat, Government finances and national accounts.
Annual average % change  % change
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Public investment has been reduced considerably over the crisis period. Even in 
the two years 2008-2010 when measures were taken t counter the deflationary 
effects of the global recession, General Government fixed capital formation 
declined on average in real terms across the EU as well as in most Member 
States. It declined by even more over the subsequent two years. As a result, 
there was an overall reduction of 15% over the 4 years 2008-2012 across the EU 
and one of 60% or more in Ireland, Greece and Spain. 
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General Government expenditure on healthcare in real terms,  
2004-2011 
EU27
EU15 
EU15 excl. DE
EU12
Belgium
Bulgaria
Czech Republic
Denmark
Germany
Estonia
Ireland
Greece
Spain
France
Croatia
Italy
Cyprus
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Hungary
Malta
Netherlands
Austria
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovenia
Slovakia
Finland
Sweden
UK
3.7
3.4
3.7
8.5
3.2
3.0
5.2
3.6
2.3
12.3
5.3
9.8
5.6
1.5
na
2.6
3.1
14.5
12.1
1.8
-0.6
0.8
9.1
3.4
10.7
-0.2
12.9
4.1
19.2
4.7
3.0
4.8
2.3
2.4
2.2
1.2
3.1
-1.0
5.1
2.4
2.9
-5.2
-1.5
-4.1
2.5
2.7
na
0.5
5.0
-14.2
-2.9
2.2
-0.3
1.6
5.8
1.6
2.1
0.8
1.8
2.2
-4.5
3.3
2.0
2.9
0.0
0.0
-0.4
0.1
4.0
0.0
1.9
0.0
1.1
3.5
-5.5
-22.0
-2.8
2.7
na
-2.0
3.4
3.6
2.1
-1.6
1.8
3.1
2.9
-2.0
-1.0
0.0
-4.5
-0.1
-4.3
2.2
3.4
-1.4
4.7
4.8
4.1
2.5
10.6
-1.9
12.5
4.9
7.1
-7.0
-8.3
-28.2
2.1
8.3
Na
-1.0
14.1
-23.7
-3.7
2.9
1.2
6.3
15.3
1.1
3.3
1.5
-1.0
4.2
-12.7
8.9
7.5
4.4
2004-2008 2008-2010 2010-2011 2008-2011
Note: General government expenditure in current price terms deflated by the GDP deflator
Source: Eurostat, Government finances and national accounts 
Annual average % change  % change
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Government expenditure on health increased in real terms in most countries 
over the two years 2008-2010, though not in the Baltic States, Bulgaria, 
Ireland, Greece, Slovakia and Hungary (where it had already been reduced 
in the preceding period, as it had in Portugal). There was a more widespread 
reduction in 2011, especially in Greece where it was cut back by over 20%., 
taking the overall reduction over the period 2008-2011 to 28%. There was also 
a substantial reduction over this period in Latvia, Slovakia, Ireland and Estonia.
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General Government expenditure on education in real terms,  
2004-2011 
EU27
EU15 
EU15 excl. DE
EU12
Belgium
Bulgaria
Czech Republic
Denmark
Germany
Estonia
Ireland
Greece
Spain
France
Croatia
Italy
Cyprus
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Hungary
Malta
Netherlands
Austria
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovenia
Slovakia
Finland
Sweden
UK
2.2
1.9
2.1
5.2
2.7
6.5
4.8
-0.8
1.3
7.0
7.7
4.3
4.2
0.7
na
0.0
5.4
9.0
7.2
2.5
-0.2
1.7
2.3
3.4
5.5
-0.8
12.2
3.6
4.5
1.6
1.7
4.0
2.0
2.1
1.8
0.4
1.5
-6.5
2.7
5.5
3.2
-5.5
-2.3
-5.3
1.4
3.4
na
-1.3
4.4
-13.3
-4.6
5.0
0.6
5.0
2.5
2.1
1.9
5.9
-16.9
0.7
12.9
2.6
1.0
2.2
-1.1
-1.3
-2.0
1.6
3.1
-2.7
3.6
-2.7
1.9
2.6
-4.2
-5.4
-2.3
0.7
na
-4.5
-2.7
-0.8
0.9
0.9
-5.7
1.9
0.1
0.4
2.6
-11.5
26.2
1.2
-6.7
0.3
1.9
-4.7
2.8
2.9
1.6
2.3
6.2
-14.9
9.4
8.4
8.5
-8.4
-8.7
-15.2
0.4
7.7
na
-7.0
6.0
-25.5
-8.1
11.1
-4.7
12.3
5.0
4.7
6.5
-0.7
-12.8
2.6
18.9
5.6
4.0
-0.5
2004-2008 2008-2010 2010-2011 2008-2011
Note: General government expenditure in current price terms deflated by the GDP deflator
Source: Eurostat, Government finances and national accounts 
 
Annual average % change  % change
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Government expenditure on education, widely considered to be important for 
future economic growth, has followed a similar pattern to spending on healthcare. 
Growth was maintained in most countries over the two year 2008-2010 but it 
came to halt or expenditure was cut back in the following year. Real expenditure, 
therefore, was lower in 2011 than in 2008 before the crisis in 10 Member States, 
most especially again in Latvia, Greece, Ireland and Estonia (though not Slovakia) 
and also in Romania.
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General Government expenditure on tertiary education in real terms, 
2004-2011
EU27
EU15 
EU15 excl. DE
EU12
Belgium
Bulgaria
Czech Republic
Denmark
Germany
Estonia
Ireland
Greece
Spain
France
Croatia
Italy
Cyprus
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Hungary
Malta
Netherlands
Austria
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovenia
Slovakia
Finland
Sweden
UK
3.4
2.9
2.9
8.2
na
5.3
4.1
-1.5
2.9
11.9
7.4
11.4
2.9
1.5
na
1.0
9.2
na
8.4
16.9
-0.4
-0.6
4.1
6.0
8.4
-3.9
na
1.2
na
0.5
-1.4
6.5
3.3
3.9
3.5
-1.5
na
-0.3
2.4
5.5
4.9
-6.1
-9.6
-7.6
1.9
16.3
na
-2.3
11.4
-13.9
-3.7
19.4
-2.4
12.8
1.2
-2.1
-0.7
4.6
-20.2
1.6
na
4.6
2.7
1.1
-9.9
-11.1
-15.9
1.0
na
-0.9
-14.7
3.6
2.5
8.7
-2.4
-2.9
na
2.6
na
-6.4
-21.7
11.7
-12.9
10.8
12.9
13.4
3.2
0.4
8.2
-16.7
-4.4
4.7
na
-0.8
4.0
-16.6
-3.9
-4.1
-9.9
-2.0
Na
-1.5
-10.5
15.4
12.9
-4.2
-20.2
-17.2
na
38.9
na
-10.7
-2.7
-17.1
-19.3
57.8
7.6
44.3
5.6
-3.8
6.8
-8.8
-39.1
8.0
na
8.7
9.7
-14.7
2004-2008 2008-2010 2010-2011 2008-2011
Note: General government expenditure in current price terms deflated by the GDP deflator
Source: Eurostat, Government finances and national accounts
Annual average % change  % change
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The relative number of people with tertiary education is commonly regarded 
as an important indicator of the growth potential of economies. Government 
expenditure on tertiary education, however, has been cut back during the 
crisis period in the majority of Member States and in many cases more so than 
expenditure on education overall. This is especially so in the countries which 
have been hit hardest by the recession – in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and 
the three Baltic States.
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Social expenditure on benefits in kind for children and families,  
2004-2012
EU27
EU15 
EU15 excl. DE
EU12
Belgium
Bulgaria
Czech Republic
Denmark
Germany
Estonia
Ireland
Greece
Spain
France
Croatia
Italy
Cyprus
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Hungary
Malta
Netherlands
Austria
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovenia
Slovakia
Finland
Sweden
UK
6.4
6.4
7.5
4.3
3.9
na
0.4
3.1
3.6
14.4
8.4
3.5
5.6
17.3
na
4.4
15.4
5.5
4.2
10.7
0.8
10.6
-1.6
4.7
na
1.4
4.4
1.3
6.8
5.3
5.5
9.3
5.7
5.9
5.0
-0.2
5.9
46.3
-9.6
2.1
8.2
-6.5
12.9
1.7
5.3
4.5
Na
2.1
-2.1
-6.2
-1.0
-4.5
3.4
5.5
3.3
15.6
Na
-6.5
-14.3
0.3
-1.4
3.2
2.3
11.5
-0.6
-0.6
-1.6
-1.2
1.2
-0.8
-0.5
-3.6
2.0
-6.2
4.2
-10.0
-1.1
1.0
na
0.0
-14.2
-0.2
-1.7
-1.7
-0.6
22.8
-2.6
-0.1
na
-1.0
-3.6
0.1
4.6
0.9
1.7
-8.7
10.5
10.8
6.8
-2.6
15.0
110.3
-19.1
-3.2
21.8
-23.1
38.4
-16.2
8.4
11.3
na
4.3
-29.5
-12.3
-5.3
-11.8
5.5
67.7
1.3
33.3
na
-14.3
-31.7
0.8
6.2
8.5
8.2
3.5
2004-2008 2008-2010 2010-2012 2008-2012
Note: General government expenditure in current price terms deflated by the GDP deflator
Source: Eurostat, ESSPROS and national account
Annual average % change  % change
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The provision of childcare by Governments is widely considered to be essential 
to make it possible for women with young children to pursue a working career 
and, accordingly, to be an important element in any policy for reducing child 
poverty as well as to ensure equality of opportunity between men and women. 
Although there are no EU-wide data on Government expenditure on childcare 
as such, the ESSPROS data give an indication of spending. These show that 
in years before the onset of the crisis, there was an expansion of expenditure in 
real terms in nearly all Member States. There was also a widespread expansion 
over the two years 2008-2010 when GDP declined virtually throughout the EU. 
In the subsequent two years, however, expenditure was reduced in real terms 
in most countries. In 2012, real expenditure was lower than in 2008 before the 
crisis hit in 10 Member States, including all three Baltic States, Greece, Portugal 
and Cyprus.
We now turn to the issue of migration.
Proportion of population aged 15-64 born outside the country,  
2004-2012 (% residents aged 15-64) 
EU15
BE
DK
IE
EL
ES
FR
IT
CY
LU
NL
AT
PT
FI
SE
UK
2.3
6.0
1.5
6.0
0.6
1.7
3.4
1.0
4.0
33.9
2.2
2.7
1.5
0.9
3.7
2.4
0.3
0.2
0.3
2.0
0.4
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.3
0.5
0.2
1.6
0.0
0.4
0.7
0.4
0.4
0.1
0.0
0.3
0.5
1.0
0.1
0.6
1.2
0.2
0.1
0.8
0.1
0.0
0.2
0.0
7.0
6.4
5.6
3.1
6.2
7.0
8.0
5.2
10.2
6.2
10.4
8.4
5.3
1.4
8.6
7.7
2.3
5.6
2.1
7.4
0.6
2.1
3.1
1.0
5.4
34.6
2.2
2.8
1.5
1.2
3.6
2.3
0.7
0.5
0.5
6.2
0.5
0.2
0.2
0.3
0.7
1.3
0.3
2.3
0.0
0.3
1.0
1.7
0.8
0.3
0.1
0.6
0.8
2.2
0.1
1.4
2.6
0.4
0.1
0.8
0.2
0.0
0.2
0.2
8.9
7.5
7.8
5.0
7.1
12.2
8.7
6.4
12.0
5.7
10.2
11.5
6.8
2.0
10.0
9.8
2.4
5.3
2.4
7.5
0.5
2.4
2.8
1.0
6.1
36.9
2.0
3.3
1.8
1.2
3.3
2.5
0.9
0.8
0.9
5.8
0.3
0.2
0.2
0.4
0.8
1.6
0.6
2.3
0.0
0.6
1.3
2.3
1.1
0.7
0.4
0.5
0.9
2.4
0.2
2.6
6.3
0.7
0.1
1.1
0.3
0.1
0.4
0.4
9.8
9.9
8.2
6.1
7.6
12.0
9.6
8.5
12.9
9.0
10.1
11.4
6.8
2.7
13.2
10.7
EU15 EU10 EU2 NON
EU27
EU15 EU10 EU2 NON
EU27
EU15 EU10 EU2 NON
EU27
2004 2008 2012
Note: EU15 excludes Germany for which there are no data. The figures in the EU15 column relate to 
those born in another EU15 country; those in the EU10 column to those born in one of the countries 
which entered the EU in 2004; those in the EU2 column to those born in Bulgaria or Romania and 
those in the non-EU27 column to those born outside the EU. Figures under 2004 relate to 2005 for 
Ireland and Italy.
Source: Eurostat, EU LFS
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Migration within the EU has risen markedly over the past decade, most especially 
since 2004 when the Central and Eastern European countries entered the EU. 
The flow of people of working age, particularly young people aged under 35, 
from these counties to the EU15 has slowed down since the crisis hit but it 
remains significant into some countries, especially from Romania into Italy and 
Cyprus. The number of people of working age born in the EU10 and living in the 
UK, therefore, increased 4-fold in the 4 years 2004-02008 and those living in 
Ireland rose by three times in the three years 2005-2008. Similarly, those born 
in Bulgaria and Romania living in Spain more than doubled in the 4 years 2004-
2008 as they did in Italy between 2005 and 2008. Over the four years of the 
crisis 2008-2012, there was some net outward migration of those born in the 
EU10 from Ireland, but the number living in the UK continued to increase if at 
a slower rate. There was also a slow-down in net migration of Bulgarian and 
Romanian in to Spain, but not into Italy or Cyprus, where the number increased 
substantially over these four years. Inward migration into the EU15 from outside 
over the period 2004-2012 was equally significant for a number of countries, 
most especially for Spain (from North Africa) and Sweden. Inward migration into 
the EU13 countries, apart from Cyprus, remains small.
Romanians and Bulgarians aged 20-34 living in other EU countries as 
% total in age group, 2012
Total   13.3
Men   11.7
Women  14.9
Basic schooling  19.4
Upper secondary  11.7
Tertiary    10.6
The outflow of Romanians and Bulgarians to other EU countries has been 
substantial in recent years, especially of women and particularly of those with 
low education. In 2012, 13% of those aged 20-34 from these two countries 
lived in another EU country, 15% of women and 19% of those with no education 
beyond basic schooling.
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Employment rates (15-64) by country of birth, 2007-2012
Same
EU10
Non-EU
Same
EU2
Non-EU
Same
EU2
Non-EU
Same
EU2
Non-EU
Same
EU2
Non-EU
Same
EU10
Non-EU
Same
EU10
Non-EU
Same
EU10
Non-EU
68.1
86.4
64.7
60.9
73.9
67.5
64.4
75.0
70.4
58.0
72.8
66.2
70.8
76.3
75.2
72.7
67.4
63.0
76.2
69.6
58.9
71.9
78.9
62.7
59.7
65.3
53.9
59.0
73.1
63.8
59.2
57.6
53.7
56.3
68.2
60.8
68.0
79.7
70.6
72.9
67.8
64.0
74.4
68.0
56.7
69.8
81.8
63.1
58.8
66.3
54.3
55.2
69.5
57.8
58.1
50.9
55.2
56.3
66.0
60.8
66.6
78.4
69.7
73.3
70.1
64.4
76.0
69.5
58.2
69.9
81.3
62.4
58.9
66.9
53.4
51.4
60.1
49.0
56.2
50.3
49.9
56.3
65.4
59.2
63.2
73.0
69.3
73.8
71.2
63.6
76.2
71.5
58.6
70.7
76.4
63.1
-8.3
-21.1
-10.8
-1.9
-0.8
-3.7
-5.2
-17.5
-16.7
-1.8
-4.6
-5.4
-2.7
3.4
-4.5
0.2
0.4
1.0
-1.8
-1.6
-2.2
-2.1
3.0
0.4
-0.9
1.1
0.5
-3.8
-3.6
-6.0
-1.1
-6.7
1.6
0.1
-2.2
0.0
-1.4
-1.3
-0.9
0.4
2.3
0.4
1.5
1.5
1.6
0.1
-0.5
-0.7
0.0
0.5
-1.0
-3.8
-9.4
-8.8
-1.9
-0.6
-5.3
0.0
-0.6
-1.6
-3.4
-5.4
-0.4
0.5
1.1
-0.8
0.2
2.0
0.4
0.8
-5.0
0.7
-9.2
-19.5
-11.3
-9.5
-13.8
-18.5
-8.2
-24.8
-20.5
-1.7
-7.4
-7.0
-7.6
-3.2
-5.9
1.1
3.8
0.6
0.0
2.0
-0.2
-1.2
-2.5
0.4
2007 2010 2011 2012
Source: Eurostat, European Labour Force Survey. There are no country of birth data for Germany in 
this database, and for a number of other countries the data cannot be considered sufficiently robust 
for the calculations presented in this table.
% population 15-64  % - point change
2007-10 2010-11 2011-12 2007-12
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Before the onset of the recession, men and women living in the EU15 from 
the EU12 countries which entered the EU in 2004 and 2007 tended to have 
higher employment rates than those born in the country concerned, the only 
two exceptions, among the countries under review here, being Austria and 
Sweden (see note at the table which explains the limited number of countries 
under review). The same was the case in the southern Member States for those 
from outside the EU, but not in the other EU15 countries. Over the crisis period, 
however, there has been some tendency for the employment of those born 
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outside the country to decline by more, or to increase by less, than for those 
born in the country. This is particularly so in Ireland, where the employment rate 
of those from the EU10 declined by much more than for those born in Ireland 
between 2007 and 2012, and in Spain, where the rate of those from Bulgaria and 
Romania fell by considerably more than that of those born in Spain.
Coefficient of variation of GDP per head, in PPS terms, in EU15 
Eurozone countries, 2001-2012
In the years preceding the global recession which hit the EU in 2008, there was 
a gradual divergence in GDP per head between the EU15 countries which are 
members of the Eurozone (the 11 Member States which were the initial members 
at the time of the formation of the single currency area, excluding Luxembourg70, 
together with Greece which entered shortly after).  While most of the member 
countries enjoyed reasonable rates of fairly continuous economic growth over 
the period from the formation of the single currency area up to the onset of 
recession, this was not the case for Italy, in particular, whose GDP per head 
in PPS terms declined from 2% above the EU average in 2001 to 7% below 
in 2007.  In 2008 and 2009, as the Eurozone countries went into recession, 
70 Luxembourg is excluded because its GDP per head is considerably higher than that of any other Member State. 
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the disparities in GDP per head between them narrowed significantly as those 
countries with the highest levels of GDP per head were affected most. From 
2009 to 2012, however, as the countries with the highest levels of GDP per head 
recovered more quickly and recession continued in those with the lowest levels, 
disparities between the countries widened again, and more markedly than before 
the crisis. 
While future developments in this respect are uncertain, the tendency towards 
divergence in GDP per head which was evident before the crisis, instead of the 
convergence which was hoped for, could turn out to be the norm in an economic 
area where there is a lack of an adjustment mechanism for correcting imbalances 
in growth performance.
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APPENDIX II: Europe's trade 
perfomance
By Terry Ward (Applica)
In this appendix we examine first the share of services in total exports in 
order to demonstrate that unlike in the economy, as regards value-added and 
employment, there is only a gradual tendency for the share to increase over time 
and by far the larger part of export earnings continue to come from the export of 
goods. Secondly, it examines trends in international competiveness as revealed 
in the share of world trade in goods and services and shows that there is little 
sign of any significant deterioration in the competitiveness of the EU relative to 
other developed economies. Thirdly, it shows the continuing competitiveness of 
Germany in export markets relative to other EU countries, especially relative to 
the larger EU15 Member States, which underlies the divergence in economic 
performance which has been evident since the crisis hit. 
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Services as a share of total exports of goods and services, 2000-2012 
EEU28
EU15 
EU15 excl. DE
EU13
Belgium
Bulgaria
Czech Republic
Denmark
Germany
Estonia
Ireland
Greece
Spain
France
Croatia
Italy
Cyprus
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Hungary
Malta
Netherlands
Austria
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovenia
Slovakia
Finland
Sweden
UK
US
Japan
22.6
22.5
25.0
23.5
19.6
33.5
18.9
32.6
13.5
31.2
21.9
57.9
31.5
21.3
48.9
19.6
81.5
36.2
20.9
72.8
17.9
30.7
20.7
27.1
22.6
21.5
14.9
17.7
15.9
13.7
22.1
30.6
28.7
10.8
24.8
25.3
29.1
19.9
21.5
26.3
14.9
39.2
14.4
32.6
46.0
55.5
33.4
21.0
50.9
17.6
84.9
33.8
16.8
78.9
16.4
53.9
20.1
27.5
16.7
26.5
21.0
19.8
10.9
24.2
29.1
41.5
31.2
13.0
25.4
26.1
29.9
19.3
24.4
24.8
15.7
39.8
15.5
30.6
47.7
52.8
32.6
21.4
48.3
18.2
84.4
29.5
16.6
81.1
18.2
54.9
21.7
28.0
16.6
27.1
15.1
19.9
8.6
27.2
30.6
40.7
32.3
12.7
24.8
25.6
29.5
18.4
24.1
21.3
15.0
39.0
15.1
27.1
51.4
46.9
31.6
21.9
47.4
17.6
81.3
26.9
16.6
83.0
17.6
53.0
20.3
28.4
16.6
25.4
14.6
19.5
8.5
27.0
31.1
39.2
31.7
11.8
2.3
3.1
4.4
-5.1
4.6
-12.2
-4.0
6.3
1.6
-4.0
29.6
-11.0
0.1
0.6
-1.5
-1.9
-0.2
-9.3
-4.2
10.1
-0.4
22.2
-0.4
1.2
-6.0
3.8
-0.3
1.8
-7.4
13.3
9.0
8.6
3.0
1.1
0.1
0.3
0.3
-1.4
2.7
-5.0
0.0
-0.3
0.7
-5.4
5.4
-8.5
-1.8
0.9
-3.5
0.0
-3.5
-6.9
-0.2
4.1
1.2
-0.9
0.3
0.8
-0.2
-1.2
-6.4
-0.3
-2.4
2.7
2.0
-2.3
0.5
-1.1
2000 2008 2010 2012 2000-12 2008-12
Source: Eurostat, National accounts
Services as % exports of goods and services  % change
148 Friends of Europe | Life Quality
Although the share of services in total exports varies between countries, in most 
cases, it increased only slightly or fell in the 12 years 2000-2012 and it remains 
at around 25% for the EU as a whole and just over 30% for the US. The fall is 
particularly evident in the EU13 countries. While the increase for the US over the 
period exceeded that for the EU, the difference is small. Over the 4 years of crisis 
2008-2012, there was at most a small increase in the share of services and in 
most countries, the share declined.
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Exports as a share of GDP, 2000-2012 
EU28
EU15
EU15 ex DE
EU13
Germany
France
UK
Italy
Spain
Netherlands
Sweden
Poland
Belgium
Austria
Denmark
Greece
Finland
Portugal
Ireland
Czech Republic
Romania
Hungary
Slovakia
Croatia
Luxembourg
Bulgaria
Slovenia
Lithuania
Latvia
Cyprus
Estonia
Malta
United States
Japan
35.8
35.3
35.9
44.9
33.4
28.8
27.4
26.7
29.0
70.1
46.5
27.1
78.1
46.2
46.5
24.9
43.6
28.9
97.5
60.9
32.9
74.6
70.5
41.7
150.0
50.5
53.7
44.5
41.9
56.1
84.6
88.8
10.7
10.9
41.2
40.2
38.0
52.5
48.1
27.0
29.4
28.4
26.4
76.3
53.6
39.9
84.4
59.2
54.8
24.1
46.8
32.4
83.4
64.4
30.5
81.7
83.5
42.0
181.7
58.2
67.9
59.6
43.1
45.8
71.0
91.9
12.6
17.7
40.9
39.6
37.4
54.9
47.7
25.6
30.2
26.5
27.3
78.6
49.4
42.2
79.8
54.4
50.4
22.2
40.4
31.3
99.9
66.6
35.5
85.1
80.3
39.7
170.8
57.4
66.8
67.7
53.6
41.9
79.3
91.7
12.4
15.2
44.8
43.3
40.9
62.3
51.8
27.4
31.6
30.2
32.6
88.0
48.5
46.6
86.1
57.2
54.8
27.0
40.5
38.7
107.8
78.0
40.0
94.6
96.6
43.4
177.3
66.6
76.0
84.0
61.6
43.1
90.6
102.5
13.6
14.7
9.0
8.0
5.0
17.4
18.4
-1.4
4.2
3.5
3.6
17.9
2.0
19.5
8.0
11.0
8.3
2.1
-3.1
9.8
10.3
17.1
7.1
20.0
26.1
1.7
27.3
16.1
22.3
39.5
19.7
-13.0
6.0
13.7
2.9
3.8
3.6
3.1
2.9
9.9
3.7
0.4
2.2
1.8
6.2
11.7
-5.1
6.7
1.7
-2.0
0.0
2.9
-6.3
6.3
24.4
13.6
9.5
12.9
13.1
1.4
-4.4
8.4
8.1
24.4
18.5
-2.7
19.6
10.6
1.0
-3.0
2000 2008 2010 2012 2000-12 2008-12
Note: EU countries ordered by GDP in EUR terms 
Source: Eurostat, National accounts 
Exports of goods and services as % GDP  %-point change
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There is a general tendency for exports of goods and services to be larger in 
relation to GDP, the smaller the country concerned, partly reflecting the greater 
possibility for large r countries to produce more of what they need. Increasing 
specialization associated with globalization and the closer integration of 
economies both tend to increase the share of exports in GDP. Consequently, 
the share would be expected to increase over time and to be larger in EU 
Member States than in countries which are not part of an economic union. These 
expectations are broadly confirmed by the data. There are a number of features 
of the data, however, which stand out. First, the share of exports in GDP in 
Germany is much larger than in the other large EU Member States. Secondly, 
it has increased since 2000 by much more than average. Thirdly, the share of 
exports in GDP in France has declined over this period, the only EU country apart 
from Finland in which this is the case. Fourthly, the share of exports in the other 
large EU15 countries has risen by much less than average.
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Shares of world exports goods of major economies, 2000-2011  
EU27
US
Japan
Canada
S. Korea
Singapore
China
Russia
Brazil
Mexico
India
Exports of 
machinery
EU27
US
Japan
Canada
S. Korea
Singapore
China
Russia
Brazil
Mexico
India
Exports of 
chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals
EU27
US
Japan
Canada
S. Korea
Singapore
China
Russia
Brazil
Mexico
India
17.5
17.4
10.7
6.2
3.8
3.1
5.6
2.3
1.2
3.7
0.9
8.1
9.2
7.4
2.5
2.2
2.1
1.8
0.1
0.3
2.2
0.1
2.4
1.8
0.8
0.3
0.3
0.2
0.3
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
16.8
11.2
6.7
3.9
3.6
2.9
12.4
4.0
1.7
2.5
1.6
7.3
4.8
4.2
1.0
2.0
1.5
5.8
0.1
0.4
1.3
0.2
2.5
1.5
0.6
0.3
0.4
0.3
0.7
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.2
16.1
11.4
6.9
3.4
4.2
3.1
14.1
3.5
1.8
2.7
2.0
6.8
4.0
4.1
0.9
2.4
1.6
7.0
0.1
0.3
1.5
0.3
2.8
1.7
0.7
0.3
0.4
0.4
0.8
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.2
15.4
10.5
5.8
3.2
na
2.9
13.4
3.7
na
2.5
2.1
6.4
3.5
3.4
0.8
na
1.3
6.4
0.1
na
1.3
0.3
2.5
1.5
0.6
0.3
na
0.4
0.8
0.2
na
0.1
0.2
-0.7
-6.2
-4.0
-2.3
-0.2
-0.2
6.8
1.7
0.5
-1.2
0.7
-0.8
-4.4
-3.2
-1.5
-0.2
-0.6
4.0
0.0
0.1
-0.9
0.1
0.1
-0.3
-0.2
0.0
0.1
0.1
0.4
0.1
0.0
0.0
0.1
-1.4
-0.7
-0.9
-0.7
0.6
0.0
1.0
-0.3
0.1
0.0
0.5
-0.9
-1.3
-0.8
-0.2
0.4
-0.2
0.6
0.0
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.1
0.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
-2.1
-6.9
-4.9
-3.0
0.4
-0.2
7.8
1.4
0.6
-1.2
1.2
-1.7
-5.7
-4.0
-1.7
0.2
-0.8
4.6
0.0
0.0
-0.9
0.2
0.1
-0.3
-0.2
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.5
0.1
0.0
0.0
0.1
2000 2008 2010 2011 2000-12 2008-11 2000-11
Note: EU countries ordered by GDP in EUR terms 
Source: Eurostat, National accounts 
% world exports Percentage point change
Total
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Shares of world exports of goods of major economies, 2000-2011 
(Cont.)
EU27
US
Japan
Canada
S. Korea
Singapore
China
Russia
Brazil
Mexico
India
4.6
3.7
2.0
1.3
1.0
0.4
2.9
0.5
0.3
0.8
0.6
4.0
2.2
1.3
0.7
0.8
0.3
5.2
0.5
0.3
0.4
0.6
3.7
2.3
1.4
0.6
1.0
0.3
5.6
0.4
0.3
0.4
0.8
3.5
2.0
1.2
0.5
na
0.3
5.5
0.4
na
0.4
0.8
-0.6
-1.5
-0.7
-0.6
-0.2
-0.1
2.3
0.0
0.0
-0.4
0.0
-0.5
-0.2
-0.1
-0.2
0.2
0.0
0.3
-0.1
0.0
0.0
0.2
-1.1
-1.7
-0.8
-0.8
0.0
-0.1
2.6
-0.1
0.0
-0.4
0.2
2000 2008 2010 2011
Source: International trade statistics Note: The changes for S. Korea and Brazil in the last two 
columns are for 2008-2011 and 2000-2011, respectively 
% world exports  Percentage point change
2000-08 2008-12 2000-12
Exports f basic manufacturers
While there are a number of potential measures of competitiveness, what matters 
ultimately is whether the share of world markets is being maintained sufficiently 
to pay for imports. Although the EU has lost some of its share of world exports 
of goods, overall it still has the largest share of all economies. Moreover, the 
reduction experienced since 2000 has been much less than that of the US or 
Japan, the former of which had much the same share in 2000.
The EU share of world exports of machinery and equipment, i.e. of medium-to-
high-tech manufactures which tends to be the most dynamic, has also declined 
over this 12-year period but is still the same as that of China and again the 
decline has been less than that of the US or Japan.
The EU share of world exports of chemicals and pharmaceuticals, on the other 
hand, has remained unchanged over the period, unlike those of the US and Japan 
which have fallen. The share, therefore, remains relatively large, much larger than 
that of other major economies. This is not the case for the EU share of exports 
basic manufactures which has fallen to below that of China. Nevertheless, it has 
again fallen by less than the US share.
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EU Member State shares of EU exports of goods to rest of world
Germany dominates EU exports of goods to the rest of the world, accounting 
for over 2.5 times more than that of any other country. Moreover, its share has 
increased over the past decade or more, whereas that of other large Member 
States has fallen as the share of EU12 countries has risen. The German share 
is particularly large as regards exports of machinery and equipment which is 
both the most dynamic manufacturing export sector and the one which tends 
to have the highest unit values. The share has risen significantly since 2000, 
while the shares of both France and the UK especially have fallen greatly. Even 
in the case of basic manufactures, the German share of extra-EU exports is 
both substantially larger than that of other large countries and has risen over this 
period. The only sector of manufactured exports in which the German share of 
extra-EU exports has fallen since 2000 is chemicals and pharmaceuticals, where 
the decline has been small (much smaller than that of other large Member States) 
and the share remains much larger than that of other countries.
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Shares of EU countries in extra-EU exports of goods, 2000-2012
Germany
France
Italy 
UK
Spain
Netherlands
Belgium
Other EU15
EU12
Exports of machinery
Germany
France
Italy 
UK
Spain
Netherlands
Belgium
Other EU15
EU12
Exports of 
chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals
Germany
France
Italy 
UK
Spain
Netherlands
Belgium
Other EU15
EU12
Exports of 
basicmanufactures
Germany
France
Italy 
UK
Spain
Netherlands
Belgium
Other EU15
EU12
24.8
14.7
11.8
14.8
4.0
5.6
5.6
15.5
3.4
30.8
16.6
9.7
14.6
2.9
4.7
3.0
15.0
2.7
25.2
14.0
7.8
13.9
3.2
6.0
8.6
18.6
2.6
20.3
11.3
18.9
14.0
4.8
4.3
8.6
13.8
4.1
27.3
11.5
11.5
10.8
4.4
6.9
5.6
14.4
7.6
35.0
11.4
10.6
9.6
3.2
5.8
2.8
13.6
7.6
24.7
13.3
6.7
10.9
4.3
6.2
11.7
16.9
5.4
24.2
9.9
17.3
10.6
4.6
4.1
6.6
14.6
7.8
27.8
11.4
10.6
10.9
4.4
7.3
6.1
14.1
7.5
37.3
11.5
9.8
10.0
3.1
6.1
2.7
11.5
7.9
24.0
11.9
6.4
11.5
4.3
6.2
12.5
18.1
4.8
25.0
9.9
15.7
10.1
4.8
4.2
7.6
14.9
7.9
27.8
10.8
10.7
10.9
4.9
7.3
6.2
13.3
8.2
37.9
10.9
9.4
10.7
3.4
5.7
3.1
10.4
8.7
24.8
11.8
6.3
10.3
4.4
7.4
12.4
17.3
5.2
24.4
9.7
15.7
10.5
5.4
4.4
7.3
14.0
8.4
2.5
-3.2
-0.3
-4.0
0.4
1.3
0.0
-1.1
4.2
 
4.2
-5.2
0.9
-5.0
0.3
1.1
-0.2
-1.4
4.9
 
-0.5
-0.7
-1.1
-3.0
1.1
0.2
3.1
-1.7
2.8
 
3.9
-1.4
-1.6
-3.4
-0.2
-0.2
-2.0
0.8
3.7
0.5
-0.7
-0.8
0.1
0.5
0.4
0.6
-1.1
0.6
2.9
-0.5
-1.2
1.1
0.2
-0.1
0.3
-3.2
1.1
0.1
-1.5
-0.4
-0.6
0.1
1.2
0.7
0.4
-0.2
0.2
-0.2
-1.6
-0.1
0.8
0.3
0.7
-0.6
0. 
3.0
-3.9
-1.1
-3.9
0.9
1.7
0.6
-2.2
4.8
 
7.1
-5.7
-0.3
-3.9
0.5
1.0
0.1
-4.6
6.0
 
-0.4
-2.2
-1.5
-3.6
1.2
1.4
3.8
-1.3
2.6
 
4.1
-1.6
-3.2
-3.5
0.6
0.1
-1.3
0.2
4.3
2000 2008 2010 2011 2000-08 2008-12 2000-12
Source: Eurostat, Balance of payments statistics  
%% EU exports to rest of world Percentage point change
Total
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EU share of international exports of services
It is more difficult to compile data on exports of services than of goods. Eurostat 
reports data on exports of services for EU Member States, other countries which 
are members of EFTA, the US and Japan, which in practice together account for 
a major part of total global trade in services. These show, first, that the EU share 
is around three times larger than the US share; secondly, that the share of both 
was much the same in 2011 than 7 years earlier in 2004; thirdly, that unlike in 
the case of goods, the German share of exports is not the largest of all Member 
States, but only the second largest behind the UK; fourthly, however, that as in 
the case of goods, the German share has increased since 2004, while the share 
of the UK (and that of the Italy and Spain) has fallen; fifthly, that the share of 
France in exports of services has risen instead of falling as for goods; and sixthly, 
as in the case of goods, the share of Japan in exports of services has fallen over 
recent years.
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Shares of exports of services, 2004-2011  
EU27
Germany
France
Italy
UK
Spain
Netherlands
Belgium
Ireland
Sweden
Luxembourg
Austria
Denmark
Greece
Portugal
Finland
Poland
Hungary
Czech Rep.
Cyprus
Bulgaria
Estonia
Lithuania
Romania
Slovenia
Slovakia
Latvia
Malta
US
Japan
Switzerland
Other 
Europe
67.3
9.0
7.1
5.2
12.1
5.3
5.2
3.2
3.2
2.4
2.1
2.3
2.2
2.0
0.9
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.1
0.1
21.0
6.0
2.6
5.7
68.2
9.7
6.2
4.4
10.8
5.4
4.8
3.5
3.8
2.6
2.6
2.4
2.7
1.9
1.0
1.2
1.3
0.8
0.8
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.2
0.5
0.3
0.3
0.2
0.2
20.2
5.6
2.9
6.0
66.6
9.7
7.7
3.8
10.5
4.9
4.6
3.6
3.9
2.4
2.5
2.1
2.4
1.5
0.9
1.1
1.3
0.8
0.8
0.3
0.3
0.2
0.2
0.3
0.2
0.2
0.1
0.2
21.7
5.5
3.3
6.2
67.4
9.6
8.3
3.8
10.4
5.0
4.9
3.4
4.0
2.5
2.5
2.1
2.3
1.4
0.9
1.0
1.3
0.8
0.8
0.3
0.3
0.2
0.2
0.4
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
21.3
5.1
3.3
6.2
0.9
0.6
-0.8
-0.8
-1.4
0.1
-0.5
0.2
0.5
0.2
0.5
0.1
0.5
-0.2
0.1
0.3
0.5
0.1
0.2
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.3
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
-0.8
-0.4
0.3
0.4
-0.8
0.0
2.0
-0.6
-0.4
-0.4
0.1
0.0
0.2
-0.1
-0.1
-0.3
-0.4
-0.5
-0.1
-0.2
0.0
0.0
0.0
-0.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
-0.1
0.0
-0.1
0.0
0.0
1.1
-0.5
0.4
0.2
0.1
0.6
1.2
-1.4
-1.7
-0.3
-0.4
0.2
0.7
0.1
0.4
-0.2
0.1
-0.6
0.0
0.1
0.5
0.1
0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.1
0.3
-0.9
0.8
0.5
2004 2008 2010 2011 2004-08 2008-11 2004_11
Source: Eurostat, Balance of payments statistics
% total exports of services of countries listed  %Percentage point change
Total
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List of Abbreviations
AGS   Annual Growth Survey
BEPG   Broad Economic Policy Guidelines
CSF   Common strategic framework
CSR   Corporate Social Responsibility
CJEU   Court of Justice of the European Union
DG   Directorate General
EAPN   European Anti-Poverty Network
EC   European Community
ECB   European Central Bank
ECJ   European Court of Justice
ECOFIN  Economic and Financial Affairs Council
EDP   Excessive Deficit Procedure
EEC   European Economic Community
EES   European Employment Strategy
EESC   European Economic and Social Committee
EMCO   EU Employment Committee
EMU   European Monetary Union
EPAP   European platform against poverty
EPM   Employment Performance Monitor (EPM)
EPSCO  Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs  
   Council
ERDF   European Regional Development Fund
ESF   European Social Fund
ESI   European Structural and Investment Funds
ESSPROS European System of Social Protection Statistics
ESU   European Social Union
ETUC   European Trade Union Confederation
EU   European Union
GDP   Gross Domestic Product
ILO   International Labour Organisation
IMF   International Monetary Fund
MIP   Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure
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MMF   Multiannual Financial Framework
NEET   Not (engaged) in Education, Employment or Training
NGO   Non-governmental organization
NRP   National Reform Programme
NSR   National Strategic Report
OECD   Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OMC   Open Method of Coordination
PISA   Programme for International Student Assessment
QMV   Qualified Majority Voting
RQMV   Reverse Qualified Majority Voting
SGP   Stability and Growth Pact
SILC   Statistics on Income and Living Conditions
SIP   Social Investment Package
SPC   Social Protection Committee
SPPM   Social Protection Performance Monitor
SPSI   Social Protection and Social Inclusion
TFEU   Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
UK   United Kingdom
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